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Abstract 
Numerous empirical studies have been devoted to analyses of diverse inflation 
processes and have demonstrated consistent patterns for money price relationships for 
various market economies. While these propositions may be valid for market economies, 
they do not seem to be holding for the majority of transition economies. Except for Russia 
and Poland, no systematic pattern for the money price relationship was detected in 
transition economies in the first half of the 1990s, thus undermining the conventional 
monetarist view at least in the transitional context. If indeed this were the case, it would 
imply among other things, that traditional tools used for stabilization and control of 
inflation in advanced market economies may not be appropriate for transition economies. 
The main objective of this dissertation is to scrutinize critically and rigorously 
inflation process in post-communist Russia, and the strength, dynamics, and causality of the 
relationship between inflation and various monetary aggregates. In particular, we test, 
whether lagged inflation has been an important determinant of contemporaneous rise in 
prices in this transition economy. In addition, we test whether there is a significant 
relationship between inflation and various monetary aggregates, and whether the lower 
inflationary environment that emerged in Russia in 1994, and especially in 1995, has 
caused the transmission of monetary impulses to future inflation to become both, slower 
and weaker. Furthermore, in a twofold aim, we shed some additional light on the issue of 
the choice of lag selection criteria in causality testing on one hand, and the issue of 
suitability of monetary aggregates for influencing and controlling inflation via policy 
instrument, in transition economies like the Russian Federation, on the other. Moreover, 
since each segment of our analysis contributes to the evaluation of the suitability of 
stabilization attempts in Russia, the role of international financial institution under whose 
influence stabilization was conducted, is inevitably brought under the spotlights. In this 
context, the dual role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), of being the main 
coordinator of the Western assistance to Russia on one hand, and the main guide to Russian 
economic policy on the other, merits a special attention. Finally, suggestion for further 
research and conclusion from the analysis are outlined. The most important findings 
contained in this summary are delineated bellow. 
Our analyses of macroeconomic instability in Postcommunist Russia emphasises the 
necessity of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. Although Russia may not be an 
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economy with a fiscal dominant regime, the study demonstrates that continuing problems 
with balancing of goverm-nent budget have led to eventual monetisation of the deficit. The 
analyses presented in the dissertation reiterate the notion that monetisation of the deficit, 
rather than the deficit themselves has been affecting the price level in Postcommunist 
Russia. 
In contrast to earlier claims, this study produces ample evidence that lagged 
inflation has been an important determinant of contemporaneous rise in prices in 
Postcommunist Russia. Using very simple autoregressive models, economic agents were 
able to make consistent, unbiased, and efficient one-month ahead forecasts of inflation. 
Although not rational in the strong form of efficiency, inflationary expectations together 
with a prevailing inflationary inertia ought to have been taken into consideration in 
stabilisation efforts. The preference for the orthodox money-based stabilisation programs 
indicates that this was not the case in this transition economy prior to July 1995. 
The analysis presented in this dissertation illustrates that the influence of changes in 
broad money growth on future inflation is considerably weaker and more protracted as the 
new economic environment in Russia has become more stable. Our evidence suggests that, 
the systematic pattern for money price relationship is fading in the new environment. Also, 
the average speed of transmission from changes in the growth of ruble broad money to 
inflation has shifted from just over three months in the first two and a half years of 
transition to just short of five months thereafter. In addition, the models of inflation 
presented in the dissertation give a reasonably good short hand description of the 
fundamental inflation process in Russia. 
The results presented in this chapter also unequivocally point out that the choice of 
a lag length in distribute lag models can be critical for the outcome of causality testing. 
Among variety of ad hoc and statistical criteria for the optimum lag length selection, the 
Akaike's FPE criterion is found to outperform all others. Leaning on these results, the 
study found the existence of the feedback or bilateral causality between inflation and broad 
money in Postcommunist Russia. The findings question the wisdom of choosing money- 
based stabilization as the optimal policy advice for this transition economy. 
Finally, this chapter argues that the IMF financial and good technical assistance to 
Russia in the 1990s has been less than generous. Not only the size of the assistance might 
have not been adequate but also the timing and actual disbursements of these funds were in 
sharp discord with pledges. More importantly, the IMF made a number of serious policy 
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mistakes in both design and the implementation of the reforms, which significantly 
contributed to a delay in stabilisation of the economy and were thus costly in terrns of the 
loss of welfare to the society. However, the IMF, as a main guide and a coordinator of the 
Western assistance to Russia, has done just enough to spoon-fed Russia to the point of no 
return to planned economy and autarky. 
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Introduction 
This thesis investigates the relationship between money supply and inflation in the 
Russian Federation during transition period. Various aspects of the strength, dynamics, and 
causality of this relationship are brought together in the dissertation as well as other issues 
related to the stabilisation of inflation in this transition economy. Although there are 
number of theoretical issues dealt with, the thesis is dominated by the empirical testing. 
Each of these empirical tests is subjected to a rigorous diagnostic analysis. By the same 
token, each empirical testing and diagnostic analyses are preceded with a presentation of an 
appropriate methodology and an overview of the literature. This is particularly relevant for 
chapters two, tree, and four. 
The scope of the study is limited to the case of Russia with occasional comparison 
with other European transition economies. The dissertation focuses generally on the 
stabilisation efforts in this transition economy until August 1998 and is set out in the 
following manner: 
Chapter One analysis the roots of persistent inflation in Postcommunist Russia 
from both, monetary and fiscal perspectives. The chapter demonstrates that continuing 
problems with balancing of government budget have led to eventual monetisation of the 
deficit. Both, the theoretical framework presented in the chapter and the simple empirical 
analyses, demonstrate the necessity for fiscal correction. Thus, there may indeed not be a 
simple monetary cure for inflation. It follows that in order for stabilisation program to 
succeed, fiscal and monetary policy ought to be interrelated and coordinated. 
Chapter Two analyses formation and rationality of inflationary expectations in 
Postcommunist Russia, a transition economy where various stabilization policies have 
initially ignored inflation persistence. In the absence of a sample survey of inflationary 
expectation and appropriate long run series of financial market indicators, the choice of 
model building technique is restricted to one that relies on the inflation history. A review of 
the literature on the topic of inflation expectations and rationality is followed by the data 
and methodology analysis, as well as the criteria for model selection. Empirical findings of 
the two competing models are presented and both models are rigorously scrutinised for 
their forecast abilities and rationality of expectations. The chapter clearly demonstrates that 
lagged inflation in Russian economy was a very important determinant of the 
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contemporaneous rate of inflation and this ought to have been considered in designs of 
various stabilisation policies in the first half of the 1990s. 
Chapter Three analysis the strength and dynamics of the relationship between 
inflation and various monetary aggregates in Postcommunist Russia. The chapter begins 
with the outline of the previous literature on the topic and the Russian monetary policy for 
the given period. Subsequently, the data and methodology, as well as the criteria for model 
selection, are delineated. This is followed by the empirical investigation of the significance 
of the relationship between money and inflation. Furthermore, we question whether the 
lower inflationary environment that emerged in Russia in 1994, and especially in 1995, has 
caused the transmission of monetary impulses to future inflation to become both, slower 
and weaker. To that end, we split the sample into two periods and conduct a number of 
empirical and diagnostic tests. The chapter concludes with the finding that broad money 
growth appears to have the strongest correspondence to contemporary inflation in post- 
communist Russia. However, this relationship proved to be unstable, and sensitive to 
changes taking place in the new economic and institutional environment. Furthermore, the 
average speed of transmission from changes in the growth of ruble broad money to inflation 
has increased. 
Chapter Four builds upon analysis presented in Chapter Three and in a twofold 
objective it aims to shed some additional light on the issue of the choice of lag selection 
criteria in causality testing on one hand, and the issue of suitability of monetary aggregates 
for influencing and controlling inflation via policy instrument, in transition economies like 
the Russian Federation, on the other. The results presented in this chapter unequivocally 
point out that the choice of a lag length in distribute lag models can be critical for the 
outcome of causality testing. Among variety of ad hoc and statistical criteria for the 
optimum lag length selection, the Akaike's FPE criterion is found to outperform all others. 
Leaning on these results, the study found the existence of the feedback or bilateral causality 
between inflation and broad money in Postcommunist Russia. The findings question the 
wisdom of choosing money-based stabilization as the optimal policy advice for this 
transition economy. 
Chapter Five examines the role of international financial institutions, particularly 
that of International Monetary Fund (IMF), in Russia's stabilisation efforts. It is argued, 
that the IMF's financial and good technical assistance to Russia in the 1990s has been less 
than generous. As a represent of the West, the IMF has consistently underestimated the size 
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of the assistance needed for the successful stabilisation in Russia. In addition, the analysis 
demonstrates that on account of conditionality, the IMF disbursed by a long way fewer 
resources than pledges, not to mention lack of desire for debt forgiveness. Furthermore, it is 
noted that all of the Russian stabilisation programmes had an IMF approval and all of them 
failed. Moreover, the study scrutinizes the IMF's specific policies implemented in Russia. 
It concludes that the IMF has arguably made a significant number of specific policy 
mistakes that have inevitably aggravated long suffering Russian economy exacerbated by 
the pains of transition. Admittedly, transition process was a unique process and errors were 
inevitable. Nevertheless, given the reputation and enviable resources of the IMF, one 
cannot help thinking that they could have done much better and that at least part of the 
Russian socio-economic pains during transition were not inevitable. 
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CHAPTER1 
Emergence of Open Inflation and Stabilisation Efforts in Postcommunist 
Russia 
1.1 Introduction 
The beginning of the last decade of 20th century signified the ultimate realisation that 
the task of mending the system of central planning was even beyond the resourceful and 
mighty Soviet Union. Substantial overhauls in 1957,1965, and 1975 as well as piecemeal 
reforms attempted between 1985 and 1989 failed to adequately address the chronic 
inefficiencies of the system. In the environment of rapid deterioration of the economy 
accelerated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of overall authority, 
the newly installed Russian goverm-nent embarked on the path of radical economic reforms 
at the end of 1991. Subsequently, Russian greatest leap into market reforms in the eventful 
20th century was launched on 2 January 1992. The cornerstones of this endeavour 
resembled the Polish reforms' launched two years earlier and included a general decontrol 
of prices and trade, subsequent stabilisation of the domestic currency and privatisation. 2 
Perhaps the least successful part of the Russian reformers endeavour was the failure 
to regain macroeconomic stability of the economy. High and volatile rate of inflation 
characterised Russian economy throughout nineties. Rise in prices is most often analysed in 
the framework of the classical Quantity Equation. However, in the theoretical analysis of 
detern-finants of inflation, an appealing new strand of research that emphasise the role of 
fiscal policy has emerged. Advocates of this strand of research (Cochrane, 1998; Canzoneri 
et aL , 1998; Sims, 1994; and Woodford, 1994) 
hold view that there can be two regimes for 
price determination; the so called 'monetary dominant regime' and the 'fiscal policy 
regime'. In the former the price level is determined by the Quantity Equation. Thus, in this 
regime monetary policy de facto determines the price level while fiscal policy is said to 
gremain reactive' (Komulainen and Pirtila, 2000). In the latter regime, the price level is 
' For differences between these two programs see Dabrowski (1997) and Hanson (1999), among 
others. 
2 To be precise, the government did not produce an overall plan, or even consistent program but 
rather a policy package that relayed on the decrees, laws and mini programs. 
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deten-nined by the government intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, if the 
sequence of future surpluses falls short of financing the debt, the price level must adjust 
upwards, thus reducing the real value of the government debt. Hence, in this regime fiscal 
policy determines the price level and monetary policy 'remains reactive'. That is to say, in 
response to changes in the price level money supply adjusts to bring the money demand 
equation in balance. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the emergence of inflation in 
postcommunist Russia from the viewpoint of both monetary and fiscal dominant regimes as 
well as their interaction. The chapter stops short of empirical determination of dominant 
regime mainly for two reasons. The first is to be found in unavailability of reliable data for 
the budget deficit, which would be likely to produce unreliable results given short time 
series. The second reason is that the empirical findings (Komulainen and Pirtila, 2000), for 
postcommunist Russian economy have already rejected the notion of fiscal dominance as 
an explanation of inflation. This is not to say that fiscal deficit does not matter for inflation. 
On the contrary, as the literature on traditional macroeconomic would suggest, and indeed 
as Komulainen and Pirtila, (2000) found, inflationary method of financing the deficit rather 
than the deficit per se affects the price level. 
The next section (1.2) of this chapter discusses monetary roots of inflation in 
postcommunist Russia following liberalisation of prices. Section 1.3 briefly describes the 
new fiscal theory of price level, gives an overview of the literature and application of the 
theory on postcommunist Russia. Section 1.4 describes a theoretical framework for 
analyses of interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. Section 1.5 is devoted to 
analyses of Russian fiscal stance during transition and its repercussions on monetary policy 
in this period. Section 1.6 concludes with a summary of the analyses. 
1.2 Monetary Roots of Inflation in Postcommunist Russia 
1.2.1. Price Liberalisation and Emergence of Open Inflation in Postcommunist 
Russia 
As mentioned above, Russian greatest leap into market reforms in the eventful 20th 
century was launched on 2 January 1992 by liberalisation of prices. Although very tardy, 
the initial domestic and external liberalisation efforts were just about sufficient to 
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eventually succeed. However, these efforts were considerably more timid than was optimal 
with serious economic, intellectual, social, and political consequences (Aslund, 1995). One 
of most serious consequences of tardy and insufficient liberalisation was sustained high 
inflation. Although views about causes of inflation may be diverse, a rare consensus 
prevails among economists about detrimental effects of inflation on domestic economy. 3 
High inflation, in transition economies, distorts relative prices, discourages investment, 
inhibits growth (Fisher et al., 1996), generates uncertainty about key prices, encourages 
unproductive activities aimed only at hedging against inflation, contributes to a general 
climate of uncertainty and lack of trust in government policies, and hurt the most deprived 
group of society (Hernandez de Cata, 1995). The failure of successful Russian governments 
to tame inflation has been the focal points of the academic literature on systemic 
transformation. 4 Hence, since the analysis of macroeconomic stabilisation is crucial to an 
understanding of the Russian economic transition we follow the suit of its critical 
assessment. 
The announcement of sweeping liberalisation of previously controlled prices on 2d 
January 1992 is often regarded as the beginning of the shock therapy in Russia. The chief 
motivation for the liberalisation of prices was to eliminate an excess demand in economy. 
In other words, the purpose of the elimination of a sizable monetary overhang or forced 
saving was to cut back the excessive demand for the artificially low priced goods and 
consequent queues. Although the sizable monetary overhang prevailed in the Soviet 
economy since its own version of a currency reform introduced in 1961, the phenomenon 
became particularly acute in 1991. In the latter year monetary authorities succeeding in 
creating as much as 137.5 billion rubles, which exceeded an accumulated total of 133.8 
rubles printed between 1961 and 1990 (Ekonomika i Zhizn, 1992). The second purpose of 
the liberalisation of prices was to alter the pattern of production to suit consumer 
preferences rather than relying on 'state orders'. As it turned out, about 80 percent of 
producer prices and about 90 percent of consumer prices were free in value terms, at 1991 
relative prices (Aslund, 1995). However, in contrast to goverm-nent declarations, price 
controls remained on food and energy, which resulted in huge subsidies to these sectors 
contributing to a large extent to the continuing budget deficit. 
' See Dorrinbusch at al. (1990); Fisher (1993); Burdekin at al. (1995); Heyman and Leijonbufvud 
(1995) among others. 
4 See Aslund 1995 for references. 
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Contrary to the forecast of various institutions including Russian Goverment and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) prices in Russia jumped in January 1992 as much as 
245 percent. 5 The failure of these institution to envisage the size in the price jump upon 
liberalisation should be sought in the inappropriate use of sophisticated models of the 
demand for financial assets and reliance on the velocity of saving deposits rather than the 
velocity on cash, because the former proved to be much more variable than the latter (Gros 
and Steinherr, 1995). In any case, the elimination of monetary overhang should not 
constitute inflation per se since inflation is by definition continuous increase in the price 
level. Thus, one-of jump in prices should not amount to inflation in this case. As it 
happened, prices in Russia attained double digits in every month of 1992 and 1993, except 
August of 1992 (NikoliC', 2001). 
Figure 1.1 Lagged Money Growth (M2) and Inflation (I-z) in Russia: 1992: 02 - 
94: 09 
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Source: Nikoli6 2000a 
There is a considerable body of evidence that support widely accepted notion that the 
rise in prices in postcommunist Russia, in a few years immediately after liberalization, is a 
consequence of the rise in money supply. 6 More precisely, Fig. 1.1 indicates that the 
inflation rate in the given period, appears to follow variations in the growth of ruble 
broad money supply (M2) four months earlier. Similarly, Nikolic' (2000a) showed that the 
growth of M2 in the given period is a reasonably good proxy for the rise in prices (Table 
5 See Nikoli6,2002. 
6 See Nikoli6,2000a for references. 
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1.1 and Fig. 1.2). Thus inflation in Russia appears to be a monetary phenomenon in the 
early years of transition. 7 
Table 1.1 OLS Estimates of the Distributed Lag Model (DLM) of Inflation for Russia: 
1992: 02-94: 09 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
A. M2 0.025028 0.099480 0.251587 0.8056 
AM2(-, ) 0.328145 0.094653 3.466824 0.0047 
, 
6kAn(-2) 0.180520 0.117613 1.534870 0.1508 
A-M2(-3) 0.212921 0.117796 1.807534 0.0958 
AAn(-4) 0.257276 0.084087 3.059635 0.0099 
AM2(-5) 0.211170 0.100409 2.103103 0.0572 
AM2(-6) 0.250186 0.090307 2.770400 0.0169 
AM47) 0.038532 0.083230 0.462960 0.6517 
A. M2(-8) -0.018118 0.081146 -0.223274 0.8271 
D, 3.668939 2.114631 1.735026 0.1083 
D6 
-0.651321 1.919754 -0.339273 0.7403 
R2 0.706866 Mean dependent var. -0.650348 
Adjusted R2 0.462587 S. D. dependent var. 3.029836 
S. E. of regression 2.221126 Akaike info. criterion 4.739840 
Sum squared resid. 59.20080 Schwarz criterion 5.282902 
Log likelihood -43.50815 F-statistic 2.893686 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.666928 Prob. (F- statistic) 0.042489 
Source: Nikoli6,2000a. 
Note: DI and D6 are seasonal dummies, denoting seasonal variations in January and Jun, respectively. 
For the detailed analysis see Nikoli6,2000a. 
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Figure 1.2 Fit of the DLM of Inflation for Russia: 1992: 02-94: 09 
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Source: Nikoli6,2000a. 
If inflation is indeed a consequence of the growth of money supply, the obvious 
question one can pose is what are the driving forces of this monetary growth? The answer 
to this question is best sought in the analysis of the balance sheet of the Central Bank of 
Russia (CBR). The accounting identities of the CBR imply that i. ) an increase in net 
domestic assets (ANDA) and net international reserves (ANIR) are fundamental 
determinants of base money growth (AMB); ii. ) base money growth, often referred as high 
powered money, is the fundamental determinant of broad money growth (A-M2), which in 
turn is a fundamental determinant of inflation (/-ý, as stated above and elaborated in the next 
chapter. The CBR activities thus drive inflation. However, there are intricate factors in 
these processes. 
The first complication is related to a change of monetary base. Namely, an increase in 
net international reserves and domestic credits does not necessarily imply one for one 
increase in monetary base. The difference is a non-credit component of net domestic assets, 
other items net (OIN). Other items net include all other unclassified assets of the CBR and 
the net worth of the CBR. More specifically, 
AMB = ANIR + ANDA 
ANDA = ANCD +A OIN 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
ANCD = ANCG + ANCB + ANFSR = AMB - ANIR - AOIN (1.3) 
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where A-NCG, ANCB, ANFSR stand for the variations in the CBR net credits to central 
government, commercial banks, and former Soviet republics, respectively. 
The second complication arises in the relationship between base money and broad 
money. The relation between these two monetary aggregates depends on the currency in 
circulation (C), deposits (D), and commercial banks' reserves (R). 8 If the ratio of broad 
money to base money, referred to as the 'money multiplier', changes, base money growth 
and broad money growth will diverge. Typically, in periods of loose monetary policy, the 
money multiplier falls and vice versa. Fig. 1.3 demonstrates that, after initial volatility at 
the beginning of 1992, money multiplier began falling dramatically in the autumn of 1992 
and was in a free fall until autumn of 1993. Needless to say this coincided with a period of 
a rapid credit expansion of the CBR. Additional reasons for the changes in money 
multiplier during the first years of transition lay in the changes in interest rates, reserve 
requirement and particularly in fluctuations of the sizable excess reserves of commercial 
banks', which itself signify, at least in part, inefficiency of the payment system in Russia. 9 
Following period of relative stability, the money multiplier began to rise at the end of 1994 
and continued its upward trend in the rest of the period under consideration. Conversely, 
this coincides with a period of relatively tight monetary policy and price stability as well as 
increased efficiency of the payment system. 
More formally, money multiplier could be defined as follows: 
M2 C+D +1 D 
MB C+R C+R 
DD 
where C stands for currency in circulation, D for deposits, and R for commercial bank's reserves. 
9 For details see Granville, 1995. 
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Figure 1.3 Money Multiplier in Postconu-nunist Russia: 1992: 02-94: 09 
Source: RET, 1993-1999. 
1.2.2 CBR Credits 
Whatever the complications related to changes of money base, money multiplier, and 
relationship between broad money and inflation, might be, it is clear that various credits 
issued by the CBR were main cause of the growth of money supply. 
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Table 1.2 CBR Quarterly Flows of Credits (% of GDP): 1992: 01-95: 06 
Period 
Commercial 
Banks CIS States 
Govem. 
(Min. Fin. ) Other' Total pb GD 
q1-92' 8.3 3.1 0.0 0.8 12.2 1832 
q2-92 10.2 10.3 12.7 0.5 33.7 2703 
q3-92 14.1 16.7 15.0 0.3 46.0 5042 
q4-92 18.5 4.6 15.7 -1.6 37.2 8486 
1992 15.0 8.7 13.5 -0.5 36.6 18063 
ql- 93 7.9 6.1 9.3 4.3 27.5 13200 
q2- 93 6.9 4.2 6.7 -1.0 16.7 22000 
q3- 93 5.4 1.7 5.6 -0.4 12.3 48500 
q4- 93 0.9 0.0 5.3 0.5 6.8 78000 
1993 3.6 1.6 8.7 0.7 14.6 161700 
ql- 94 2.0 0.1 6.7 1.4 10.1 85700 
q2- 94 2.2 0.3 10.9 -1.0 12.4 116800 
q3- 94 1.7 -2.5 9.0 2.8 11.1 183500 
q4 -94 1.6 0.0 5.5 -1.9 5.3 244000 
1994 1.8 -0.7 7.7 0.1 8.9 630000 
ql -95 2.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 3.3 252000 
q2 -95 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -7.0 354000 
Source: Russian Economic Trends (RET), 1995; Granville (1995), and author's calculations. 
Note: 'CBR credits to Enterprises, to other (non-federal) fonns of government and to extra-budgetary 
funds. 
b Since the RET (1993 -99) does not provide GDP monthly sen es for 1992 and 1993 these are taken from 
Granville (1995). 
c An average monthly increase in flow of credits relative to December 1991 for the first quarter. 
1.2.3 Net Credit to the Government 
The first type of credit, net credit to the government (A-NCG), was used for the 
monetary financing of the budget deficit. In essence, there are three ways to finance the 
budget deficit: money creation, internal debt or bonds and external debt. The infancy of the 
domestic financial market and low credibility in the rouble denied an opportunity to the 
Russian government to finance its deficit by bond creation in the early stages of refonns. 
Similarly, lack of the disbursements of the pledged international assistance in the early 
years of reforms left the government with the only option: financing its deficit by money 
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creation in this period. ' 0 Table 1.3 demonstrates the size of the budget deficit in the period 
between 1992 and 1998. 
Table 1.3 General Balance of the Russian Government 1992-98 
Source: European Bank for Restructunng and Development (EBRD), 2000. 
The monetisation of the budget deficit was mainly achieved by variation of the 
monetary base. Financing government deficit in this way amounts to an implicit taxation. 
Two most common measures for the evaluation of the real value of the revenues that 
government can obtain by the money creation are seignorage (SE) and inflation tax (17). 
Seignorage is usually defined as: " 
SE = AMIGDP (1.4) 
where M stands for an aggregate of money supply such as currency in circulation (C), base 
money (MB) or broad money (M2), and GDP stands for gross national product. 
Conversely, inflation tax is a tax imposed on holders of monetary wealth and can be 
defined as follows: 
IT = M)zIGDP 
IT= (C; T+ Dor-i))IGDP 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
'0 CBR credits to the government were prohibited in 1995 prior to an introduction of June 
stabilization program. 
" This is a flow definition of seignorage that corresponds to the amount of goods and services the 
government can obtain by issuing additional money or forcing commercial banks to hold more reserves. 
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where /7, D, and i represent rate of inflation, ruble deposits and interest rate 
respectively. 12 Table 1.4 demonstrates that both seignorage and inflation tax amounted to a 
significant proportions of GDP, particularly in the first two years after liberalisation. 
Table 1.4 Seignorage and Inflation Tax on Monetary Aggregates in Russia: 1992-98 
/1Z . 7z GDP C MB M2MBIGDP SECSEmBSEm2iTmBiTm2 
end year ann. av R tril. R bn R bn R bn 
1991 161 97.2 1.4 191 182 958 
1992 2506.1 1526 19 1678 2235 6400 
1993 840 875 171.5 13278 16691 32601 
1994 204.4 311.4 610.7 35698 48000 97800 
1995 128.6 197.7 1585 80800103800220800 
1996 21.8 47.8 2200103800130900288300 
1997 10.9 14.7 2602130400164500374100 
1998 84.5 27.8 2685 187800210400448300 
%GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP 
13.00 
11.76 7.83 10.81 28.64 14.2 52.8 
9.73 6.76 8.43 15.28 11.0 24.0 
7.86 3.67 5.13 10.68 6.5 12.7 
6.55 2.85 3.52 7.76 3.6 7.5 
5.95 1.05 1.23 3.07 1.0 2.3 
6.32 1.02 1.29 3.30 0.6 1.3 
7.84 2.14 1.71 2.76 4.6 9.7 
Source: EBRD (2000), RET (1993-99). 
Note: I-r= Inflation rate; GDP = Gross Domestic Product; C= Cash in Circulation, MB = Monetary 
Base, M2 = Rouble Broad Money, SE = Seignorage, IT= Inflation Tax (Derived from the monthly figures of 
economic aggregates (RET, 1993-99) according to formula: IT= ((M*)7) / GDP) * 100. Unlike in Layard and 
Richter, 1994, interest receipts from deposits are thus not accounted for. 
The trouble with monetary financing from the government point of view is that, 
economic agents opt to hedge against tax on their monetary wealth. They do that mainly by 
converting rubles into foreign currency assets, the US dollar in particular. In doing so, the 
tax base (MBIGDP) as a proportion of GDP, in this case base money (MB), shrinks as 
demonstrated in Table 1.4.13 Subsequently, if the government were to maintain a constant 
level of monetary financing of the budget deficit, inflation rate would need to accelerate. In 
other words if the tax base is shrinking the tax itself has to increase in order to maintain 
same level of monetary financing. An additional consequence of low monetisation is that it 
" Providing inflation rate and real money balances remain constant (steady state), seignorage equals 
inflation tax. 
" Share of base money in GDP in developing countries varies from country to country but averages 
about 15 percent. 
25 
makes the economy very sensitive to capital flows. An annual capital flight of several 
billions US dollars, which may be more than a third of the entire stock of ruble A42 valued 
in US dollars, could easily create serious macroeconomic problems and hann the entire 
financial system. Thus, the government has a stark choice; to find non-monetary way of 
financing budget deficit if deficit itself cannot be slashed, or to let inflation accelerate. 
From May 1993 the government started issuing various securities to help finance budget 
deficit. These securities covered 1.5,10, and 40 percent of budget deficit in 1993,1994, 
and 1995 respectively (Granville, 1995). In addition, external financing also contributed to 
deficit financing although this was considerably less than pledged (NikoliC', 2002). 
Eventually, in early 1995 the CBR was prohibited from financing budget deficit, which was 
essential for stabilisation of the economy, at least in the short to medium run. 
1.2.4 Net Credit to Commercial Banks 
Second type of CBR credits, net credit to commercial banks (ANCB), in addition to 
being provided for liquidity through refinance rate, were also channelled to enterprises as a 
non-budgetary subsidy. These credits were allocated according to political bargaining 
rather than market consideration (Granville, 1995). In the dispute over jurisdiction of the 
CBR between the government and the Duma, the latter had the upper hand. The rationale 
for the Duma to increase the CBR issuance of credits to enterprises via commercial banks 
was to maintain the level of employment and help ailing industries and agriculture. These 
credits included military conversion subsidies and working capital credits (Granville, 
1995). Clearly macroeconomic stabilisation was not high in order of preferences of the 
CBR in this period. 
Table 1.2 demonstrates that CBR credit to commercial banks amounted to 15 and 3.6 
percent of GDP in 1992 and 1993 respectively. Most of these credits were designated to 
ailing enterprises and agriculture. Since these credits were issued via commercial banks, the 
responsibility for their repayment laid with the banks, at least theoretically. However, no 
action was taken at least until 1994 against a bank or a firm, which could not reimburse 
such a loan (Granville, 1995). Moreover, since real interest rates on these credits were 
negative, directed credit to enterprises amounted to the grants. When in November 1993 
positive real interest rates were introduced, banks started to refuse to channel these credits. 
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Having being used as a conduit for directed credits to enterprises, commercial banks 
were slow to forward these funds to enterprises, building up massive excess reserves (RET, 
1995). The excess reserves were about four times greater than required reserves in 1992 
(Granville, 1995). Similarly the former were twice as much as the latter in 1993 (Granville, 
1995). This is a puzzling phenomenon which probably could be partly explained by the 
inefficiency of the financial system, large credit risk, and an opportunity for the banks to 
delay channelling directed credit and buy foreign assets which would yield considerable 
gain in a short time span given environment of high inflation. It is however difficult to 
defend this bank strategy from the rational point of view, even though it is highly likely that 
the inflation tax imposed on these non-interest bearing funds was rolled to deposit holders 
in terms of smaller saving rates. On the other hand, the government gained extra revenue in 
terms of inflation tax on these funds. 
1.2.5 Net Credit to Former Soviet Republics 
Third kind of the CBR credit, net credit to former Soviet republics (ANFSR), 
provided both cash and non-cash credits to 'near abroad' countries enabling those to 
continue trading with Russian enterprises. Cash credits given to former Soviet republics 
were intended to minimize dislocation of central planning's organic enterprise links 
between these states. That implies smaller trade shocks and lower fall in output. In addition 
to cash credits, many non-Russian enterprises were able to obtain unauthorized credits 
('non-cash' rubles) from the Central Bank of Russia via national central banks. The dual 
money system, characterized on one hand, with unlimited supply of non-cash credits and a 
hard constraint on the delivery of cash on the other, was particularly costly to Russia in the 
first year of transition. Credits to other FSRs amounted in 1992 to at least 8.5 percent of 
Russian GDP if delivery of cash is excluded, and 11.6 percent otherwise, in terms of the 
CBR credits alone (Granville, 1997). Needless to say, such substantial increase in money 
supply inevitably fed into higher prices and much aggravated stabilization efforts. Although 
it has four distinct phases, the destabilizing effects of the Ruble zone prevailed until 
November of 1993. In July of 1993, the CBR suddenly withdrew pre-1993 ruble notes, 
which, together with the collapse of negotiations between Russia and Kazakhstan in 
November 1993, effectively sealed the fate of the old Ruble area. 
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1.3 The Fiscal Theory of Price Level and Its Application to Russia 
In the classic macroeconomic literature prevails the view that inflation has monetary 
determinates such as money supply and exchange rate. In contrast, the crux of the new 
fiscal theory of price level (FTPL) lays in the notion that it may well be conceivable that 
the price level must adjust to equilibrate the real value of nominal government debt with 
present value of surpluses (Komulainen and Pirtila, 2000). However, the quantity theory 
and fiscal theory of price determination are not mutually exclusive but they are rather 
various strands of the same theory (Cochrane, 2000). In fact the origins of the new fiscal 
theory are obvious in the work of Sargent and Walace (1986) and their notion of interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policies. This theory is further developed and formallsed 
recently by Woodroff (1994), Sims (1994), Burnside et al. (1998), and Canconeri et al. 
(1998). 
Unsurprisingly the new theory has attracted considerable criticism. The critics 
charges that since the theory rules out possibility of government default the model leads to 
an over determination of the price level in the fiscal regime (Buiter, 1999). In addition, it is 
argued (Buiter, 2002), that the FTPL model is misspecified since it assumes that the 
government's interternporal budget constraint needs to be satisfied only in equilibrium. 
Similarly, Cochrane (1998) argues, should the government violate the present value budget 
constraint the model could not be empirically tested since the prices would react and the 
off-equilibrium price sequence would remain hidden. 
Despite strong criticism, the new fiscal theory has found application in transition 
economics since most of them have experienced persistent budget deficit and high inflation 
rates. Among theoretical papers it is worth mentioning the work of Begg and Wyplosz 
(1999) among others. The authors used the fiscal theory of price level to emphasise 
necessity of prudential stability in countries of Central and Eastern in their quest to join 
European Union. Similarly, Fakin and de Crombrugghe (1997) argue that after a dramatic 
shift away from subsidies in the early years of transition, the countries of Central Europe 
still show signs of an unsuccessful fiscal adjustment, insufficient deficit reduction, and 
loose expenditure policy. 
Although fiscal issues have usually been overshadowed by monetary ones in 
transition economies the interest in fiscal policy has intensified in the wake of August 1998 
Russian financial crises. Vast number of authors emphasise the importance of controlling 
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fiscal deficit to achieve price stability (see Coricelli, Dabrowski and Urszula, 1998; Budina 
and van Wijnbergen, 1997; Barbone and Marchetti, 1995; Buiter, 1997; Dabrovski, 1999; 
Cottareli and Doyle, 1999; Fakin and de Crombrugglie, 1997, among others). 
Having experienced consistently high level of inflation during transition, Russian 
fiscal policy has attracted considerable attention. Prior to August 1998 financial crises, 
perils of the unsustainable Russian budget deficit have been emphasized by Lopez-Claros 
and Alexashenko (1998), Sinel'nikov-Murilev and Trofimov (1998), and Cheasty and 
Davis (1996) among others. In the wake of August 1998, Russian fiscal performance 
attracted wider attention, as mentioned above. Although economist rarely achieve 
consensus, there was little doubt among researchers that the cause of financial meltdown in 
Russia in that year was to be sought in poor fiscal performance coupled with other internal 
and external factors (see NikoliC', 2000a; Kharas et al., 2001; Desai, 2000; and Sutela, 2000, 
among others). 
However, empirical findings for the premise that inflation in Russia is caused by the 
fiscal deficit are pretty thin. This conclusion is also confirmed in a recent study of the 
extent to which inflation has been affected by the fiscal deficits. Namely, using vector- 
autoregressive models (VAR) Komulainen and Pirtila (2000) have recently studied whether 
fiscal deficit causes inflation in Romania, Bulgaria and Russia. While the authors have 
found some evidence that the fiscal deficit has increased inflation in Bulgaria, they rejected 
the null hypothesis that fiscal deficit was significant determinant of inflation in both 
Romania and Russia. According to the authors, these findings did not support the presence 
of fiscal dominant regimes in these countries. In other words, Komulainen and Pirtila 
(2000) found the price level in Russia and Romania to be determined in the monetary 
dominant regimes by the quantity theory of money. This however, is not to say that fiscal 
policy does not matter. On the contrary, it does, as traditional macroeconomics would 
suggest. Komulainen and Pirtila (2000) findings simply underline the notion that the 
inflationary method of financing the deficit, rather than the deficit themselves, affect the 
price level. 
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1.4 Frameworks for Analysis of the Impact of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on 
Macroeconomic Stabilisation 
Predictably, an expansionary monetary policy of the CBR was not a conductive 
environment for the overdue macroeconomic stabilisation. Unlike in other transition 
economies, several, mainly half-hearted stabilisation programs, implemented in Russia 
between 1991 and 1994, had a very little success. Similarly, mid 1995 stabilisation effort, 
after initial success, ended in the severe financial crises in August 1998. It has become 
conventional wisdom that these programs failed because they were not supported by 
structural and institutional reforms (Gavrilenkov and Kuboniwa, 1997). In the absence of 
the structural and institutional reforms most of the macroeconomic problems arose from the 
fiscal side. Subsequently, monetary policy was used as an adjustment tool. It follows that in 
order for stabilisation program to succeed, fiscal and monetary policy ought to be 
interrelated and coordinated. The interaction between fiscal and monetary policies can 
conveniently be analysed in the Sargent and Wallace (1976,1986) framework. 
1.4.1 Fiscal and Monetary Framework of Stabilisation 
In the Sargent and Wallace (1976,1986) framework interaction between 
policyrnakers (monetary and fiscal authority) and the public (private agents) is 
endogenised. On the one hand fiscal authority take decisions on public expenditure and tax 
rates, while monetary authority decide about composition of the government debt. They do 
so by maximising their objective function subject to the constraints imposed by the 
behaviour of the public. On the other hand, the public decides about consumption, 
investment, and employment and is assumed to pay the imposed taxes. 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (Muth, 1961) postulates that future rates of 
inflation are conditioned by agents' perceptions of long-term government monetary and 
fiscal policies. The agents are expected to change their 'strategy of rules' whenever there is 
a 4regime change' in government policies (Sargent and Wallace, 1976). Private agents limit 
government action and determine government budget constrain by choosing how much and 
what combination of elements of government debt to hold. Hence, monetary and fiscal 
policies must be coordinated because the government faces a budget constraint. It follows 
that there is no "purely monetary" cure for inflation. 
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The budget constraint thus becomes pivotal in the analysis of high inflation 
stabilisation in the Sargent and Wallace framework. Utilising this framework, Eq. (1.7) 
represents the government budget constraint given by Sargent and Wallace (1976,1986): 
G, - Tt = (Ht - Ht- 1)1, irt + (Bt - B, 1) - r, Bt- I (1.7) 
where Gt and Tt represents real government expenditures at time t and real taxes net 
of transfers (except for interest payments on the government debt) at time t; respectively; Ht 
is a stock of base money at time t; -ý is the price level at time t; B, is the real value of one- 
period government bond issued at t and paid off at (t+l); r is the net real rate of interest. 
Eq. (1.7) specifies that a real government primary or non-interest budget deficit (Dt= 
Gt- Tt) at time t, can be financed by a combination of an increase in monetary base and/or 
issuing to the public an interest bearing debt. Following Keynesian tradition, this 
framework assumes that the public is willing to hold interest-bearing government debt on 
the same terms applicable to private debt. The upper bound (B) of public's willingness to 
accumulate real interest-bearing government debt (B) is assumed to be constraint by the 
total wealth in the country. In practice B is most often far lower than the total wealth. 
Similarly, public willingness to accumulate the other government debt, the level of 
stock of base money, is determined by the version of Cagan (1956) function of demand for 
money (Eq. (1.8)). It describes the demand for the real base money as a decreasing function 
of the expected rate of inflation in the following manner: 
Ht 
-a-a, E, 17t+l I'Tt /IT t 
al > 6(2 ý! 0 (1.8) 
whereE, 1-1 is the value of [-] expected to prevail by the public as of time t. Eq. (1.8) 
depicts the demand for real base money as a decreasing function of the expected gross rate 
of inflation. Solving Eq. (1.8), ; Tt can be expresses solely in terms of expected future values 
of Ht: 
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Eq. (1.9) describes the determination of price level at time t by interaction of the 
public's preference for holding high powered money (parameters a, and a2) with the 
expected path of high powered money now and into the indefinite future. It follows that the 
government deficit could influence the price level solely through the effects on the 
expected path of high powered money. As pointed out by Sargent (1993) this is a crux of 
monetarist supposition that inflation is always a monetary phenomenon. 
However, the government deficit and path of high powered money do not need to be 
necessarily rigidly linked. The reason is that the government can cover its deficit by the 
interest bearing government debt, at least temporarily and to a point, as shown in Eq. (1.7). 
Hence, under the Sargent's (1993) system, made of Eqs. (1.7) and (1.9), the inflationary 
consequences of government deficits depend delicately on the government's strategy for 
servicing its debt. 
There are evidently two clear-cut alternative debt-servicing strategies for the 
government as well as a combination of those. The two strategies are i) a strict Ricardin 
regime, and ii) Friedman (1949) rule. The former regime is not inflationary, at least 
initially, while the latter is. More precisely, in the strict Ricardian regime the government 
always finances its entire deficit or surplus by issuing or retiring interest-bearing 
government debt. Sargent (1993) shows that this kind of regime has no effect on the price 
path, as long as the deficit is of a temporary nature, since it is not permitted to have effects 
on the path of base money. In contrast, according to Fridman (1949) rule, deficits are 
always to be financed entirely by issuing additional base money. Subsequently, the time 
path of government deficits affects the time path of the price level via increase in money 
supply in a rigid and instant way, as shown in Eq. (1.7) (Sargent, 1993). 
There are a number of combinations of above mentioned regimes which government 
can use. For example, Sargent (1993) cites Bryant and Wallace (1980), and Sargent and 
Wallace (1986), who have described the debt-servicing regimes that are intermediate 
between Ricardo's and Friedman's. In these regimes, issuing high powered money will 
affect the price path sooner or later. The time lag of the effects would depend on the 
parameters a, and q2 in Eqs. (1.8) and (1.9) (Sargent, 1993). 
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The theme that monetary and fiscal policies are interrelated and must necessarily be 
coordinated is further extended by Sargent and Wallace (1993). Their extended analyses is 
centred on the premise that in the absence of fiscal authorities help, fighting current 
inflation with tight monetary policy must eventually lead to higher future inflation. In 
contrast, according to Sargent and Wallace (1993), fiscal correction is the necessary and 
sufficient condition for stabilisation. 
The dimensions of the limits of the monetary policy are further illustrated by Sargent 
and Wallace's (1993) 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic'. The authors argue that financing 
the debt by money and debt, shifting towards tight monetary policy, would lead to increase 
in the goverm-nent debt in the future. The increase in the debt would be caused by the 
government interest burden increase. Given that there exists a limit on the public sector's 
willingness to absorb the debt, the government finds it difficult to sell its debt to the public 
except at falling prices, which in turn increases expenditures. In order to avoid insolvency 
the government resorts to inflationary money creation to finance its deficit. Thus, public 
perception of the government inability to meet the intertemporal budget constraint would 
cause an unexpected increase in inflation rate above the level initially expected by the 
agents. In other words, inflation will only occur if the present value of government's debt is 
not equal to the present value of all the government's surpluses expected in the future. 
The only way to avoid inflation is to be offered by the fiscal authorities. Namely, the 
fiscal program must meet the intertemporal budget constraint to be accepted as credible 
evidence such that inflation will not be used to finance the budget. Should the long term 
government policies violate the budget constraint, the higher inflation rate would inevitably 
follow in the rational expectations model. In sum, the unpleasant arithmetic of Sargent and 
Wallace (1993) postulates that the central bank is prevented from successfully fighting 
inflation by itself if the fiscal authority persists in running a net-of- interest budget deficit. 
1.4.2 Open Economy Framework 
The analysis so far has concentrated on a closed economy. In an open economy 
framework, the government budget constraint (Eq. (1.7)) is also determined by the 
international economic transactions. These include financial and real resources transfers 
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between trading nations. Thus, the government budget constraint for a small open economy 
becomes: 
Gr- Tt = (Ht - Ht- 1)/)ý + (Bt - Bt- 1) + rt- 1B, I+ et(B *t -B*, 1) +r*, 1 eB *, - I-e, 
(R *, -R*, - 1) 
(1.10) 
Rearranging Eq. (I - 10) we obtain Eq. (I. 11): 
Dt + rt- 1B, I+r *t- 1 etB *t- I= AHtl; T, + ABt + etA(B *t -R *t) (I. 11) 
where Dt = Gr- Tt stands for the real government primary or non-interest budget deficit as 
described above; et represents the real exchange rate at time t; B *, represents foreign public 
debt at time t; R *t represents foreign currency reserves at time t; and r *t is an interest rate 
on foreign debt at time t. Hence, Eq. (I. 11) states that the excess of real government 
spending, G at time t, and domestic debt, rB, plus foreign debt service, r *B *,, over real tax 
receipts, T, must be financed by one of the four sources: printing money, running down 
international currency (and/or gold) reserves, selling of public debt to the domestic sector 
or to the foreign sector. Running down international reserves, if those are sizable, can only 
provide temporary relief. The downside of this option is that depletion of reserves adversely 
affects the exchange rate. Similarly, borrowing either from domestic public or from abroad 
may induce domestic spending which in turn will likely affect the budget deficit. 
1.5 Interaction of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Russia During Transition 
1.5.1 Budget Distortions in the Late Years of Communism in Russia 
Budgetary problems and fiscal crises throughout Russian economic transformation 
have roots in the late years of communism. Failing system of central planning reflected a 
part of its inefficiency in the balance of state budget. Among important factors of mounting 
budget distortions at the end of 1980s were: i) fall in world prices of raw material ii) 
growing military expenditure caused by the arms race and the war in Afghanistan, iii) 
wrong economic policy decision in mid-1980s (e. g. attempt for new industrialisation, the 
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anti-alcohol campaign sharply reduced budget revenues), and iv) series of large-scale 
disasters (Chernobyl, earth quake in Armenia). The deterioration of state finances, 
manifested through falling revenues and increased expenditures at the end of communist 
period is clearly shown in Table 1.5. 
Table 1.5 Budget Balance in the USSR: 1985-1990 
Source: Robinson, 2001. 
1.5.2 Russia's Fiscal Performance During Transition 
Russian reformers were aware of the problems with the budget deficit and envisaged 
to tackle it in the first stages of reforms. Even President Yeltsin was confident that deficit 
would be slashed and announced that the "budget deficit in 1992 should be almost non- 
existent or minimal" (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1991). 
In the event, the intentions of the reformers were too ambitious and fell far short of 
expectations. Table 1.3 demonstrates that budget deficit persisted to mar government 
efforts to stabilise economy throughout transition period. Main obstacles to the expenditure 
side of the state budget were the government inability to stop subsidy payments being made 
either by local authorities or by the CBR (Robinson, 2001). Conversely, tax collection has 
been one of the weakest elements of Russia's macroeconomic performance throughout 
transition period. Tax revenues have declined sharply during this period and according to 
official data, the actual tax revenues of Russia's enlarged budget (including the 
consolidated revenues of the federal and the regional budgets and those of the 
extrabudgetary funds) fell from over 44 percent of GDP in 1992 to less than 30 percent in 
1996 (RET, 1997). The trend only slightly improved in 1997 as a result of one-off payment 
of tax arrears of several large enterprises, most notably Gasprom. 
35 
Image removed due to third party copyright
The key factors underlying the deteriorating revenue performance during transition 
period have been the following (RET, 1997): 
1. decline in output and profits, 
2. shrinking tax base due to the impact of tax exemptions, tax deferrals 
and other tax concessions, 
3. statutory tax rates have been reduced under the profit tax and VAT 
reforms, so that excess wage tax was eliminated and the export tariffs phased out, 
4. a deterioration in tax discipline; sharp increase in tax arrears 14 , and 
tax evasion 15 3 
5. large share of tax revenues received in kind, which made fiscal 
policy less flexible. 
Government fiscal position has been further undermined by an outdated and non- 
transparent tax code. More precisely, for almost a decade Russia had not had a 
comprehensive overhaul of its tax system. The old Law on the Principles of Tax System, 
introduced in 1991, was replaced by the new Tax Code, but only its first general part, and 
not before the beginning of 1999. 
The insufficient budget revenues in 1992 and 1993 severely undermined the 
government stabilisation effort. More importantly for the reform process, a poor fiscal 
record of the government dealt a heavy blow to reformist parties in Parliamentary election 
in December 1993, and eventually forced their PM and finance minister out. According to 
Russian press, the shortfall in tax collection in 1993 was 30 percent (Rossiiskie vesti, 
1994), while by the autumn 1994 it was as much as 50 percent (Segodnya, 1994). The 
dramatic decline in revenues in this period could not be offset sufficiently by slashing 
expenditures so that ballooning budget deficit exerted unbearable pressure on the exchange 
rate, which was slipping away from the CBR control. With reserves running low the CBR 
could not prevent Black Tuesday on October 11 when the ruble (R) to US dollar ($) 
exchange rate fell by 28%, jumping from R3,000 to almost R4,000 in one day (RET, 1994). 
14 In 1996, the stock of identifiable arrears to the consolidated budget were estimated at close to R 
128 trillion or 5.7 percent of GDP, while arrears to the extrabudgetary funds were close to R 100 trillion or 
4.3 percent of GDP (RET, 1997). 
15 The State Tax Service reported that at the beginning of 1997 about one-third of enterprises did not 
pay any taxes. In addition, only 16.6 per cent of enterprises were paying taxes that were due (RET, 1997). 
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The Black Tuesday of October 1994 brought home the depth of reform's failures in the area 
of budget financing in the previous three years as well as final realization that the days 
when the CBR could issue large credits without causing high inflation were over. As a 
consequence of this realisation, in the new stabilisation effort in 1995, the CBR was barred 
from financing budget deficit. 
In the new policy environment the government tapped into a pool of domestic debt 
coupled with borrowing from abroad. The short-term treasury bills (GKO) and fixed 
coupon bonds (OFZ), although introduced in 1993, only took off in the aftermath of Black 
Tuesday as a result of the rise in the CBR discount rate. Subsequently, in 1996 the stock of 
GKOs and OFZs had pilled up to about II percent of GDP (RET, 1993-199) causing a 
major concern for the monetary authorities. Interest rate on these securities rose to over 100 
percent in the same year and the state's domestic debt tripled (Izvestya, 1997). By the 
autumn of 1996, Russian commercial banks had no longer liquidity to finance the 
government debt market since the stock of GKOs and OFZs exceeded the total stock of 
ruble deposits in the banking system (EBRD, 1998). In order to ascertain control over the 
growing deficit and be able to finance it, the government had to find new pool of liquidity 
at the lower cost of borrowing. Given the lack of liquidity of the Russian banking sector, 
the only option for the government was to seek out external sources of deficit financing so 
as to roll over debt repayments into fresh bond issues and expand the debt market at a lower 
cost (Robinson, 2001). Subsequently the GKO market was open for foreigner in 1996. 
However, the demand for the GKOs peaked in 1997 when foreign investors acquired 
US$19.7 billion which was about 34 percent of entire stock of GKOs and OFZs (Robinson, 
2001). Inevitably such high demand for these securities lowered interest rates on the 
government debt to less than 10 percent in the summer of 1997 (Robinson, 200 1). Most of 
the foreign money invested in the government debt market in 1996 and 1997 was in short- 
term debt that matured in under a year. Maintaining investors' confidence was thus crucial 
for the roll over in new GKO issues of matured debt. 
Investors observed the rise of accumulated deficits, which pushed up debt service 
costs for the future, and so increased the size of future deficits. As markets viewed the 
government's finances, and thus the exchange rate target, as unsustainable, this perception 
led to a higher currency risk premium, which resulted in upward pressure on interest rates 
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(Nikolic', 2000a). 16 The higher interest rates, in turn, led to an increase in the future debt 
service costs and so thus increased the future expected budget deficit. The spiral was 
further exacerbated by the adverse effects of a higher interest rate on growth, of dwindling 
foreign exchange reserves, and of the compounded perception of less than credible 
government policies, all of which eventually led the country into a variant of the debt-trap 
(NikoliC', 2000a). 
The dire position of government finances and the economy as a whole was 
undermined further by the external and other internal factors (Nikolic', 2000a). The most 
important of the external factors, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crises, was the fall in 
confidence on the part of the international capital investors to invest in countries like 
Russia, which was, and still is, plagued by macroeconomic and structural weaknesses, 
particularly over-dependence on short term capital inflows (RET, 1998). The second 
adverse external factor was the fall of oil and other commodity prices. Among the domestic 
factors the most important were the excessively large budget deficit and the unsustainable 
build up of ruble-denominated debt. These adverse domestic factors originated from 
problems associated with poor tax collection mentioned above, non-productive government 
expenditures, a small and weak domestic capital market, a weak and inefficient banking 
system, poor corporate governance, and the continued accumulation of payment arrears 
(RET, 1998). The failure of the policymakers to address these issues in the relatively 
favourable investment climate of 1997 led Russia, in August 1998, into the worst financial 
crises of its transition period and contributed to the global financial turbulence. The ruble 
was effectively devalued and left floating while the government defaulted on its GKOs 
(NikoliC', 2000a). 17 
1.5.3 Empirical Indicators of the Government Non-Interest Budget Constraint in 
Postcommunist Russia 
Using a simplified version of the Sargent and Wallace (1976,1986) framework, we 
estimated the government budget constraint faced by the Russian government between 
16 The currency risk premium is defined as the difference between the interest rate for the same 
maturity instrument of ruble-denominated domestic debt, taking into account the depreciation expected under 
the current exchange rate policy, and dollar- denominated government debt. 
17 In 1998, the official exchange rate went from R5,96/$ to R-20,655, a depreciation of 246 per cent. 
From August 1998 to end-March 1999, the ruble has depreciated 287 per cent, from R6,24/$ to R24,16/S 
(RET, 1999). 
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1992 and 1998, albeit excluding the interest accrual on the government debts. More 
precisely, the Sargent and Wallace (1976,1986) constraint described in Eq. (1.11), is 
simplified so not to include the interest accrual on the government domestic and foreign 
debts. The reason for this exclusion is that reliable data on the build up of interest on 
goverm-nent debts were not available. Hence, after modification Eq. (I. 11) takes the fonn 
expressed in Eq. (1.12): 
Dt = AHtll-rt + ABt + etA(B *t -R *t) (1.12) 
Eq. (1.12) states that the real government deficit, D, at time t, must be financed by 
one of the four sources: printing money, AH,, running down internatIonal currency (and/or 
gold) reserves, etA(B *t -R *t), selling of public debt to the domestic sector, ABt, or to the 
foreign sector, AB*t. 
Table 1.6 Simple Empirical Assessment of the Non-Interest Budget Constraint - Russia: 
1992-98 
GDP 
R bn. 
D, 
R bn. 
Dt 
% GDP 
A. Ht 
R bn. 
ABt 
R bn. 
ARt* 
$ bn. 
ABt* 
bn. 
et 
RJ$ 
1991 1400 8.2 0.1692 
1992 19000 2057.08 10.83 2053 0.744 10.60 0.4145 
1993 171500 14699.73 8.57 14456 207.63 4.354 33.30 1.247 
1994 610700 43882.8 7.19 31309 12532.37 -1.869 9.80 3.55 
1995 1585000 116721.9 7.36 55800 60975.70 10.386 -1.20 4.64 
1996 2200000 190534.5 8.66 27100 163393-10 -2.841 4.60 5.57 
1997 2602000 181362.2 6.97 33600 147767.20 1.936 1.10 5.974 
1998 2685000 49406.32 1.84 45900 2176.51 -5.305 57.60 21.14 
Source: EBRD, 1999; RET, 1993-99; IMF, 1999; Nikoli6,2002, and author's calculations. 
Table 1.6 demonstrates that the non-interest nornInal budget deficit in Russia between 
1992 and 1998 was very significant. In addition, Table 1.6 reveals that money supply was a 
principal tool for financing the deficit between 1992 and 1995. Although monetization of 
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the deficit continued in the following years, the principal source of financing the deficit 
between 1996 and 1998 was from domestic borrowing. The domestic borrowing, in these 
three years, was about twice as much the increase in base money. In 1998 alone, even 
though the government could not borrow after the default in August of that year, the 
increase in the domestic borrowing for the whole year amounted to 14.4 percent of GDP, 
which was at similar level to an increase in the previous year. Thus, even from the limited 
evidence, presented in Table 1.6, it is clear that the government financing of its deficit had 
an unsustainable path. The international financial investors could clearly observe that the 
government finances are in disorder and that the government was poised to default on its 
obligations sooner or later. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Our analyses of macroeconomic instability in postcommunist Russia lays heavy 
emphasis on the necessity of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. The formal 
analysis demonstrates that monetary authorities are prevented from successfully fighting 
inflation by itself if the fiscal authority persists in running a net-of-interest budget deficit. 
Needles to say, the problem of fighting inflation becomes far more confounded should 
monetary authority subordinate macroeconomic stability to other socio-economic aims. 
Although Russia may not be an economy with a fiscal dominant regime, the study 
demonstrates that continuing problems with balancing of government budget have led to 
eventual monetisation of the deficit. In a few years after price liberalisation budget deficit 
was mainly financed by money creation. In the following years, domestic borrowing well 
surpassed the level of money creation, but eventually became unsustainable leading the 
economy into the financial crises of August 1998. Naturally, both periods were 
characterised by the lack of macroeconomic stability. 
Both, the theoretical framework presented in the chapter and the simple empirical 
analyses, demonstrate the necessity for fiscal correction. In this framework fiscal correction 
is the necessary and sufficient condition for stabilisation. This is not to say that the Russian 
fiscal regime has dominated over monetary one. Rather, we want to reiterate the notion that 
monetisation of the deficit, rather than the deficit themselves has been affecting the price 
level in postcommunist Russia. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Inflation Expectation in Postcommunist Russia 
2.1. Introduction 
The central role of inflation expectations has long been recognized in both 
macroeconomic theorizing and stabilization policy analysis. Wage bargaining, price setting, 
asset allocation and investment, all depend on inflationary expectation on one way or 
another. While inflation expectations received scrupulous attention in market economies 
over a long period of time, interest for the topic in the fori-ner socialist economies arose 
only with liberalization attempts at the beginning of transition. Given the lack of experience 
with open inflation on the part of economic agents in majority of transition economies, the 
literature on the formation of expectations in these economies is still rather scant. Hence, 
the objective of this chapter is to analyze formation and rationality of inflationary 
expectation in postcommunist Russia, a transition economy where various stabilization 
policies have initially ignored inflation persistence. In the absence of a sample survey of 
inflationary expectation and appropriate long run series of financial market indicators, the 
choice of model building technique is restricted to one that relies on the inflation history. 
The findings of this chapter sharply contrast the claims that lagged inflation has been 
relatively unimportant in explaining inflation in transition economies (Cottarelli et al., 
1998; Coorey et al., 1998; and Cottarelli and Boyle, 1999). 
The balance of this chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of 
the literature and the origins of open inflation and inflationary expectations in Russia. In 
section 3 the data and methodology, as well as the criteria for model selection, are 
delineated. The empirical results are reported and discussed in section 4, while section 5 
gives an alternative model. Sections 6 and 7 are devoted to tests for forecasting abilities of 
the models and for rationality of expectations, respectively. Section 8 outlines some policy 
implication and suggestions for further research while section 9 concludes with the 
summary of the findings. 
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2.2 A Brief Overview of Inflation Expectations in Postcommunist Russia and the 
Literature 
Early analysis of formation of expectations were characterized by emphasis on a 
weighted average of past changes (Fisher, 1930) and the role of exogenous psychological 
factors, i. e., 'animal spirit' (Keynes, 1933). In other words, expectations were assumed to 
be subject to a high degree of inertia but also to unexplained waves of optimism or 
pessimism. Following the Second Word War, expectations were modelled in some 
deterministic manner, mainly assuming that the expected value of a certain variable could 
be proxied by its observed values in a recent past (Cagan, 1956; Frenkel, 1973; Holden and 
Peel, 1977; among others). Alternative measures to the arbitrary modelling of price 
expectations could be based on financial market indicators or a survey-based data. While 
the former direct measurement of inflationary expectation uses some financial indicator 
such as forward interest rate for example (Mishkin, 1990; Svensson, 1993; Frankel and 
Lown, 1994; and S6derlind, 1995; among others), the latter uses some sample survey like 
Livingston Survey for the United States or the Gallup poll for the United Kingdom. 18 
Limitations of these kinds of modelling gave impetus to development of the rational 
expectation hypothesis (REH) (Muth, 196 1; and Sargent and Wallace, 1976, among others). 
Although REH can be applied to a wide range of economic variables, most of the 
theoretical and empirical work has focused on the formation of inflationary expectations. 
The particular interest in the role of expectations in market economies arose with 
the disillusionment with the long run validity of the Philips curve, and stagflations of 
1970s. 19 It was argued that, the coexistence of high and increasing unemployment with 
rapid and accelerating inflation contain an expectations hypothesis that prices rise because 
people expect them to rise (Carlson and Parkin, 1975). Since fori-nation of these 
expectations is crucial for the genesis of inflation persistence (Ball, 1991), this topic has 
received a scrupulous attention in stabilization policies, particularly, but by no means 
exclusively, in inflation targeting regimes. Various types of models of expectations have 
been given, particularly for the United States. These models have been broadly classified as 
those falling under the adaptive expectations hypothesis (Fisher, 1930; Cagan, 1956; 
" For description of the Livingston data see Tumovsky (1970), Carlson (1977), and Figlewski and 
Wachtel (1981) among others. For the Gallup Poll survey see seminal work of Carlson and Parkin (1975). 
" For theoretical discussions see Friedman (1968), Phelps (1968), and Lucas and Rapping (1969), 
among others. 
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Frenkel, 1973; among others), hybrid models of expectations, 20 the REH (Muth, 1961; 
Poole, 1976; Shiller, 1978; Sargent and Wallace, 1976; among others), and direct measure 
of inflationary expectations in a form of a sample survey measure of inflation (Tumovsky, 
1970; Carlson, 1977; Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981; Carlson and Parkin, 1975) or financial 
market indicators (Mishkin, 1990; Svensson, 1993; S6derlind, 1995). Researchers have 
paid the greatest attention to Livingston data published by Philadelphia Enquirer. 
Reportedly, the most striking feature of this series is its poor forecast ability (Wachtel, 
1977). In particular, the actual inflation exceeds expectations in over 70 percent of the 
surveys over the period 1947-1973. In addition, the poor prediction of inflation, over the 
entire period, is demonstrated by the low R2, which does not exceed 30%, and the large 
constant term of 2.05 per cent (Wachtel, 1977). As far as rationality of Livingston data is 
concerned, the findings of various researches are generally not in accord. While many 
researchers found these data consistent with rationality (Tumovsky, 1970; Mullineaux, 
1978; Mullineaux, 1980, among others), others re ected the REH even in the weak form, j 
except for the specific period 1957-1971 (Pesando, 1975; de Menil and Bhalla, 1975; 
Carlson, 1977, Holden and Peel, 1977; Figlewski and Wachtel, 198 1, among others). 21 
In contrast to market economies, where formation of both, consumers' and 
producers' inflation expectations received scrupulous attention, the topic has received a 
scarce interest in transition economies. Although inflation expectations were not at the core 
of their analysis Hoggarth (1996); Allen et al. (1996); Korhonen and Pesonen (1998); and 
NikoliC' (2000), all showed that one-month lagged inflation is among the most important 
determinants of the contemporaneous inflation in Russian economy. Quite the reverse 
findings, for all transition economies as a whole, could be found in Cottarelli et al. (1998), 
and Coorey et al. (1998). The feeble interest for the topic could perhaps be explained by the 
lack of experience with open inflation in majority of transition economies, lack of surveys 
data on expectations of inflation as well as non- availability of financial and the long run 
time series of inflation. In the absence of means of independently measuring expectations, 
we have to postulate a scheme for generating expectations in terms of observable variables. 
20 Hybrid models of expectations can be further classified as the adaptive-regressive or habitat 
models (Modigliani and Sutch, 1966; Modigliani and Shiller, 1973; Frenkel, 1976; among others) and 
partially rational expectations models (Walters, 1971; Feige and Pearce, 1976; Brinner, 1977, Spitdller, 1978. 
among others) 
2' For a detailed review of the literature see Gramlich (1983) and Ball (1991) and the references 
therein. 
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However, prior to empirical analysis, a brief description of the history of open inflation in 
postcommunist Russia is in order. 
In the presence of monetary overhang, Russian liberalization of prices of 2 nd 
January 1992 was bound to cause an explosion in prices. Indeed, in the first month of 
liberalization, prices rose by about 245 percent (Russian Economic Trends (RE7)), far in 
excess of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Russian government predictions. This 
mechanism of initial jump in prices could be conveniently analyzed with a help of the 
Quantity Equation. An often-used variant of the Quantity Equation is the income version 
given by Pigou (1927): 
MV=PY (2.1) 
where M is defined as the total quantity of money in the economy, V represents the income 
velocity of circulation defined as the average number of times a unit of currency turns over 
in the course of financing the year's final activity, P is implicit price deflator and Y is 
national income. If prices were fixed in time t but liberalized in time t+ I the jump in prices 
should be equal to: 
Pt+l (Mt+llmt)(Vt+llvt) 
A Y+I/Y 
(2.2) 
Subsequent analysis of prices movements after price liberalization in the short run 
can safely ignore the changes in income and money supply. That is because there is no 
reason to expect that government will print money at the same time it undertakes price 
liberalization. By the same token, there is no a priori reason to expect that income would 
change dramatically because of liberalization either. After all, it would take time for these 
changes to materialize. Hence, for, say, the first month after liberalization, one can assume 
that Y, +IIY, and Mt+l1Mt are both approximately close to one. It follows that the prediction 
of the jump in prices requires only prediction of an increase in velocity. It is in this area that 
serious miscalculations occurred. While the IMF and the Russian Prime Minister estimated 
the size of monetary overhang about 50 per cent (Gros and Steinherr, 1995) and price jump 
of 100 percent (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1992), respectively, the prices jumped as much as 245 
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percent in January 1992, as mentioned above. One of the probable causes of this 
miscalculation should be sought in the use of sophisticated models of the demand for 
financial assets that give quite good results over the long run in developed market 
economies (Gros and Steinherr, 1995). However, these models proved inadequate in Russia 
and other transition economies, were households had essentially only 3 assets: cash, saving 
deposits and foreign currencies. Another probable cause for the miscalculation of price 
jump was reliance on the velocity of saving deposits rather than the velocity on cash, 
because the former proved to be much more variable than the latter (Gros and Steinherr, 
1995). 
Since empirical work on the demand for money balances in transition economies 
was very limited and even non-existent for newly independent states, the behaviour of 
velocity in subsequent stabilization programs was seriously misjudged. Stabilization 
programs for Baltic States, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union, 
envisaged that inflation would not respond immediately to monetary tightening. Therefore 
they projected a rise in velocity of broad money in the first quarter of the program, 
assuming that velocity would subsequently remain broadly stable or even decline. In the 
event, velocity continued to rise into subsequent quarters in almost all of the cases where 
stabilization was not successful. 
Whatever the initial jump in prices may be and however calculated, price 
adjustment caused by the elimination of monetary overhang would not constituted inflation 
if prices did not continue to rise in the following months. It would merely result in the one- 
off change in the price level. This is because, by definition, inflation is a continuous rise in 
the level of prices. In the event, the prices continued to rise by double digits in every month 
of 1992 and 1993, except August of 1992. After considerable volatility in 1994 and 1995, 
prices stabilized steadily in the following years but did not attain a single annual digit. 
The main reasons behind the inflation in the years after liberalization can be traced 
to a series of supply shocks, which arose from a combination of shortages, monopolistic 
pricing, financing of budget deficit, excessive issuance of credits, and substantial decline in 
the value of the ruble in the foreign exchange market. Even though economic agents in 
Russia hardly had any experience with a monetary policy in market economy, the 
continuous increases in velocity indicate that they observed that the government permitted 
the economy to adjust to the earlier supply shocks by an increase in the general level of 
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prices . As a result, each successive shock 
led to expectations that a similar response 
would follow in the future. The public, however, took time to adjust its behavior to the new 
inflationary environment and to protect the real value of their assets and income. These 
adjustments took numerous forms, but the strong preference for a foreign currency, 
particularly US dollar, was prevalent. The government took opportunity of the delay in 
adjustment of money balances by extorting an extraordinary level of inflation tax. More 
specifically, in 1992 (except January) and 1993, when average inflation was the highest, the 
average monthly inflation tax amounted to as much as 32.1 and 15.5 percent of GDP, 
respectively. 23 
Over time, inflationary expectations became deeply embedded. Typically, 
businesses reacted by demanding higher prices for their good and services. Trade unions, in 
turn, responded by demanding higher wages and benefits for their members in order to 
maintain real income in the face of persistent inflation. Hence, most economic agents in 
Russia came to accept a significant part of inflation as permanent. 
It appears that rise in prices was the result of both, inertia and expectations. The 
former a consequence of a rigid price and wage determination inherited from the previous 
economic system, and the latter a consequence of considerable depreciation of ruble, itself 
largely a consequence of a sustained high rate of money supply. 24 In any stabilization 
attempt, the former is best broken by freezing wages and the latter by anchoring 
expectations to an effective intermediate target. Since, in the absence of well-developed 
financial market, economic agents best available proxy for a current inflation rate, except 
inflation history, is a prevailing level of market exchange rate, the latter seems to be an 
obvious target. Anchoring exchange rate gives strong and transparent signals that future 
inflation is likely to be low. This is particularly relevant for transition economies like 
Russian, where evident shifts in demand for money and unstable velocity reduce the 
effectiveness of money as a target. 
22 Similar accommodation, but with various degrees, was also observed in the 3 leading reformers in 
Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), at the beginning of transition (Rostowski and Nikoli6, 
1998). 
23 Inflation tax (IT) is calculated using monthly data given by the RET according to the fon-nula: IT 
M2 x (Inflation rate - interest rate). Layard and Richter (1994) calculated that in 1992 for quarters 2 (Q2) to 
Q4 and 1993 for Ql-Q3, IT was 29.9 and 25 percent, respectively. 
24 Preliminary testing of Pair wise Granger causality test, including inflation, wages, exchange rate 
and money supply variables up to 6 lags, confirins the previous conjecture. In addition, correlation between 
inflation and contemporaneous and lagged nominal wages is quite strong (in excess of 50% for up to 6 lags) 
indicating backward indexation process in Russia. Very similar results are obtained for the correlation 
between inflation and contemporaneous and lagged exchange rates. 
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Nevertheless, none of the Russian stabilization programs had a heterodox elements 
or exchange rate was used as an intermediate target until July 1995. At the latter date, a 
currency band of 4300 to 4900 rubles for US dollar was introduced, which was later 
modified into a sort of a crawling peg. While the official programme did not envisage price 
or wage controls, the Russian authorities applied such measures in autumn 1995 (Bofinger 
et al. , 1997). This was accompanied by the imposition of control over budget deficit, so that 
stabilization of inflation becomes a realistic and achievable aim, at least in the medium 
term. 
As far as expectations of inflation are concerned, it is clear that the introduction of 
the currency band, some wage control, and more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
dampened inflationary expectation. This conjecture could be confirmed by the observation 
that velocity of circulation of M2 started steadily declining approximately after 
implementation of stabilization program (Fig. 2.1). 25 Even though, quantity theory assumes 
that velocity and real growth are stable in the long run, we observe that this may not hold in 
the short run. 26 The period prior and after stabilization in Russia in July 1995 is a clear case 
in point. Namely, it is evident that in the years prior to stabilization, inflation was clearly 
sticky. That is tightening of monetary policy was not followed by an immediate fall of 
inflation, which is manifested in the rise of velocity. Between February 1992 and Jun 1995, 
ruble broad money (M2) and inflation grew on average by 13.2 and 16 percent, 
respectively. Thus growth of inflation was for about 3 percentage points greater than the 
growth of money supply. Possible explanations for the divergence between growth of 
money and prices include the changes in the demand for real balances, exogenous 
movements in the exchange rate, wages, the terms of trade, the future stance of monetary 
policy, rise in inter- enterprise credits and other arrears, remaining administrative prices, and 
finally measurement errors. 27 The general upward trend of velocity in this period is, 
however, most likely caused by a gradual improvement of the payment system and the 
growing skills of the economic agents in preserving their money holding from depreciation. 
25 One has to be aware that, velocity of circulation seems to be overestimated in Russian economy. 
This is because the GDP is underestimated, given sizable chunk of grey economy. As the grey economy 
becomes more established and measurable, the measured economy will grow faster than the material 
economy, which will show velocity falling rather faster than is actually the case. However, the pronounced 
decline in velocity leaves little doubt that decline is caused not only by the more precise measurement of GDP 
but even more so by the increase in the average time economic agents hold money balances. 
2' Buch (1999) found that quantity theory holds for Russia in the long run, too. 
" For the details of factors affecting the underlying demand for money see Anderson and Citnin 
(1995). 
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More importantly, the expectations of higher future inflation must have been underlying 
cause of the increase in velocity. Conversely, the mid 1995 stabilization program dampened 
inflation expectations so that money supply could rise somewhat without necessarily 
causing inflation. Moreover, credible tightening of monetary and fiscal policies, 
establishing positive real rates of return on domestic assets, stable real exchange rate, as 
well as containment of capital flight, increased confidence about low rate of expected 
inflation so that velocity declined significantly in the following years. Indeed the average 
monthly growth of money supply in this period was 2.32 percent while inflation grew only 
by 1.66 percent, and yet velocity was declining. 
Judging by the path and trend in velocity before and after stabilization of June 1995, 
it appears that inflation was expected to rise in the former and to decline in the latter period 
(Fig. 2.1). In both cases, economic agents could have used the previous experience with 
inflation to anticipate its current level within general trends in the two subperiods. Thus, 
since inflation persistence was strong throughout the entire period, it seems promising to 
analyze the next-period expected rate of inflation by its recent history. 
Fig. 2.1 Velocity and Trends in the Sub Periods 
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2.3 Methodology and Model Specification 
The data in this study consist of monthly observations of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) published by the RET, and cover the period between February 1992 and July 
1998. 
The beginning of the period is determined by the month after price liberalization while the 
end period is dictated by availability of data. Inflation path and its descriptive statistics, as 
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well as a one-time change in the intercept of a trend stationary process, are shown in Fi U. 
2.2. 
Fig. 2.2 Inflation and a One-time Change in the Intercept of a Trend Stationary Process 
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Note: ADF and PP stand for Augment Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron standard unit root tests, 
respectively, while KPPS stands for Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) tests for stationarity. 
* (An asterisk) indicates I percent level of significance. 
C, To indicates whether a constant term and/or a linear trend has been introduced, respectively, and the 
maximum lag length of the dependent variable (in parenthesis). 
One of the interesting features of the descriptive statistics is that the Ljung-Box tests 
reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. This is an indication that series contain a 
large degree of persistence and perhaps of near unit root process. Nevertheless, standard 
tests for unit root and the KPSS test for stationarity could not reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, as shown in Fig 2.28 In addition, the Jarque-Bera normality test shows, that 
inflation contains a sizable non-normal distribution. While kurtosis of the series is near 
mesokurtic (2.92), non-normal distribution is most likely caused by the considerable 
28 Nikoli6 (2000a, 2000b) has also shown that the inflation series, calculated as monthly growth rates 
of the CPI in Russia for the same period, is a trend stationary process with at least one structural break and no 
seasonal components. Since the break point is assumed to be unknown a prion, the break point that gives the 
least favourable result for the null hypothesis of a unit root using the test statistic is chosen. In other words, 
the break point is chosen to minimize the one-sided t statistic. These, as well as all other estimations in this 
analysis, are done in EVIews (v. 3.0). 
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skewness to the right (0.93). The positively skewed distribution lends credence to the 
hypothesis that inflation persistence may be driven by relative price adjustment (Coorey et 
al., 1998). Administered price increases may have supported higher inflation rates in the 
framework of downward sticky prices. 
The underlying assumption in this chapter is NikoliC' (2000a) observation that 
inflation in postcommunist Russia is determined, to a large extent, by its lagged values. 
That is there is a strong inflationary persistence prevalent in economy. As mentioned 
above, there is clear evidence that inflation in Russia was sticky in the period prior to June 
1995. The idea of stickiness of nominal prices and wages is one of the founding stones of 
discipline of macroeconomic. It implies among other things, that in the short run, monetary 
policy affects economic activity rather than prices. Aside probable asymmetry in price and 
wage stickiness, a major limitation to proxying expectations uniquely through past 
behaviour is implicit assumption that expectations are not affected by other factors such a 
major shift in government policy, discrete exchange or terms of trade changes and 
exogenous shocks. By definition, such expectations are not rational. As long as changes 
from year to year are smooth, the expectation proxies based solely on past behaviour are 
likely to work well in terms of explanatory power. However, in the event of sudden and 
large fluctuations, there is clear risk that the model may perform poorly. Yet despite these 
shortcomings, it is hypothesized that, in the absence of experience with economizing with 
real money balances in a market economy, as well as infantilism of financial system, a 
recent monthly inflation rate was the best available proxy for the current monthly inflation 
rate for most economic agents in Russia, particularly in the few years following 
liberalization of prices. 
Hence, a very simple autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model based on the 
inflation history, which captures inflationary expectations, is given in Eq. 2.3. 
zt = co + ai ; rt-i + eo 
i=I 
(2.3) 
where co is a constant, a, s are coefficients of lagged inflation, subscripts i and t 
denote the 
lag length and the current time period, respectively, 1-r is an inflation rate, X 
is the optimal 
lag length of autoregression, and eo, , is the stochastic error term that 
follows the classical 
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assumptions; namely, it has zero mean, constant variance, and is not autocorrelated (i. e., 
they are white noise). This model can be thought of as one of the family of models from the 
Hicks' classical analysis of the factors affecting formation of expectations. 29 
Prior to estimating expectations it is essential to establish an optimal lag length of 
the autoregression, which amount to determination of an integer X in Eq. 2.3. Among a 
number of statistical and ad hoc criteria, minimizing the Swartz Criterion (SC) of predictive 
accuracy is favoured, because it does not only produces the most parsimonious model but it 
is also asymptotically consistent. 30 Application of the SC, for X up to 15, produced the 
results presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Lag Length Selection for the ADL Model of Inflation 
lag 123456789 10 11 12 13 14 
- 
15 
SC 5.18 5.20 5.23 5.19 5.14 4.96 4.97 5.00 4.80* 4.87 4.94 5.00 5.08 4.95 5.03 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes the smallest value of the SC. 
2.4 Results 
After determining the appropriate lag length for the ADLM of inflation we apply 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) method to Eq. 2.3. However, application of the OLS, 
which is presented in Table 2.2, does not produce efficient estimates since the error term in 
the final expression does not seem to follow the classical assumption specified above. More 
specifically, although diagnostic statistic, presented in the Table 2.2, does not indicate any 
deficiency of the model, further testing utilizing Lagrange Multiplier (LM), the 
correlograms of the squared residuals, and Jarque-Berra tests, presented in Tables 3-5 
respectively, reveal that the magnitude of residuals appeared to be related to the magnitude 
of recent residuals. In other words there is autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
2'The other two models in this taxonomic classification are those that capture stochastic shocks 
(wars, crop failure, major natural disasters, etc. ) and structural developments, including monetary, fiscal, 
incomes and exchange rate policies. 
30The test statistics is given by the SC=-2LIn+klognln where k is the number of estimated 
parameters, n is the number of observations, and L is the value of the log likelihood 
function using the k 
estimated parameters. In order to select the most appropriate model, we choose the values that minimize the 
SC. Analogues to other information criteria, the SC is based on minus 2 times the average log likelihood 
function, adjusted by a penalty function. 
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(ARCH) in the residuals. Even though, ARCH in itself does not invalidate standard OLS 
inference, ignoring ARCH effects may result in loss of efficiency. 
Table 2.2 OLS Estimates of the ADLM of Inflation 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.001 0.001 0.999 
/ 'T t-I 1.068 9.466* 0.000 
/Tt-2 -0.191 -1.181 0.242 
)Tt-3 0.212 1.294 0.201 
ITt-4 -0.368 -2.290* 0.026 
ITt- 5 0.207 1.500 0.139 
)Tt-6 -0.045 -0-380 0.705 
IT-7 0.015 0.130 0.897 
; Tt-8 0.076 0.646 0.521 
ITt- 9 -0.022 -0.267 0.791 
R2 0.943 SC 4.800 
R2 adj. 0.934 F 108.773 
S. E. 2.123 Prob. (F) 0.000 
L -144.445 D. W. 2.075 
Table 2.3 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
Lags 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. 
F-statistic 7.91 * 4.14* 2.66 2.41 1.87 1.52 1.26 2.66* 
Probability 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.02 
Obs. xR2. 7.28* 7.68* 7.53 9.01 8.87 8.84 8.73 17.72* 
Probability 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.27 0.02 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. The F-statistic is an omitted 
variable test for the joint significance of all lagged residuals. Because the omitted variables are residuals and 
not independent variables, the exact finite sample distribution of the F-statistic under HO is not known, but we 
still present the F-statistic for comparison purposes. The Obs. xR2 statistic is the Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
statistic. This LM statistic is computed as the number of observations, times the (uncentered) R2 from the test 
regression. Under quite general conditions, the LM test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a 
J(p). 
Table 2.4 Ljung-Box Q-statistics for the Squared Residuals 
lag 123 
---4 
56789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Q- 7.68* 7.71* 7.73 9.22 9.88 10-19 10.37 2289* 25.55* 2 5.61 *25.61 26 37* 2&69* 26.73* 26 82* 2T08* 2109 2709 
Stat. 
Prob. 0.01 0.02 0.05 U6 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 004 Oý06 0.08 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. 
Table 2.5 Normality Test for the ADL Model 
Skewness 0.348* 
Kurtosis 7.668* 
Jarque-Bera 64.028* 
Probability 0.00 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. The asymptotic standard errors 
of the skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 
C(6 _IT) 
and 
C(24 _IT) 
, respectively, where T is the sample 
size. An asterisk associated with the coefficients of skewness and/or kurtosis indicates significance and 
implies that the coefficient exceeds twice its standard error. The Jarque-Bera (JB) non-nality statistic is 
distributed as Chi-square with two degrees of freedom. 
In order to account for the ARCH effects, we utilize ARCH models proposed by 
31 Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). In the first step, an appropriate specification of 
ARCH model should be determined. To that end we relied on minimizing the SC of 
predictive accuracy. We looked at the ARCH(l), ARCH(2), and ARCH(3) models and, as 
it had become a convention, at the GARCH(l, l), GARCH(1,2), GARCH(2,2) and 
GARCH(2,1) models. According to Bera and Higgins (1993), a data set that requires a 
model of order greater than these presented is very rare. The results of the search for the 
appropriate ARCH model are presented in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Choice of ARCH/GARCH Model 
ARCH Lo 2,0 350 
- 
151 1ý2 252 2,1 
sc 4-008* 4.120 4.147 4.126 4.063 4.113 4.069 
Note: An asterisk indicates the minimum value of the SC for the given ARCH models 
" For the sake of brevity, we will use ARCH to refer to 
both ARCH and generalised ARCH 
(GARCH) models. For details of ARCH/GARCH modelling see 
Nikoli6 (2000a). 
-ý'l 
After determining the optimal specifications of the ARCH model, we increase 
efficiency of estimate of Eq. 2.3 by using maximum likelihood method. Hence, the 
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estimates of the ARCH(l) are presented in Table 2.7 . 
Table 2.7 Maximum Likelihood Estimate of Inflation - ARCH(1,0) 
Coefficient z-Statistic Prob. 
CO -0.006 -0.062 0.951 
; Tt- 1 1.138 11.170* 0.000 
7ý-2 -0.149 -0.919 0.358 
, 74-3 -0.097 -0.766 0.444 
; Tt-4 -0.010 -0.102 0.919 
, 7t- 5 -0.050 -0.559 0.576 
0.107 1.493 0.135 
t-7 0.087 1.558 0.119 
)Tt-8 -0.019 -0.283 0.777 
'74-9 -0.022 -0.620 0.535 
Variance Equation 
c 0.106 0.979 0.328 
ARCH(l) 1.609 2.824* 0.005 
R2 0.933 F 72.498 
R2 adj. 0.920 Prob. (F) 0.000 
S. E. 2.340 Q18 (sq. res. ) 23.240 
L -112.873 Prob. 
Q18 0.182 
D. W. 2.223 Skewness 0.078 
Q18 (stand. res. ) 13.467 Kurtosis 2.158 
Prob. Q18 0.763 ARCH LM8 9.578 
Jarque-Bera (JB) 2.108 Prob. LM8 0.296 
Prob. (JB) 0.349 RESET F (1) 0.048 (0.057) 
Prob. F (1) 0.827 (0.81 1)ý 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. 
Diagnostic statistic, presented in Table 2.7, does not reveal any deficiency of the 
ARCH(I) model of inflation in Russia for the given period. The fit of the model is 
reasonably good and there is no sign of autocorrelation in the residuals. Although the only 
32 The hypothesis that, in addition to lagged inflation rate, the expectation of future inflation also 
depend on its variability, which is defined as the absolute change in the rate of inflation, is also tested. 
However, the coefficient of variability of inflation is not found significant. 
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significant lag in the autoregression. appears to be lag one, the Wald test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the rest of the lags are jointly zero. 33 
Given enormous changes that took place in Russia and numerous structural shifts 
during stabilization period, it would be interesting to examine whether the parameters of 
our model, presented in Table 2.7, are stable across various sub-samples of our data. The 
majority of stability tests, however, cannot be performed on the models estimated by 
likelihood method. Since most of these tests can be used with least squares and two-stage 
least squares regressions we subjected the OLS estimates of Eq. 2.3, given in Table 2.2, to 
plethora of recursive least squares stability tests. The tests include: recursive residuals test 
(RRT), CUSUM test based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals, CUSUM of 
square test, one step forecast test (0-SFT), N-step forecast test (N-SFT), and finally the 
recursive OLS coefficient test (ROLSCT). As shown in Figs. 2.3 and 2.4, all of the stability 
tests, except the CUSUM square test, could not reject the null hypothesis of no structural 
break in the data at the conventional level of significance. 34 
3' F-statistics = 0.7649 (probability = 0.6347); Log likelihood ratio (LR) = 24.7217 (probability 
0.00173). 
34 The conventional level of significance throughout the paper is 5 percent. 
55 
Fig. 2.3 Tests on Parameter Stability of the ADL Model of Inflation 
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Fig. 2.4 Recursive Coefficients Estimates of the ADL Model of Inflation 
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Specifically, in contrast to the results of the rest of stability test, the plot of the 
CUSUM of square test points that at the beginning of 1994 the parameters of the equation 
change significantly. Aided by the plot of the O-SFT, we can see that indeed the period of 
about one year between early 1994 and early 1995 is the least successfully captured by the 
equation. This particular period is characterized by the uncertainty brought about by the 
stop and go policies of various stabilization efforts as well as the exchange rate collapse on 
"Black Tuesday" in October 1994. Thus the performance of the model in this period is 
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hardly surprising, particularly in light of the fact that we have already established that 
inflation series has a structural break at the beginning of the 1994 period. In order to 
account for the potential structural break in the model, one could include a dummy variable 
for structural break as well as a dummy for the external shock of October 1994. Such model 
would improve the fit for about 3-percentage point, but would inevitably be less 
parsimonious and it would require further diagnostic testing. Nevertheless, the CUSUM 
square test indication of a structural break could not be supported by any other stability test 
mentioned above. 
In particular, since recursive residuals in the RRT fall inside the plus minus two 
standard error band, there is no sign of instability of parameters of the equation. Similarly, 
the lower portion of the plot (left vertical axis) of the O-SFT shows the probability values 
for those sample points where the hypothesis of parameter constancy would be rejected at 
the 5,10, or 15 percent levels. While this plot can help us spot the periods when our 
equation is least successful, it shows that parameter constancy could not be rejected at the 5 
percent level. By the same token, the N-SFT, which uses the recursive calculations to carry 
out a sequence of Chow Forecast tests, does not indicate instability of parameter of the 
equation. 35 Much of the same applies to the CUSUM, which is based on the cumulative 
sum of the recursive residuals. Since the cumulative sum does not go outside the area 
between the two 5% critical lines, there is no indication of parameter instability. Finally, 
the RCE enables us to trace the evolution of estimates for any coefficient as more and more 
of the sample data are used in the estimation. Not only the plots of selected coefficients do 
not go beyond its own two standard error bands, but also there are no dramatic jumps in the 
plot except some mild one at the beginning of the period, which are likely to be reflecting 
the limited number of observation used to estimate them at the start of the recursion. As a 
matter of fact, the plots of individual coefficients are remarkably smooth and linear. In 
addition, Ramsey's (1969) regression specification error test (RESET) does not indicate 
any deficiency of the model. 
35 In contrast to the single Chow Forecast test, this test does not require the specification of a forecast 
period- it automatically computes all feasible cases, starting with the smallest possible sample size for 
estimating the forecasting equation and then adding one observation at a time. 
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2.5 Alternative Modelling 
An alternative and more parsimonious method of modelling time series, like 
inflation rate in our sample, is a popular Box-Jenkins method, technically known as the 
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA). The ARIMA models encompass the 
generic family of models associated with the broad term 'adaptive expectations hypothesis'. 
The emphasis of these new forecasting tools is not constructing a single or simultaneous 
equation(s) models but on analyzing probabilistic, or stochastic, properties of economic 
time series on their own under the philosophy 'let data speak for themselves'. Hence, the 
conditions for optimal forecasts can be generalized to include the nature of the shocks, 
leading to the general proposition that forecasts should be revised by a weighted average of 
all previous errors and not just by a fraction of the last one. In this way, the ARIMA models 
provide a general framework for the most efficient forecast of inflation, when no 
information other than past inflation is considered (Feige and Pearce, 1976). Given this, 
ARIMA models appear to be the most appropriate for our analysis. Since our time series is 
found to be stationary i. e., it does not need to be integrated, we can model Eq. 2.3 as an 
autoregressive (AR), or moving average (MA), or combination of these two (ARMA) 
processes. 
The first step of our analyses is to identify an approximate structure of the model by 
finding out appropriate values of the AR term (p) and the MA (q) term. To that end, we 
utilize the chief tools in identifications: autocorrelation function (ACF), partial 
autocorrelation function (PACF) and the resulting correlograms. This analysis indicates that 
both the ACF and the PACF decay exponentially and both have significant spikes. 36 Hence, 
the likely model is to be an ARMA process. Significant spikes at lags I and 6 in the PACF 
indicate AR(6) process while quite a few significant lags in the ACF indicate a complex 
MA process. In order to identify the optimum model we again utilize the SC of predictive 
accuracy. To that end we tested the AR(6) in combination with various MA terms. With a 
help of ACF, PACF and the S C, the tentative identified model turned to be ARMA(6,1). 
Having tentatively identified the appropriate p and q terms in our ARMA model, we 
then estimated parameters of the AR and MA terms included in the model. The results of 
" The graphs of the correlogram and partial correlogram are not presented but could be obtained 
from the author upon a request. 
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this estimate, obtained by the OLS, as well as the diagnostic statistics, are presented in 
Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 ARMA(6,1) Model of Inflation 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
CO 3.506 8.754 0.400 0.690 
AR(6) 0.067 0.056 1.204 0.233 
AR(l) 0.878 0.066 13.349* 0.000 
MA(l) 0.337 0.124 2.708* 0.009 
R2 0.913 Mean dep. var. 8.128 
R2 adj. 0.909 S. D. dep. var. 8.318 
S. E. 2.504 S. C. 4.854 
L -166.187 F 238.536 
D. W. 2.061 Prob. F 0.000 
Q20-resid. 19.452 Q20-resid. sq. 21.178 
Prob. Q20 0.303 Prob. Q2o sq. 0.219 
Inverted AR Roots 0.96 . 45 -. 46i . 45+. 46i -. 22 -. 52i 
-. 22+. 52i -0.54 
Inverted MA Roots -0.34 
After estimation of the ARMA(6, I), model we applied diagnostic tests in order to 
check whether it was specified correctly. We assumed that the random error terms in the 
actual process are normally distributed and independent. It follows that, if the model has 
been specified correctly, the residuals from the model should resemble white noise process. 
None of the individual autocorrelation and partial autocorrelations came out to be 
significant. Similarly, Box-Pierce Q20 statistics of residuals and square residuals, presented 
in Table 2.8 also came out to be insignificant. The reciprocal roots of the AR and MA 
polynomials have modulus no greater than one. 37 Hence, white noise residuals obtained by 
the model indicate acceptance of the model. 
However, in testing for stability of parameters of the model, the Chow Break Point 
38 (SBT) test indicates that there is a structural break at the beginning of 1994. This finding 
came as no surprise, since we already established that inflation series had a structural break 
in this point of time. Subsequently, we modified the ARMA(6,1) model to take account of 
37 If p has a real root whose absolute value exceeds one or a pair of complex reciprocal roots outside 
the unit circle (that is, with modulus greater than one), it implies an explosive autoregressive process. 
Conversely, if q has reciprocal roots outside the unit circle, we say that the MA process is noninvertible, 
which makes interpreting and using the MA results difficult. 
38 LR=26.4416, probability-0.000026. 
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the structural break (SBFEB94). In addition, following Nikolic' (2000a), a dummy variable 
D094 is included in the model to account for exogenously induced inflation that occurred 
in 1994 as result of the exchange rate crises of October 1994 (Black Tuesday). 40 Hence, the 
following model is estimated: 
t=ci + ýiAR(I)+arjAR(6)+ 6MA(l) + co, SBFEB94+ VID094+el, t I -r (2.4) 
where cl is a constant, el,, is an error term with classical properties described above, and ý1, 
tui, 6, Q, and V/1, are the coefficients of the respective variables described above. 
Estimates of the Eq. 2.4 and accompanying diagnostics statistics does not reveal any 
deficiency of the model, as shown in Table 2.9 and Fig. 2.5. The fit of the model is good 
and the model seems to be predicting turning points reasonably well. 
3' Dummy variable SBFEB94 =I after January 1994 and 0 otherwise. 
'0 The dummy variable, D094, takes a value of I for October 1994 and zero otherwise. At the 
beginning of October 1994, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) lost control over the exchange rate and with 
reserves running low, was unable to prevent Black Tuesday on October II when the ruble (R) to dollar ($) 
exchange rate fell by 28%, jumping from R3,000 to almost R4,000 in one day. For the entire month of 
October, the exchange rate jumped from R2,361/$ to 2,994/$, which is equivalent to a month-to-month 
nominal depreciation of 26.8% (RET, 1994). While there have been many financial and other crises in Russia 
during transition, Nikoli6 (2000a) found that, the magnitude of the Black Tuesday crises, if not taken into 
account, renders a simple ADL model of money price relationship to be unstable. A similar exogenous shock, 
but with a greater magnitude, seems to have taken place in August 1998. It would be necessary to take this 
into account in a similar manner if the period after July 1998 were modelled. 
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Table 2.9 ARMA(6, I) Estimate of Inflation Including Structural Break 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Variable 
Cl 14.391 3.972 3.624* 0.001 
SBFEB94 -9.661 1.971 -4.901 * 0.000 
D094 2.515 1.093 2.3 01 * 0.025 
AR(l) 0.779 0.080 9.725* 0.000 
AR(6) 0.103 0.063 1.629 0.108 
MA(l) 0.588 0.114 5.161 * 0.000 
R2 0.939 Mean dep. var 8.128 
R2 adj. 0.934 S. D. dep. var 8.318 
S. E. 2.138 S. C. 4.627 
L -153.730 F 201.801 
D. W. 2.074 Prob. F 0.000 
Q20 16.078 Q20 sq. 17.743 
Prob. Q20 0.518 Prob. Q20 sq. 0.405 
ChowFT1995: 06LR 18.582 RESET, 1.403 
Prob. ChowFT 0.997 Prob. RESET, 0.236 
Inverted AR Roots 0.93 . 47 -. 52i . 
47+. 52i -. 25 -. 56i 
-. 25+. 56i -0.6 
Inverted MA Roots -0.59 
Fig. 2.5 Actual and the ARMA(6,1) Fitted Inflation 
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2.6 Forecasting 
Perhaps the most important use of ARMA models is to forecast future values of the 
sequence of a dependent variable. Since our objective is to examine the formation of 
inflation expectation based on its own history, it would be interesting to test the 
performance of our ARMA(6,1) model. This is done by applying static forecasting, or one- 
step-ahead forecasts, and presented in the Fig. 2.6. 
Fig. 2.6 Static Forecast of ARMA(6, I) Model With the Structural Break 
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Forecast: zF 
Actual: ýr 
Sample: 1992: 08 1998: 07 
Include observations: 72 
Root Mean Squared Error 2.0466 
Mean Absolute Error 1.4205 
Mean Abs. Percent Error 78.594 
Theil Inequality Coefficient 0.0896 
Bias Proportion 0.0000 
Vanance Proportion 0.0548 
Covariance Proportion 0.9452 
The first two forecast error statistics depend on the scale of the dependent variable. 
These can be used as a relative measure to compare forecasts for the inflation series across 
different models; the smaller the error, the better the forecasting ability of that model 
according to that criterion. The remaining two statistics are scale invariant. The Theil 
(1961) inequality coefficient always lies between zero and one, where zero indicates a 
perfect fit. The mean squared forecast error can be decomposed as: the bias proportion, 
which tells us how far the mean of the forecast is from the mean of the actual series; the 
variance proportion, which tells us how far the variation of the forecast is from the variation 
of the actual series; and the covariance proportion, which measures the remaining 
unsystematic forecasting errors. 41 
In our model, the bias proportion is extremely small, indicating that the mean of the 
forecasts does a decent job of tracking the mean of the dependent variable. In other words, 
Note that the bias, variance, and covariance proportions add up to one. 
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since the extent to which average values of simulated and actual series deviate from each 
other is negligible, there is no indication of systematic error in the model. Furthermore, 
somewhat larger, but still very small, the variance proportions indicates that most of the 
bias is concentrated on the covariance proportions. Hence, our one-step ahead forecast of 
ARMA(6,1) model of inflation seem to perform reasonably well. 
We also applied one-step ahead forecast on the estimated ARCH(I) model described 
above. The procedure includes computing static forecast of the mean, its forecast standard 
error, and the conditional variance. The upper part of the Fig. 2.7 shows the forecast of the 
dependent variable from the mean equation together with the two standard deviation bands. 
The lower part of the graph is the forecast of the conditional variance. 
Fig. 2.7 Static Forecast of ARCH(1,0) Model of Inflation 
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The variance shown in the lower graph (Fig. 2.7) appears to be declining over this 
forecast horizon but it has at least 3 notable peaks. As expected, the largest peak is at the 
point of the structural break in inflation series as discussed above. The next largest peak in 
the forecast of variance is unsurprisingl in October 1994 at the time of exchange rate crises 
as explained above. Finally, third significant peak in the forecast of variance in early 1995 
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perhaps indicates the inflation shock related to a significant liberalization of the energy 
prices in this period. Since the ARCH term is not close to one, the volatility shocks, 
although notable, are not for the most part persistent and the forecasts of the conditional 
variance converge to the steady state reasonably fast. 
In conclusion about forecasting, it seems that both models give good static forecasts 
of inflation. 
2.7 Rationality of Expectations 
Under rationality, the long-run response of expected inflation to the actual rate of 
inflation should be equal to one, as economic agents cannot systematically be fooled (Muth, 
1961). In other words, expectations of agents are said to be rational if they coincide with 
the true mathematical expectations conditioned on all relevant information available at the 
time forecast was made. Two types of tests are used to test the rationality of expectations: 
test for unbiasedness and test for efficiency. The former tests whether forecasts are 
unbiased estimates of the actual inflation rate, and the latter, whether forecasts incorporate 
all available relevant information. The latter typically distinguishes between 'weak fonn 
efficiency' and 'strong form efficiency'. The weak form efficiency test implies testing 
whether the expectations error can be explained by previous periods expectations errors. 
Conversely, strong form efficiency (orthogonality) implies that economic agents make 
efficient use of all available information in forming expectations of the inflation rate. 
In order to analyze the underlying principle behind each of the test of rationality 
more formally, let ; Tt be the inflation rate at time t and /-ý, be the rate of inflation during 
period t expected by agents at the end of period t-1, and let It contain all relevant 
inforniation at the end of t- 1. If 1-ýt is the rational expectation (RE) of -ý, then 
)Tt I It (2.5) 
where E is the conditional operator. Eq. 2.5 implies that If t is an unbiased predictor of /-ý, 
which can be tested by running the regression 
17t --: ý: C2 +a /-ý, +e2, t (2.6) 
65 
and testing the joint hypothesis that (C2, a) = (0,1). Acceptance of the null hypothesis 
would be consistent with rationality. 
However, tests based on Eq. 2.6 are rather weak, since RE hypothesis imply much 
more than unbiasedness. For expectations to be rational, they must include all relevant 
information available at the time they are formed. This information is likely to include the 
past history of inflation, previous period inflation forecasts and thus forecast errors, and 
most probably other variables that may influence inflation i. g., money supply, 
unemployment, fiscal variable etc. Typically, this is the objective of the tests for efficiency. 
The weak form efficiency test implies testing whether the expectations errors can be 
explained by previous periods expectation errors. Let Oj, tt- 1-7't represent measured )T 
forecast error, wherej=l for ARCH(1,0) andj=2 for ARMA(6, I) model presented above. 
The hypothesis of zero correlation and non-significant zero mean can be tested by 
regressing Oj, t on lagged values of itself. That is we estimate 
0j, t 0j, I+ e3, t (2.7) 
and test the null hypothesis HO:, fli = 0, i=1, ..., K for a range of choices 
K. Assuming that 
past price information is readily available and clearly relevant (i. e., )r, -i 
is contained in the It- 
, for iý: I), an obvious test of rationality is that Oj, t cannot be correlated with lagged rates of 
inflation. The Eq. 2.8 is estimated and the following null hypothesis is tested: Ho: 7i = 0, i 
11 .... K 
for a range of choices K. 
K 
j+ e4, t ,=o (2.8) 
Strong form efficiency or orthogonality implies that economic agents make use of all 
available information in forming expectation about inflation rate. This hypothesis can be 
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tested by examination for lack of correlation between forecast errors (0j, ) and other 
variables contained in 1,1.42 
Oj, t= z't-ig+ e5, t (2.9) 
where z't-i is a vector of information variables dated i- I or earlier (extended broad money 
43 
supply, m2x, in our case), 5is a vector of coefficients, and the null hypothesis (consistent 
with rationality) Ho: 9= 0, i=I is tested. 
Each of the tests described above tests for violation of rationality in a particular 
direction. The tests give various and interesting assessment of rationality and they are 
therefore presented separately. Each test is performed on both, ARCH(l) and ARMA(6, I) 
models. However, forecast error series are required to be stationary in their regressions. 
Hence, both series were tested for stationarity and found to be stationary at the 
conventional 5 percent level of significance. The results of the standard unit root tests, such 
as ADF and PP, are presented in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10 Unit Root Tests for 01 and 02 
01 02 
ADF -6.57* -4.82* 
Specificationa 0,0(1) 0,0(2) 
LMI, (LM4)b 1.98, (2.82) 0.35, (6.25) 
pp -9.26* --9.26* 
Specificationa 0,0(3) 0,0(3) 
Note: * (**) indicates 1 (5) percent level of significance. 
'Indicates whether a linear trend (T) and/or a constant term (C) has been introduced and the maximum lag 
length of the dependent variable (in parenthesis). 
b Chi-square - values of an LM test on 1" (0) order auto c orrelati on. Critical values at the 5 percent level of 
confidence are 3.84 (9.49). 
42 An alternative test for the hypothesis of strong rationality can be performed by adding variables 
contained in I,, in addition to the lagged expectation errors, to the right side of Eq. 2.7 and testing for the joint 
significance (Pesaran, 1987). 
4' The choice of variable(s) contained in I,, would depend of the available information and the costs 
to acquire and process them. It follows that rational agents will set the marginal costs of acquiring and 
processing information to be equal to the benefits of acquiring them. We assumed that one of the most 
relevant variables to influence inflation is broad money supply (m2x) as in Nikoli6 (2000a). If it turns out that 
this variable does not systematically influences expectation of inflation, than alternative variable would be 
included in I,, and consequently tested. Conversely, if expectations turn not to be rational there is no point in 
including other variables in the set for our purpose. 
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Diagnostic statistics, presented in Table 2.11, clearly demonstrates that null 
hypothesis of coefficients restriction in Eq. 2.6 could not be rejected in either of the models. 
Hence, expectations of inflation are unbiased in both of the models. 
Table 2.11 Wald test statistics of the coefficients restrictions: (C2, a) : -: ": (0,1) 
ARCH(1,0) ARMA(6, I) 
F-statistic 0.735 0.428 
Probability 0.484 0.654 
Chi-square 1.469 0.856 
Probability 0.480 0.652 
Similarly, Wald test for the null hypothesis, Ho: 6i = 0, i=1, in Eq. 2.7, as well as 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests for zero correlation in forecast errors, could not reject the 
notion of rationality of expectation of inflation, either. 44 
Table 2.12 Tests for Zero Correlation and Non-significant Zero Mean 
ARCH(1,0) ARMA(6, I) 
LM 1 (4) 0.000 (3.008) 0.345 (6.249) 
Probability 1(4) 1.000 (0.556) 0.557 (0.181) 
Wald F 0.945 1.154 
Probability 0.334 0.334 
Wald X2 0.945 3.463 
Probabili! j 0.331 0.326 
In the same way, the null hypothesis from Eq. 2.8 could not be rejected as shown in 
45 Table 2.13 . 
Table 2.13 Test for the Lack of Serial Correlation and Non-significant Zero Mean 
ARCH(I 0) ARMA(6,1) 
. _- LM 1 (4) 0.947 (5.200) 2.293 (2.293) 
Probability 1(4) 0.331 (0.267) 0.682 (0.682) 
Wald F 1.282 0.343 
Probability 0.262 0.560 
X2 Wald 1.282 0.343 
Probability__ 0.258 0.558 
44 The SC of predictive accuracy was used to choose an integer Kin Eq. 2.7. Consequently, K= I and 
K=3 was set for the ARCH(1,0) and ARNIA(6,1) models, respectively. 
45 SC chooses K= I for both models. 
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Nevertheless, the strong form efficiency test, presented in Eq. 9 rejects the notion of 
RE of inflation for both models. Table 2.14 presents the OLS estimates of the inflation 
regressed forecast errors on the slightly modified monetary model given in Nikoli6 
46 (2000a). Efficient forecasting requires that the coefficients of all the information variables 
equal zero. A nonzero coefficient implies that forecasters could have improved their 
predictions by better exploiting the information set 1,1 or its subset. Rationality also 
requires non-correlated error terms in these equations. Autocorrelated forecast error would 
imply that predictions could be improved by simply taking account of this phenomenon in 
generating predictions. 
Table 2.14 OLS Estimates of the Strong Form Efficiency Test 
Variable 
ARCH(1,0) 
Coefficient t-Statistic 
ARMA 
Coefficient 
(6, I) 
t-Statistic 
-0.144 -3.248* -0.104 -2.952* 
m2xt-I 0.077 1.997 0.060 1.927 
m2xt-2 -0.058 -1.537 -0.093 -2.739* 
m2xt-3 0.096 2.573* 0.146 4.369* 
m2xt-4 0.054 1.432 0.038 1.124 
D094 6.146 3.360* 2.142 1.253 
SBFEB94 -0.628 -2.305* -0.522 -2.109* 
R2 0.356 0.390 
R2 adj. 0.294 0.334 
S. E. 1.790 1.682 
D. W. 2.247 2.272 
F 5.722 6.927 
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 
LM 1(7) 0.849 (16.920*) 3.097 (16.267*) 
Prob. LM 1(7) 0.357 (0.018) . 078 
(0.023) 
46 More specifically, contemporaneous values of m2x are excluded from these regressions because it 
is assumed that agents do not have this information on their disposal. The same models are estimated 
including constant term but the results and conclusions are not significantly different. Similarly, 
autoregressions of higher order are also estimated i. e., 9 lags for inflation and 3 lags for m2x as specified 
by 
the SC, but the results in respect of rationality are not qualitatively different. 
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Since values of F-statistics, in each of the models presented in Table 2.14, are not 
significant, we can reject hypothesis that the coefficients of all the information variables 
equal zero. Similarly, although the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test does not 
indicate the presence of the first order serial correlation for any of the models, it does so for 
the seventh order. Furthermore, rationality is undermined by the reasonably high 
coefficients of determinations. Hence, having established nonzero coefficients of the 
information variables and the presence of autocorrelation we can reject rationality 
hypothesis in its strong fonn. 
2.8 Policy Implications and Direction for Further Research 
Prevalence of persistent inflation 47 in Russian economy does not only signify 
accommodating character of Russian monetary policy, but also has strong implications for 
stabilization policy. It is the latter that seem to be neglected prior to summer of 1995 with 
adverse but somewhat predictable outcomes. Classic orthodox money based stabilization 
programs are not usually reputed for high credibility and transparency. Given the economic 
environment of persistent high inflation, this stabilization approach might have not been the 
most appropriate one to achieve rapid synchronized disinflation in Russia, particularly if 
commitment for fiscal adjustment was lacking. The sluggishness with which money-based 
programs reduce inflation, when they do at all, and their high costs in terms of output and 
unemployment, does not favour their implementation in countries where chronic inflation is 
persistent. In contrast, exchange rate based heterodox programs have ability to quickly 
break up both inertia and inflationary expectations and therefore bring inflation down to 
low levels. 
Since it appears that the inflation in Russian economy is a result of both, inertia and 
expectations, an exchange rate-based heterodox stabilization might be an appropriate 
recommendation. Even though, a strong inflationary persistence would indicate a 
preference for this stabilization approach, this may not be without shortcomings. Such 
programs would need sizable foreign currency reserves, which Russia did not have at the 
beginning of stabilization attempts. In addition, heterodox elements, wage and price 
47 Since our models are reduced forin. models, we cannot however say that the inflation is pe i 
rs 
i 
istent in a 
structural sense, or whether the appearance of persistence simply results from the economic polci es used at 
the time, and the shocks hitting the Russian economy. 
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controls, may occasionally be superfluous and difficult to enforce. Furthermore, they can 
introduce substantial rigidity in relative prices and they may prove hard to phase out. 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, it appears that this type of program, with an 
external financial assistance, would have performed better than orthodox money-based 
stabilization if introduced earlier. As the experience of July 1995 indicates, such a 
programme would have a clear dampening effect on inflationary expectations on one hand 
and would be likely to break up inflationary inertia on the other. Needless to say, a strong 
commitment to fiscal adjustment, as well as high likelihood of being followed, would need 
to be a conditio sine qua non for the success of such program, as indeed is the case for any 
stabilization program. 
Even though both of our models seems to exhibit desirable statistical properties, the 
notable volatility of inflation in Russia in the given sample, indicates that this phenomenon 
may alternatively be duly modelled by Markov- switching model. 48 In contrast to 
conventional modelling, this approach makes explicit allowance for the possibility of 
structural change. In other words, Markov- switching model conjectures that two or more 
regimes could have prevailed over the course of history. That is, there is a regime, or a 
state, when inflationary expectations are low and one or more regimes when they are high. 
Series of shifts between the regimes (timing of breaks) occur in probabilistic fashion, thus 
endogenously rather than being imposed by the researcher. Such a model may be able to 
pick up endogenous shifts in the level of inflationary expectations in Russian economy and 
give superior results. In addition, Markov- switching model may be complemented by 
inclusion of other potential variables that explain inflation and are available for forecasts, 
i. e., unemployment, money supply, and output gap. Furthermore, it is more likely that such 
model may prove rational not only in the weak sense but also by the strong efficiency 
criteria described above. 
2.9 Conclusion 
In contrast to earlier claims, this chapter clearly demonstrates that lagged inflation 
in Russian economy was a very important determinant of the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation. In both, ADLM and ARNIA models of inflation expectations, lagged inflation 
rates accounted for more than 90% of the variations in the contemporaneous inflation. 
48 See Hamilton (1989,1990) and Ricketts and Rose (1995) 
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Economic agents could easily utilize both of these simple models to make consistent 
forecasts of a one-month ahead inflation rate. Unsurprisingly, even though they are 
unbiased and weakly efficient, these forecasts are not rational in the strong form of 
efficiency. In other words, in addition to previous inflation rates, economic agents could 
have used other available information at their disposal at the time to improve upon their 
forecasts. In addition, having identified a high degree of inflation persistency in Russian 
economy, this study implicitly suggests that, instead of the money-based stabilizations, 
exchange rate based stabilization with heterodox elements might have been more suitable 
for this transition economy. This stabilization approach would be more likely to both, 
dampen inflationary expectations and break inflationary inertia. The findings in this study 
indicate that the experience in terms of inflationary expectations of a transition economy 
may not be different from a market economy, but some of the institutional and historical 
legacies of the former socialist system should not be overlooked. 
Finally, one has to be aware that a disadvantage of autoregressive models to predict 
sharp downturns and upturns in a series limits their value for forecasting. In particular, 
these kinds of models require that policies of the government have not changed sharply 
over the period under consideration. In other words, following the 'Lucas critique' one may 
claim that expectations obtained by mechanical extrapolation of the past value of a variable 
may fail to capture the change in the formation of expectations due to the policy rule 
change (Lucas, 1981). Furthermore, the measurement error, limited number of 
observations, and questionable reliability of Russian statistical apparatus could further 
undermine the relevance of the estimated inflationary expectations. However, in the 
absence of long run series of financial market indicators and sample surveys, these are 
economical forecasting alternatives, particularly suited for the short time forecasting. 
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CHAPTER3 
Money Growth Inflation Relationship in Postcommunist Russia 49 
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between the growth of different monetary aggregates and the rise 
in prices is one of the best-documented relationships in economic literature. In the simple 
analytical framework of Fisher's (1963) variant of the Quantity Equation, prices (P) may 
increase as a result of a growth of money supply (M), an increase of velocity of money 
(V), or a decline of the total physical volume of transactions (T), assuming in each case 
that other two factors remain unchanged. 50 
P=M+V-T (3.1) 
In practice, changes in the other two factors may either add to or offset the initial 
disturbance, but empirical works often adopt the convention of the Naive Quantity Theory 
(Locke, 1823), where V and T in Eq. (3.1) are treated as constants, with P varying in 
direct proportion to M. Such a representation makes explicit the role of time, and thereby 
facilitates the study of the effect of monetary change on the temporal pattern of inflation. 
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated consistent patterns for money price 
relationships for various market economies. Monetarists argue that these studies have 
supported their claim that inflation can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the 
quantity of money than of output, and it is thus regarded as a purely monetary phenomenon 
(Friedman, 1989). While these propositions may be valid for market economies, they do not 
seem to be holding for the majority of transition economies. Except for Russia and Poland, 
49 1 am indebted to the Editor of Journal of Comparative Economics, John Bonin, and two 
anonymous referees for the useful comments on the earlier versions of this paper. Responsibility for any 
remaining errors rests with the author. 
'0 A dot over variables denotes the rate of growth. 
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no systematic pattern for the money price relationship was detected in transition economies, 
thus undermining the conventional monetarist view at least in the transitional context 
(Economic Conu-nission for Europe, 1995). 
Although it would be challenging to re-examine this relationship in all transition 
economies with the benefit of the longer data series now available, this chapter focuses 
attention solely on Russia. The main objective of this chapter is to scrutinize critically and 
rigorously the strength and the dynamics of the relationship between inflation and various 
monetary aggregates in post-communist Russia. In particular, we test firstly, whether this 
relationship is significant, and secondly, whether the lower inflationary environment that 
emerged in Russia in 1994, and especially in 1995, has caused the transmission of 
monetary impulses to future inflation to become both, slower and weaker. The evidence of 
the significant strength of this relationship and the insights into the dynamics may, under 
certain conditions, be an important aid for the creators of Russian monetary policy. 51 The 
reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses briefly Russian 
monetary policy to date and provides an overview of the literature on the topic. In section 3 
the data and methodology, as well as the criteria for model selection, are delineated. The 
empirical results are reported and discussed in section 4, while section 5 analyzes the 
relationship between money and prices in both the early and the latter phases of transition. 
Section 6 concludes with the summary of the findings. 
3.2 A Brief Overview of Russian Monetary Policy and the Literature 
Unlike the majority of countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were able to 
regain relative macroeconomic stability soon after the beginning of their transition to 
market economy, Russia took a long time to bring inflation down to acceptable levels. 
Several, mainly half-hearted, stabilization programs, implemented between the autumn of 
1991 and the spring of 1994, attempted to enforce tighter monetary conditions and tame 
inflation, only to be followed by periods of monetary expansion and renewed increases in 
prices. Even though the quest for macroeconomic stabilization has been characterized by 
The conditions under which a significantly strong relationship between money supply and inflation 
may be a useful tool for policy making, apart from the Issue of the temporal stability of model's parameters, Is 
beyond the scope of this paper (see Nikoli6,2000b). 
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ups and downs rather than continuous improvement (Koen and Marrese, 1995), both money 
supply and inflation have had downward trends in Russia. 
An examination of the balance sheet of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) reveals 
that the main factors leading to growth of the money supply after the liberalization of prices 
in January 1992 were the CBR credits to the government, i. e., monetary financing of the 
budget deficit, to commercial banks, and to former Soviet republics. Since these mainly 
centralized credits were priced well below market clearing interest rate, the predominantly 
infinite demand for loans at negative real interest rates forced the CBR to follow 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) suggestions and impose quantity constraints on the 
credit growth in the early 1993. These quantity constraints were accompanied with 
quantitative targeting of various aggregates of the money stock, a policy that was presented 
in the "Guidelines on the monetary policy of the CBR" in 1992 and continued for years 
after. 
The setting of a positive real interest rate in early 1993, followed by a collapse of 
the Ruble zone and the steady increase in the political support for stabilization, shifted the 
main goal of monetary policy from short-run maintenance of output to the control of 
inflation. The ambitious March 1994 program, after some initial success in bringing 
inflation down to single digits in the summer of 1994, failed in its objectives as the monthly 
rate of inflation regained double digits in the autumn of 1994. Restrictive monetary policy 
reinforced by the unsustainably high interest rates led to the relaxation of monetary and 
fiscal policies in the sunu-ner of 1994. This, in turn, eventually led not only to the exchange 
rate collapse on Black Tuesday in October 52 of 1994, but also to the final realization that 
the days when the CBR could issue large credits without causing high inflation were over. 
Despite CBR interventions to steady the value of the ruble, there was no explicit 
exchange rate target until 1995. In July of that year, an exchange rate band between 4,300 
to 4,900 rubles per US-dollar was announced as an integral part of a well-prepared 
stabilization program. The signalling properties of an exchange rate target with respect to 
future inflation are high, particularly in a country where foreign currency, predominantly 
US dollars, is extensively used as an explicit unit of account. However, the success of the 
52 At the beginning of October 1994, the CBR lost control over the exchange rate and with reserves 
running low, was unable to prevent Black Tuesday on October II when the ruble (R) to dollar ($) exchange 
rate fell by 28%, jumping from R3,000 to almost R4,000 in one day. For the entire month of 
October, the 
exchange rate jumped from R2,361/$ to 2,994/$, which is equivalent to a month-to-month nominal 
depreciation of 26.8% (Russian Economic Trends (RET), 1994). 
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exchange rate stabilization program is by no means certain unless the fundamentals are 
brought under control. It is thus hardly surprising that the monetary stabilization succeeded 
for the first time, after failed attempts in the preceding years, when the government deficit 
was brought under control, even though only temporarily. Subsequent to earlier deficits of 
18.9 percent in 1992,7.7 in 1993, and 10.1 percent in 1994, the budget deficit was slashed 
to a respectable 4.9 percent in 1995 (Cheasty and Davis, 1996). This considerable reduction 
in the budget deficit, as well as the increased reliance on capital markets and foreign loans 
as sources of financing the subsequent deficits, are the main reasons for success of 1995 
stabilization program. 
However, macroeconomic stability is always fragile in transforming economies like 
the Russian Federation in which the fiscal deficit has averaged close to 8 percent per annum 
up to 1998. After a substantial decrease in the accumulated deficits in the early years of 
transition, the debt to GDP ratio climbed to about 50 percent in 1996. The rise of 
accumulated deficits pushed up debt service costs for the future, and so increased the size 
of future deficits. As markets viewed the government's finances, and thus the exchange rate 
target, as unsustainable, this perception led to a higher currency risk prenýiium, which 
resulted in upward pressure on interest rates. 53 The higher interest rates, in turn, led to an 
increase in the future debt service costs and so thus increased the future expected budget 
deficit. The spiral was further exacerbated by the adverse effects of a higher interest rate on 
growth, of dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and of the compounded perception of less 
than credible government policies, all of which eventually led the country into a variant of 
the debt-trap. 
The dire position of government finances and the economy as a whole was 
undermined further by the external and other internal factors. The most important of the 
external factors, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crises, was the fall in confidence on the 
part of the international capital investors to invest in countries like Russia, which was, and 
still is, plagued by macroeconomic and structural weaknesses, particularly over-dependence 
on short term capital inflows (RET, 1998). The second adverse external factor was the fall 
of oil and other commodity prices. Among the domestic factors the most important were 
the excessively large budget deficit and the unsustainable build up of ruble-denominated 
" The currency risk premium is defined as the difference between the interest rate for the same 
maturity instrument of ruble-denominated domestic debt, taking into account the depreciation expected under 
the current exchange rate policy, and dollar- denominated government debt. 
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debt. These adverse domestic factors originated from problems associated with poor tax 
collection, non-productive government expenditures, a small and weak domestic capital 
market, a weak and inefficient banking system, poor corporate governance, and the 
continued accumulation of payment arrears (RET, 1998). The failure of the policy-makers to 
address these issues in the relatively favourable investment climate of 1997 led Russia, in 
August 1998, into the worst financial crises of its transition period and contributed to the 
global financial turbulence. The ruble was effectively devalued and left floating while the 
goverm-nent defaulted on its own maturing short-term securities (Gosudarstvennye 
Kratkosrochnye Obligatsii). 54 Although inflation averaged relatively low levels of well 
below 2 percent per month in the 3 years after the 1995 stabilization, prices jumped by over 
38 percent in September 1998 and by almost 12 percent in December of the same year. The 
earlier downward trend in the rise of prices continued in subsequent months, as inflation 
averaged just over 4 percent in the first 5 months of 1999. 
Having briefly described the Russian monetary policy during transition, we turn to 
issues related to the transmission of monetary impulses to prices. Russia, along with 
Poland, may be viewed as a special case among transition economies, because their money 
supply has had a systematic impact on inflation rate. 
In earlier studies (Easterly and Viera da Cunha, 1993; Fisher, 1994; Koen and 
Marrese, 1995; Hoggarth, 1996; Allen et al., 1996; Korhonen, 1996; Korhonen and 
Pesonen, 1998; and Korhonen, 1998), researches claimed that inflation in Russia, since 
price liberalization at the beginning of 1992, clearly has monetary roots. 55 In all of these 
studies, the past growth of ruble broad money (M2) is claimed to have the strongest 
influence on inflation rate among various monetary aggregates. Working with a limited set 
of data, these authors found that the acceleration of inflation, in a few years after price 
liberalization in Russia, corresponds closely to the acceleration in the growth of M2 with a 
lag of up to four months. However, these findings differ with respect to the strength of the 
influence of various lags of M2 on inflation and the length of the period covered by 
56 analysis. The atypical short length of the time lag between money supply and inflation in 
54 In 1998, the official exchange rate went from R5,96/$ to R20,65/$, a depreciation of 246 per cent. 
From August 1998 to end-March 1999, the ruble has depreciated 287 per cent, from R6,24/$ to R24,16/$. 
15 However, this view is not shared unanimously among Russian economists. Koen and Marrese 
(1995) pointed out Petrakov, who maintained that inflation in Russia is fundamentally caused by the structural 
deformities of the economy. 
56 For a comprehensive survey, see Korhonen and Pesonen (1998). 
77 
Russia, 57 according to Hoggarth (1996), is a consequence of the tenet according to which 
the length of the time lag between changes in money growth and inflation is in direct 
proportion to the stage of transition process of a country. Similarly, Buch (1998) claimed 
that the speed of transmission of monetary impulses into prices is inversely related to the 
sophistication of country's financial system, and this process is comparatively fast in 
Russia because its financial system is not very sophisticated. 
Hoggarth (1996) and Allen et al. (1996) suggested that a temporary fall in the 
inflation rate not only may reduce the extent to which money growth affects future inflation 
but also, by establishing a lower inflationary envirom-nent, lengthen permanently the time 
lag of monetary PoliCY. 58 Consequently, Hoggarth (1996) suggested that the lag from M2 
growth to inflation in Russia appeared to have increased from three to four months in the 
1992 to 1993 period to six months in the lower inflationary environment of 1994. These 
findings are also supported by Korhonen and Pesonen (1998) who concluded that the lag 
length between money growth and prices in Russia, for the period between January 1992 
and October 1997, has shifted gradually from lags of one to four months to longer lag 
lengths. Similarly, Alan et al. (1996) concluded that, in the lower inflationary environment 
in both Russia and Poland from 1993 to 1994, money velocity became more uncertain, with 
the implication that a change in the broad money growth had a weaker and a more 
prolonged influence on future inflation. The results from these two transition economies are 
implied (Alan et al., 1996) to have wider implication for some major economies where the 
present very low rates of inflation could, in principle, increase the time lag of monetary 
policy. 
3.3 Data and Methodological Overview 
The method and the objectives of this analysis differ from previous studies. First, 
we employ the longest time series available to date, covering the entire period since the 
57 In Western economies, the lag from monetary policy changes to inflation is much longer. For 
example, Carlson (1980) reported that the change in money supply In the US economy is felt over a period of 
20 quarters with a mean lag of about II quarters, for the period from 1955 to 1969. Similarly, 
Hoggarth 
(1996) wrote that, in the UK, the lag is estimated to be between 2 and 3 years and reiterated the claim that 
monetary policy effects are broadly similar across G7 countries. 
"As Hoggarth (1996) noted, the short run Philips Curve may be flatter at low rates of inflation than 
at high rates. 
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liberalization of prices in January 1992 until the Russian financial crisis of August 1998. 
Second, in addition to using data for M2, which is claimed to have had the strongest link 
with inflation in the previous studies, we also analyze the narrower and more easily 
controlled monetary aggregates, ruble cash (MO) and the monetary base (MB), as well as 
extended broad money (M2X). Third, instead of arbitrarily choosing the lag length of 
money supply aggregates or applying the rule of thumb method, we employ statistical 
criteria to select the optimum lag length. Fourth, various statistical tests and diagnostic 
statistics are applied and presented to test the performance and robustness of the given 
model. Finally, measures of summary statistics are employed in order to quantify, albeit 
tentatively, the impact of changes in growth of money on the temporal pattern of the 
response of prices. 
As in most previous studies, this study is conducted using data published by the 
RET. 59These data consist of monthly observations of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 
the monetary aggregates, i. e., ruble currency outside the banks (MO), base money (MB), 
which is defined as MO plus the minimum reserve requirements of the CBR on commercial 
banks, ruble broad money (M2), which is defined as MO plus ruble deposits in the banking 
system, and extended broad money (M2X), which is defined as M2 plus foreign exchange 
deposits with domestic banks. 
As an empirical work on time series requires, all variables were examined for 
stationarity and cointegration. Not surprisingly, no variable in its original form was found 
to be stationary, nor were any of the original times series of monetary aggregates 
cointegrated with the CPI. In order to obtain stationary time series, we employed the 
growth rates of each individual variable, which is approximately equivalent to combining 
differencing transformation, or operator as it is often termed, with power transformation. 60 
The growth rates of each time series (CPI, MO, MB, M2, and M2X), denoted as I-r, 
mO, mb, m2 and m2x respectively, were found not to exhibit a unit root; i. e., all series were 
59 The first observation for all of the series, except the MB series, is February 1992. For the MB 
series, the first available observation in the RET is May 1992. All of the estimations are 
done in EViews (N'. 
3.0), except the Run test, which is done in Minitab (v. 9.2). 
60 Thus, in this combination, rates of growth are equivalent to differences of logarithms, since 
Alog (X) = log (X, ) - log (X, -, 
) = log (X, /X) ý (X, / X) -1 = (X, - X) /X, -, 
as long as the ratio x/x is reasonably small. tM 
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found to be stationary at the conventional 5 percent level of sig f 61 ni icance. The results of 
the standard unit root tests, such as augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
(PP), are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Unit Root Tests: 1992: 02-1998: 07 
MO mb m2 m2x /IT 
ADF -2.73* -5.19* -3.93* -4.02* -4.07** Specification' 0,0(11) 05 0(11) 010(11) 
LMI, (LM4)b 0.00, (7.55) 1.03, (7.47) 1.02, (3.04) 
0,0(11) 
1.26, (3.24 
C5 T(1)' 
) 3.54, (9.01) 
PP -8.47* -6.67* -6.60* -6.63* -4.46* Specification a C, T(3) C, T(3) C5 T(3) C5 T(3) C 
Note: * (**) indicates 1 (5) percent level of significance. 
'Indicates whether a linear trend (T) and/or a constant term (C) has been introduced and the 
maximum lag length of the dependent variable (in parenthesis). 
b Chi-square - values of an LM test on I" (4h) order autocorrelat ion. Critical va lues at the 5 percent 
level of confidence are 3.84 (9.49). cAlternatively, ADF is 2,45 for 0,0 (13). Also significant at 5 percent 
level, LM(I)=0.67, LM(4)=1.21 
In order to examine seasonality patterns in the data, all variables were regressed 
against a constant, a trend, and the seasonal dummies, Dk's. A seasonal dummy, Dk, was set 
to equal I for the month in which seasonal variation was observed and 0 otherwise, and 
k-- i ... 11, denotes the month in which the value for a dummy 
is set equal to I e. g., 
DI=January, D2=February, ... D11=Novernber. While 
inflation series do not contain any 
seasonal component, all of the money supply measures, except the M2X series, do, as 
reported in Table 3.2. In addition, a dummy variable D094 is included to account for the 
exogenously induced inflation that occurred in 1994 as result of the exchange rate crises of 
61 Inflation rate time series might have had a structural break at the beginning of 1994 when the 
inflation rate decreased markedly without a significant change in the trend (slope) over the period. Applying 
the modified unit root test (Perron, 1989), the previous assumption concerning a structural break is confin-ned 
and the unit root hypothesis rejected. Following Perron's proposed unit root test, we included a dummy 
variable to account for a potential structural break. Hence, the following regression was estimated: 9 
A/T = 15.32 - 0.15trend - 4.52D,, - 0.61 1-r +Y ; rA/-r 
(4.59) (3.71) (4.23) (4.88) 
where D, is a dummy variable so that D, =1 after January 1994 and 0 otherwise, while t-ratios are in 
the brackets. The values of the test statistics for the Dummy variable (4.23) and for the one period lagged 
inflation (4.88) imply a structural break and the rejection of a unit root, respectively. 
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October 1994 (Black Tuesday). The dummy variable takes a value of I for October 1994 
and zero otherwise. 62 
Following earlier studies, (Easterly and Viera da Cunha, 1993; Koen and Marrese, 
1995; Hoggarth, 1996; Allen et al., 1996; Korhonen and Pesonen, 1998) changes in prices 
(7ý are modelled as a function of each of the aggregates of money supply (m). All variables 
are in growth form and the following model is estimated: 
zt=co+>, 'ß-mt-j+ ')4, Dkt + OD094t + et (3.2) 
j=O k=l 
where co is a constant; the Os are parameters of money supply to be estimated; subscripts j 
and t denote the lag length and the current time period, respectively; N is the maximum 
number of lags; Dkt's and )lk's are the seasonal dummies and their respective coefficients; S 
is the number of seasons; D094 and 0 are the October 1994 dummy and its respective 
coefficient; and e is the stochastic error term that follows the classical assumptions, namely, 
it has zero mean, constant variance, and is not autocorrelated. 
Generally, this model is a version of a distributed lag (DL) model associated with 
the monetarist tradition and could be viewed as a restricted form of the Saint Louis 
equation. 63 Like other similar monetary models, it is not intended to explain each and every 
wiggle in the rate of change of prices, but rather it is a short hand description of the 
fundamental inflation process. 64 The equation implies that disequilibrium in the money 
market, for a given stock, is eliminated only by changes in the general level of prices. 
Unlike in structural models, exclusion of nonmonetary factors in Eq. (3.2) reflects the view 
that the potential exogenous shift variables have only temporary or short-run impacts on the 
rate of inflation. 65 
62 While there have been many financial and other crises in Russia during transition, the magnitude 
of the Black Tuesday crises, if not taken into account, renders a simple distributed lag (DL) model of money 
price relationship shown below to be unstable. In addition to the structural break that seems to occur in 
October 1994, the failure to take account of this exogenous shock causes the true partial coefficients 
simultaneously to equal zero (F-test). A similar exogenous shock, but with a greater magnitude, seems to have 
taken place in August 1998. It would be necessary to take this into account in a similar manner if the period 
after July 1998 were modelled. 
63 For a proof of this statement, see Andersen and Kamosky (1974). 
64 An alternative approach for future research aimed at establishing a causal relationship could applý' 
cointegration analysis to this restrictive functional form. 
6' The arguments about the superiority of structural or monetarist models are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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In empirical work, it is common practice to adopt some a priori restrictions on theg 
coefficients in models like the one depicted by Eq. (3.2). This is usually done by assuming 
that the 8's follow some systematic pattern. Thus, researchers often assume that the 9 
coefficients either decline geometrically (the Koyck 66 DL model), or follow a cyclical 
pattern (the Almon or Polynomial DL model with or 
67 
without restrictions). Since these 
models impose some artificial patterns on the distribution of the #coefficients over time 
that are not likely to coincide with their true distribution, their usefulness for our purpose is 
limited. Therefore, as our goal is to establish the true distribution of the 'a coefficients, 
which reflects the relative importance or weights of each lagged value (j) of m, we proceed 
without imposing any restrictions on the distribution of fl's. 68 
Inclusion of a single, one term, lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable in Eq. (3.2) yields an autoregressive dynamic model suggested in the previous 
literature (Hoggarth, 1996; Allen et al., 1996; Korhonen and Pesonen, 1998). This model is 
specified by Eq. (3.3): 
N 
co + alzt -i+ ß-mt -i+ 
2ý. kDkt+ OD094t + et (3.3) 
j=O k=l 
This procedure could be justified by observing that IT,, contributes a great deal to the 
contemporary inflation rate, and thus the model captures the significant inflationary inertia 
prevalent in the Russian economy. 
Since values of the fl coefficients in Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3) are likely to be sensitive to 
the choice of the lag length, careful attention must be given to the manner in which lag 
length is set. In the majority of the empirical studies on this subject known to us, either 
some ad hoc approach or a rule of thumb method was applied to specify the lag length. In 
contrast, we employ the Schwarz (Bayesian) Criteria (SC) and the Akaike Information 
66 Since the Koyck DL model, although neat, is obtained by a purely algebraic process, and thus 
devoid of any theoretical underpinning, it is often rationalized as an adaptive expectation model or a partial 
adjustment model or a combination of both. 
67 For application of Almon lag technique, see Almon (1971), and for problems in the application of 
this technique see Schmidt and Waud (1973). 
68 We recognize that, in models like one depicted in Eq. (3.2), multicollinearity is likely to appear. In 
other words, since successive values (lags) tend to be highly correlated, the standard errors tend to be large 
and, therefore, the estimation of coefficients is likely to be less than fully efficient. Nevertheless, 
multicollinearity violates no regression assumptions. Unbiased, consistent estimates will occur. The only 
effect of multicollinearity is to make it hard to get coefficients estimates with small standard error. 
Moreover, 
multicollinearity may not pose a serious problem in the case when R2 is high and the regression coefficients 
are individually significant as revealed by high t values. 
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Criteria (AIC) to determine the most appropriate lag structure for the model. 69 
Implementing the SC and AIC tests for the selection of the optimal lag length, 1*, in Eqs. 
(3.2) and (3.3), with the maximum number of lags, N, set at 15 , yielded the results 
presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Seasonal Dummies and the Optimum Lag Length (1*) Selection Using SC and 
AIC 
OLS Independ. Seasonal Sc (1*) AIC (1*) 
method Variab. Dummies 
mo Di, D4, D6 6.2607(8) 5.811(8) 
mb DI, D4, D6, D7 5.8492(4) 5.4674(5) 
Eq. 3.3 m2 Di, D6 5.9104(8) 5.4928(8) 
m2x 5.6556(13) 5.120 
mo Di, D4, D6 4.6918(9) 4.0411(15) 
mb Di, D4, D6, D7 4.5849(5) 4.1587(6) 
Eq. 3.4 m2 Di, D6 4.4063(9) 3.9206(9) 
m2x 4.5120(9) 4.038 
Note: The dependent variable is the rate of inflation (1-r, ) in all estimates and the 1*'s are given in 
parenthesis. 
3.4 The Results 
Although not presented here, estimations of the DL model expressed in Eq. (3-2) 
using the OLS method produced a high R2 of over 80% for each of the monetary 
aggregates. However, the R2 was greater than the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic in all cases, 
pointing to the presence of serial correlation in the data. Following Maddala (1992), we re- 
estimated Eq. (3.2) in first differences using the OLS method, and dropping the intercept 
term for all monetary aggregates. Subsequent to a new optimal lag length selection by re- 
application of the SC, the estimates of the DL model in first differences are presented in 
Table 3.3. 
69 The test statistics are given by SC=-2LIn+klognln and AIC=-2LIn+2kln respectively where 
k is the 
number of estimated parameters, n is the number of observations, and L Is the value of the 
log likelihood 
function using the k estimated parameters. In order to select the most appropriate model, we choose the values 
that minimize the SC and AIC. Among various statistical criteria, SC has superior 
large sample properties and 
therefore it is favored when it suggests a different lag selection from the AIC. 
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Table 3.3 OLS Estimates of the DL Model of Inflation in First Differences 
Coeff. 
mo 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
mb 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
m2 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
m2x 
t-Stat. 
0.096 1.93 -0.045 -0.71 0.046 0.92 -0.024 -0.60 
19, 
0.159 3.08* 0.089 1.40 0.243 4.75* 0.048 0.99 
0.118 2.39* 0.068 1.08 0.144 2.53* 0.018 0.35 
0.079 1.76 0.043 0.67 0.161 2.76* 0.114 2.28* 
A 0.121 2.67* 0.077 1.48 0.211 4.32* 0.161 3.43* 
, 
95 0.167 3.3 1* 0.203 3.80* 0.118 2.54* 
A 0.177 3.57* 0.193 3.92* 0.028 0.60 
A 0.108 2.68* 0.063 1.41 0.033 0.82 
A 0.008 0.26 0.006 0.16 0.006 0.16 
7.796 3.84* 6.741 3.22* 7.188 4.32* 6.358 3.47* 
Yl 4.027 3.32* 1.021 0.99 1.976 2.32* 
Y4 -1.552 -1.43 -0.349 -0.30 
Y6 -0.264 -0.27 -0.521 -0.52 -0.461 -0.61 
Y7 -0.414 -0.46 
Model Perfonnance 
R2 0.41 0.28 0.55 0.40 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.17 0.47 0.31 
S. E. 1.86 2.00 1.60 1.82 
F-statistic 3.19* 2.56* 6.44* 4.38* 
Log likelihood - 13 3.60 -140.21 -123.72 -133.90 
D. W. 1.66 1.75 1.61 2.04 
LM 1 (4) 0.36(l. 62) 0.00 (4.643) 1.97(6.45) 0.00 (1.028) 
ARCH LM 9.256 (1)* 6.83 (1)* 7.599 (1)* 12.46 (1)* 
(lag) 
Skewness -0.324* -0.125 -0.214 -1.030* 
Kurtosis 3.392 4.110* 3.054 6.959* 
Jarque-Bera 1.651 3.724 0.534 57.25 1* 
Sc (1*) 4.670(8) 4.678(4) 4.322(8) 4.495(8) 
Summary statistics 
Long ran mult. 1.03 0.23 1.27 0.50 
Mean Lag 3.71 2.85 3.56 4.20 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. The asymptotic standard errors 
of the skewness and kurtosis coefficients are 
j(6 / T) and 
V(24 / T) 
, respectively, where 
T is the sample 
size. An asterisk associated with the coefficients of skewness and/or kurtosis indicates significance and 
implies that the coefficient exceeds twice its standard error. The Jarque-Bera (JB) normality statistic is 
distributed as Chi-square with two degrees of freedom. 
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The performance and the diagnostic statistics of the DL model presented in Table 
3.3, for each monetary aggregate, suggest that the OLS method may not give satisfactory 
results. The statistics reveal that our assumptions about the error term, e, may not be 
satisfied. More specifically, e is assumed to have zero mean, constant variance, and not to 
be autocorrelated. However, visual inspection of the forecast errors revealed their large 
variability over time. This suggests that the variance of the forecast error is not constant but 
varies from period to period. In other words, there seems to exist a particular kind of 
heteroscedasticity in which the variance of the regression error depends on the volatility of 
the errors in the recent past. Indeed, the null hypothesis of no correlation in the variance of 
the OLS residuals, formally tested by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), was rejected for all monetary aggregates at the 
conventional level of significance. Additionally, we calculated the coefficient of skewness 
(a test of symmetry) and kurtosis (a test for fat tails) for the estimated residuals and 
70 performed a Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test . 
Since, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, biased and inconsistent estimation of 
the variances of the OLS parameters estimates render statistical inferences invalid, Engle 
(1982) suggested that the use of an ARCH model would lead to increased efficiency. In 
such a model, Eq. (3.2) needs to be complemented by an additional equation, that relates 
the variance (o2t) of the error term (e, ) to the amount of volatility observed in the recent 
period. This model is written in the following form (ARCH(p) model): 71 
2 
t-I + 
92e 2 
t-2 +--- 
9pe 2 
t-P. (3.4) 
The presence of ARCH effects could be, and usually is, corrected by the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE). Assuming normality and ARCH errors, the MLE estimates 
'0 A zero value of the skewness coefficient and a large value (over 3) of the kurtosis coefficient 
would suggest the existence of ARCH effect. So similarly, a large value for the JB test would indicate a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of normality and would also be consistent with the existence of ARCH effects. 
71 Eq. (3.4) can be further generalized into a general autoregressive conditional heteroscedasti city 
model, GARCH(p, q), in which the conditional variance of e at time t is dependent not only on past squared 
disturbances but also on past conditional variances: 
o', =4+ &ý e',, + ... 
+ 5pe', p + 
X, oý,, ++ Aq oý, q. 
By the same token, we can introduce cý, (or, alternatively, the standard deviation o-, ) on the right 
hand side of Eq. (3.3), in order to test whether inflation is dependent on the oý, or o-t of the 
forecast error as 
well as on changes in money supply. This is referred to as an ARCH-M (ARCH-in-mean) model. 
For a surveý 
and an overview of the application of ARCH and GARCH models, see Bollerslev et al. 
(1992). 
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are determined through an iterative search, which amounts to maximizing the log likelihood 
function (0 of the following form: 
lt =-0.5 log o2t - 0.5 e 
2t / 02t. (3.5) 
An alternative ARCH specification could be obtained by minimizing the SC of predictive 
accuracy. In our case, both criteria provide similar or equivalent information about the 
exact linear specification of the conditional variance function for all monetary aggregates, 
except for the monetary base. 72 However, none of the criteria does seem to give an 
ARCH/GARCH specification that makes the growth of monetary base a good proxy of 
inflation. Therefore, the specification of the equation involving mb, obtained by the SC, 
which is more parsimonious, is presented in Table 3.4 along with the other exact orders of 
the ARCH/GARCH models for the rest of monetary aggregates. 73 
Table 3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the DL Model of Inflation 
mo mb m2 m2x 
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
'9 
0.029 1.12 -0.017 -0.71 -0.037 -2.06* 0.036 1.33 
0.028 1.22 0.007 0.23 0.113 3.68* 0.072 1.54 
0.006 0.29 -0.030 -0.94 0.036 1.44 0.058 1.43 
-0.022 -1.14 -0.009 -0.32 0.084 3.38* 0.101 2.85* 
, 
94 
-0.003 -0.12 0.016 0.76 0.150 10.35* 0.137 8.35* 
A 0.018 1.09 0.120 5.46* 0.115 8.37* 
A 0.018 1.23 0.076 3.80* 0.040 2.88* 
0.065 3.64* 0.023 1.28 0.048 2.34* 
0.014 1.81 0.000 -0.03 0.029 0.96 
72 Iterative estimation of 1 indicates that the best specification for an ARCH/GARCH model 
for the 
monetary base is GARCH(2, I), while SC favors GARCH(1,1). The tests for 
determining the exact order of 
the ARCH and GARCH models are not reported but are available from the author upon request. 
73 We have looked at ARCH(l), ARCH(2), and ARCH(3) models and, as it has become a 
convention, at GARCH(1, I), GARCH(1,2), and GARCH(2, I) models. A 
data set that requires a model of 
order greater than these presented is very rare (see Bera and Higgins, 
1993). 
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Table 3.4 continued 
7.083 0.50 4.925 1.32 
yl 0.676 1.17 0.533 0.58 
Y4 -0.505 -1.79 0.023 0.04 
Y6 -0.035 -0.14 -0.321 -1.01 
Y7 
90 
(y, 
(52 
0.003 0.01 
10.493 8.18* 
0.968 2.36* 
-0.302 -1.25 
-0.010 -0.78 -0.020 -1.44 0.173 1.22 
6.670 0.37 
-0.008 -0.79 
-0.025 -0.20 0.223 1.56 1.078 2.53* 1.008 S. 18* 
0.582 2.29* 1.014 3.62* -0.892 -8.73* 
0.538 4.22* 0.780 9.01 * -0.621 -3.67* 0.906 12.97* 
Model Performance 
R2 0.167 0.182 0.450 0.334 
Adj. R2 -0.089 0.007 0.295 0.177 
S. E. 2.288 2.185 1.841 1.989 
F-statistic 0.653 1.041 2.893* 2.12* 
Log likelihood -95.142 -108.855 -99.785 -104.290 Run test 0.058* 0.534* 0.493* 0.163 * 
Skewness -0.202 -0.234 0.353* -0.017 
Kurtosis 3.119 3.235 2.183 3.304 
Jarque-Bera 0.512 0.787 3.352 0.270 
SC (1*) 
_ 
3.801 (8) 3.953(4) 3-874(8) 3.882(8) 
Summary statistics 
Long run mult. 0.15 -0.03 0.57 0.64 
Mean La g 4.7 6 0.47 3.99 3.81 
' Q-statistics for Standardized Residuals 
lag 1 2 34 5 6789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
mo 3.02 3.02 3.50 5,38 6.33 7.16 7.18 7.35 7.43 10.24 11.08 11.08 11.08 12.05 12.10 13.06 16.45 18-17 
mb 2.08 3.97 9.46* 16.4* 16.5* 16.78* 17.94* 18.05* 18.24* 22.76 * 22.76* 25.30* 25.41* 26.44 * 26.45* 26.47* 27.13 27-93 
m2 0.14 0.23 0.42 1.15 2.41 2.42 2.83 2.83 3.89 4.69 7.83 7.85 8.68 9.94 10.41 12.73 14.02 15.28 
m2x 0.12 0.15 0.15 1.12 2.13 6.56 7.36 8.92 8.94 9.57 9.67 13.95 13.96 18.45 18.76 18.82 20.0521.79 
Q-statistics for S quared Residuals 
lag 1 2 34 5 6789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
mo 0.00 0.43 0.63 0.70 1.61 2.16 2.55 4.75 4.79 4.84 5.14 6.04 6.18 6.23 6.43 6.46 7.02 7.53 
mb 0.01 0.46 0.99 1.01 1.81 1.94 1.96 2.24 2.60 2.73 3.00 4.41 4.41 4.63 4.81 4.89 4.91 6.80 
m2 0.51 2.96 3.06 3.06 7.75 10.48 11.11 11.11 11.20 11.25 11.35 11.37 11.37 11.55 12.50 12.61 14.56 15.38 
m2x 0.10 0.25 0.50 4.05 6.22 6.26 6.36 6.43 6.49 6.92 7.74 7.76 7.97 9.78 9.80 10.95 11-00 11.07 
Note: * significant at 5% or better level. 
The performance and the diagnostic statistics of the DL model of inflation corrected 
for ARCH effects presented in Table 3.4 reveal that, in addition to monetary base, the 
growth of ruble cash money does not seem to be a good proxy for inflation. Even though 
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the coefficient of seven months lagged ruble cash seems to be highly significant 
individually, the overall test of significance of the regression line, i. e., the F-statistic, 
indicates that the coefficients are simultaneously not different from zero. In addition, the Q- 
statistics for standardized residuals, in the equation containing mb, is significant implying 
the presence of autocorrelation. 
In contrast, the diagnostic statistics of both measures of broad money supply, m2 
and m2x, suggest that they both explain variations in inflation rate (Table 3.4). The Q- 
statistics of the standardized and square residuals as well as the run test statistics do not 
justify rejection of the null hypothesis of no significant correlations. Even though the 
coefficient of skewness associated with the equation containing m2 marginally exceeds 
twice its standard error, neither the ARCH LM test (not reported) nor the Q-statistics of 
squared residuals reveal the presence of the ARCH effects. With respect to the variations in 
the current inflation rate, the growth of lagged m2 explains just under a half of them and 
somewhat more than does m2x. Most of the coefficients and all of the ARCH/GARCH 
terms are statistically significant for both aggregates. However, the significantly negative 
coefficient of the current m2 seems to run counter to economic theory. Nevertheless, the 
general requirement that all gs are positive, although common, is somewhat too stringent. 
It may be possible that a number of short run shocks, such as administrative price 
adjustments of oil and gas, exchange rate swings, swings in the regime of monetary policy, 
or discrete income policy decisions, may render the lag structure unstable in a relatively 
short sample. Perhaps more importantly and more likely, inflation may overreact initially to 
a change in money supply and compensating adjustments may be needed subsequently, as it 
appears to be the case in our sample. 
As was the case for the DL model, the OLS method does not seem appropriate for 
the ADL model expressed in Eq. (3.3). The ARCH LM test as well as the Q-statistics of the 
squared residuals (not reported), indicate the presence of ARCH effects for all monetary 
aggregates (Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5 OLS Estimates of the ADL Model of Inflation 
mo mb m2 m2x' Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
-0.558 -1.37 -0.631 -1.62 -0.545 -1.47 -0.401 -2.03 * 0.869 15.23* 0.779 12.50* 0.876 14.92* 0.818 8.80* 
0.089 1.69 0.030 0.44 0.038 0.72 -0-052 -0.75 0.057 1.69 0.095 1.88 0.178 3.68* 0.055 1.14 
-0.036 -0.95 -0.019 -0.37 -0.072 -1.60 -0.020 -0.48 
-0.007 -0.16 0.019 0.29 0.033 0.80 0.108 3.09* 
A 0.046 1.35 0.071 1.60 0.075 1.82 0.085 2.99* 
0.074 1.87 0.019 0.36 0.024 0.54 -0.004 -0.10 
0.020 0.63 0.003 0.06 -0.058 -1.08 
-0.060 -1.64 -0.099 -2.36* 0.034 0.55 
A -0.066 -1.96* -0.037 -0.91 0.002 0.04 
A 0.009 0.28 0.014 0.36 0.030 0.65 
0 8.088 4.18* 7.150 3.80* 7.043 4.22* 6.509 13.17* 
yl 4.466 3.84* 2.797 2.73* 2.195 2.60* 
Y4 -0.624 -0.52 0.071 0.06 
Y6 0.570 0.50 0.261 0.23 -0.086 -0-10 
Y7 -0.229 -0.26 
Model Perfonnance 
R2 0.96 0.96 0.972 0.965 
R2 adj. 0.95 0.95 0.964 0.957 
S. E. 1.76 1.78 1.563 1.720 
F-statistics 96.60* 117.76* 132.924* 127.027* 
Loglhood -128.00 -130.658 -120.261 -128.141 
LM 1 (4) 3.01 (3.91) 4.56* (7.62) 3.735 (9.859)* 0.153 (1.951) 
ARCH LM 10.66 (1)* 8.76 (1)* 9.230 (1)* 16.449 (1)* 
(lag) 
Skewness -0.002 -0.371 0.093 -0.143 
Kurtosis 2.866 4.055* 3.018 5.801* 
Jarque-Bera 0.052 4.786 1.001 22.79* 
Sc (1*) 4.692(9) 4.585(5) 4.406(9) 4.5120(9) 
Note: * significant at 5% or better level. 
' Hetero skedasti city Consistent Covanances (White, 1980) 
The exact order of the ARCH or GARCH models is determined by the same procedure 
employed for the DL model. Both, the 1 and the SC, suggest the identical order of 
ARCH/GARCH models. The estimates of the ADL model expressed in Eq. (3.3) and 
corrected for ARCH effects are presented in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the ADL Model of Inflation 
Coeff. 
mo 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
mb 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
m2 
t-Stat. Coeff. 
m2x' 
t-Stat. 
c 0.157 1.28 -0.033 -0.66 -0.313 -6.28* -0.462 -5.21 * 0.930 25.09* 0.782 51.91 0.886 32.89* 0.798 18.65* 
0.029 1.00 0.046 3.30* 0.017 0.95 0.028 0.99 
19, -0-008 -0.39 0.019 3.84* 0.041 2.55* 0.047 3.40* 
-0.033 -1.61 -0.022 -3.33* -0.064 -3.19* -0-010 -0.68 
-0.034 -1.40 -0.022 -1.86 0.034 1.71 0.071 9.39* 
, 
94 0.015 0.76 0.029 3.13* 0.068 6.01* 0.070 5.89* 
fl5 0.030 1.46 0.065 6.07* 0.044 3.28* 0.009 0.51 
0.007 0.78 -0.027 -1.94 -0.036 -1.91 0.021 1.10 -0.029 -3.39* 0.001 0.06 
-0.048 -2.18 -0.026 -1.94 0.004 0.30 
-0.027 -1.80 0.013 0.98 0.028 1.48 
6.930 1.54 8.926 0.39 6.657 0.72 7.418 34.88* 
71 0.952 1.69 1.539 6.12* 1.400 6.07* 
Y'd -0.558 -1.34 -0.718 -4.13* 
YA -0.007 -0.02 0.091 0.77 0.502 2.79* 
Y7 -0.236 -2.91 * 
5n -0.002 -0.27 0.000 0.02 0.001 0.06 0.202 2.78* 
0.275 1.74 2.684 4.18* 2.319 3.90* 1.456 4.95* 
-0.006 -0.15 
0.690 6.44* -0.006 -0.802 
Model Performance 
R2 0.941 0.948 0.962 0.960 
Adj. R2 0.919 0.934 0.950 0.949 
S. E. 2.357 2.131 1.858 1.867 
F-statistic 44.014* 68.689* 76.679* 85.906* 
Log likelihood -84.849 -91.242 -89.812 -100.484 
Run Test sig. 0.546* 0.043 0.546* 0.118* 
Skewness 0.176 0.312* 0.054 0.087 
Kurtosis 3.110 2.548 2.255 2.837 
Jarque-Bera 0.389 1.705 1.632 0.164 
Sc 3.626(9) 3.565 (5) 3.708(9) 3.894(9) 
Q-statistics for the Standardized Residuals 
lag 12 345 6 789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
mo 1.19 1.25 1.30 1.42 1.51 1.57 1.57 3.04 3.54 4.65 5.26 5.43 5.49 8.11 8.12 8.82 10.61 10.61 
mb 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.94 1.26 1.32 5.89 6.15 6.89 9.95 10-06 10-08 10.27 10.62 10.63 10.67 10.72 10.72 
m2 0.42 1.19 1.85 4.55 4.61 4.86 5.05 5.11 5.19 6.50 7.23 7.84 8.61 12.09 13.44 15.52 16.59 21.81 
m2x 0.62 1.10 1.85 2.38 2.43 6.11 6.71 7.22 7.61 7.67 8.37 11.05 12.71 16.05 16.05 16.25 16.68 17.08 
Q-statistics for the Squared Residuals 
lag 12 345 6 789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
mo 0.51 0.78 1.63 4.76 5.40 5.52 5.91 7.05 8.86 9.55 9.71 9.77 11.79 11-80 11.99 12.33 12.87 
13.01 
mb 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.47 1.65 6.31 6.31 7.28 7.53 7.53 7.56 7.58 7.66 8.12 18.50 18.95 18.96 
19.33 
m2 0.01 0.34 0.51 1.92 1.94 2.90 3.74 3.98 3.98 4.01 4.56 5.28 5.96 5.98 6.25 6.92 7.40 
8.79 
m2x 0.95 1.37 1.39 3.95 3.97 3.99 4.89 6.33 7.58 7.58 8.09 9.60 10.40 11-21 11.24 11.58 12.09 
16.41 
Note: * significant at 5% or better level. ' Hetero skedasti city Consistent Covariances (White, 1980), 
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The ARCH LM test (not presented) and the Q-statistics of the residuals of each of 
the aggregates of the money supply do not reveal the presence of ARCH effects. 
Nevertheless, Table 3.6 illustrates that the performance of the models containing mO and 
mb are somewhat inferior to the models including any of the broad money variables. Less 
generally, in the ADL model of inflation corrected for ARCH effects, there is no positive 
significant coefficient of mO and the model containing mb seems to be plagued by 
autocorrelation. Even in the model containing m2, a number of negative values of the 
coefficients of money, of which two are significant, run counter to the postulates of 
economic theory. Hence, one may tentatively conclude that the ADL model containing 
m2x, corrected for ARCH effects, is a pretty good determinate of inflation in post- 
communist Russia. 74 
After estimating the DL and ADL models and leaming that monetary aggregates m2 
and m2x are the best proxies of inflation in these models respectively, we test to see if the 
inflation functions have undergone any structural change in these models. 75 . With that end 
in view, we subjected both models to the plethora of stability tests. 76 The results of these 
tests are somewhat mixed as demonstrated by a matrix of potential breaks in Table 3.7. 
" One cannot help noticing, however, that most of the explanation for the current rate of inflation in 
the model seems to be coming from the one month lagged inflation rate. A unit change in the previous month 
inflation rate seems to be determining as much as 80% of the variations in the current inflation rate. By the 
same token, the large value of the dummy D094 may dwarf all other coefficients. Nonetheless, the exclusion 
of this dummy does not change much. The fit of the model deteriorates only slightly and the values of the 
longer lags become negative suggesting that model should be more parsimonious if this dummy is excluded. 
Indeed, the Wald test for redundant variables suggests the exclusion of lags longer than four in the new 
specification. 
15 The usefulness of equations like those estimated here for policy purposes hinges crucially on the 
temporal stability of the equation parameters. However, stability of the model coefficients is a necessary but 
not a sufficient requirement for the model to be a useful tool for policymakers. This issue is discussed further 
in Nikolid (2000b). 
76 The tests include: recursive residuals test (RRT), one step forecast test (0-SFT), N-step forecast 
test (N-SFT), scaled recursive Chow test (SRCT), Chow forecast test (CFT) and finally the recursive OLS 
coefficient test (ROLSCT). Since these tests may be used with OLS and the two-stage OLS regressions, they 
are performed on the DL and ADL models presented in the Tables 3.3 and 3.5 respectively, after omitting 
variable D094 from the estimation for computational reasons. In order to conserve space only the O-SFT and 
the SRCT are presented. 
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Table 3.7 Significant Scaled Recursive Chow and One-Step Forecast Stability Tests 
Jan-94 Feb-94 Mar-94 Apr-94 May-94 Jun-94 Jul-94 Aug-94 Sep-94 Oct-94 
m2 (DL) 1.16 1.18 1.2 1.16 1.15 1.18 1.05 1.00 1.01 
(6.64) 
m2x (ADL) 1.27 (6.08) 
Note: The values in parenthesis are the O-SFT values of the recursive residuals that lie outside the 
two standard error bounds. As the Chow statistic and the critical values of F are functions of time, we divided 
the Chow value by its 5 percent critical value from the tables of F to yield a SRCT for recursion. Values of 
this statistic greater than unity imply that the null hypothesis of no structural change between periods t- I and t 
would be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
All of the stability tests, based on recursive estimations, indicate that both models 
provide a poor fit for the October 1994 observation. These findings are suggestive of either 
an outlier or exceptional value for )rt or an alteration in the structural parameters of the 
model. Thus, inclusion of the dummy variable, D094, for October 1994 seems justifiable. 
However, the SRCT indicates a lack of stability for the parameters of m2 in the DL model 
throughout 1994. Similarly, the SRCT is suggestive of a structural break in February and in 
October 1994 for the ADL model including m2x. It is not obvious to what extent the 
inclusion of the D094 dummy affects stability of parameters in the models, since these 
tests cannot be applied with this dummy included. In order to overcome this difficulty, we 
applied the dummy variable, in the additive form, technique to test for structural stability. 
The dummy takes a value of I for the observations of and after the suspected structural 
break and zero otherwise. The results of this test do not justify rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no structural break in 1994 in the DL model including m2 and the D094 
dummy. Hence, the DL model involving m2 has no structural break and it is a reasonably 
good representation of inflation. In contrast, the same test points to a structural break in 
February 1994 for ADL including m2x. The latter result is hardly surprising given that the 
Perron's (1989) test presented above suggested a structural break in the inflation series in 
February 1994. Hence, after accounting for the structural break, and after the 
implementation of the exact order of the ARCH term, the best final ADL model of inflation 
77 
that includes m2x turned out to be ARCH(1,0); it is presented in Table 3.8. 
77 In order to make the model more parsimonious, the Wald test for redundant variables is applied. 
This justifies the exclusion of the variables of m2x with lags longer than 4 months since their coefficients are 
jointly not different from zero. 
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Table 3.8 ARCH(1,0) ADL Model of Inflation Involving m2x 
c a A 0 
Coeff. 4.819 0.648 0.011 0.084 -0.049 0.035 0.102 10.461 -4.842 0.248 1.151 t-Stat. 8.90* 25.27* 0.60 3.77* -1.80 1.55 6.69* 4.53* -11.18* 1.86 3.16* 
R2 Adj. R 2 S. E. F Log Run Skew. Kurto J-B SC (1*) 
0.924 0.912 2.467 76.46* -119.38 0.251* 0.271 2.505 1.662 3.866 4 
lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Q-stnd. res. 3.44 3.60 5.12 7.93 9.83 11.87 11.87 12.76 12.77 12.78 13.18 13.18 13.34 13.44 
Q-sq. res. 0.57 2.25 3.68 3.68 3.78 6.04 6.94 8.79 8.81 8.81 9.55 9.59 11.63 11.77 
Note: * significant at 5% or better level. ýis a coefficient of the dummy for structural break in 
February 1994. 
The time path of the recursive OLS estimates reveals that, after initial instability of 
the parameters estimates due to the small number of observations, all of the money 
coefficients of the variables in the DL and ADL models are either constant or slightly 
declining over time. This could be seen unambiguously from Fig. I for the DL model 
involving m2, which adds to the evidence of the diminishing influence of money on 
prices. 78 
Only coefficients of the DL model are presented since it may be argued that the lagged inflation 
rate in the ADL model would impose a geometrically declining lag structure which smoothes Out short-term 
fluctuations in money supply and consequently affects the distribution of the coefficients of money. A 
dummy 
variable, D094, is omitted from the estimation for computational reasons. 
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Fig. -3.1 Kecursive Coefficient Estimates of m2 in the DL Model 
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3.5 Breaking up the Sample 
In order to compare the influence of the money supply on inflation over the two 
phases of transition, we divided the sample into two parts. The first part (1) includes the 
observations before October 1994 and the second (11) the observations thereafter . 
79 The 
choice of the split point is inspired by the observation that the O-SF test indicates existence 
of a structural break in the models in October 1994.80 Furthermore, it has been claimed 
(Hoggarth, 1996; RET, 1994) that inflation, in the second half of 1994, started to follow the 
six months lag in m2 growth instead of a three to four months lag in the 1992 to 1993 
period. In order to verify these claims, we plotted the most highly correlated lags of broad 
money growth with the inflation rate for the two subperiods. Visual inspection of Fig. 2 and 
utilization of the correlation statistics, suggests that not only has a shift occurred in the 
second part of 1994, but also the lagged response of prices to money has become even 
longer than six months. Indeed, the correlation coefficients (r) between inflation and lagged 
money growth depicted in Fig. 2 suggest that the dominant response of the former to the 
growth of latter has shifted from the four months (r--0.59) prior to the late summer of 1994 
to seven months (r--0.62) thereafter. Incidentally or not, the split point appears to be near 
enough to the time that Russia embarked on a path of relatively sustained monetary 
stability, which may arguably be taken as a break in the economic policy regime. 
79 The October 1994 observation is omitted since it's very large value needs to be modelled by 
introducing a dummy as explained above. Inclusion of this variable may, not only dwarf other values of the 
parameters but it also reduces the degrees of freedom in the relatively small sub-samples. 
'0 Arguably, an alternative date for the split point could be February 1994, as indicated both by the 
SRCT for ADL model and the observation that the inflation rate has a structural break in this period. 
However, the preference for the October 1994 is guided by a practical consideration. Namely, an earlier 
date 
would reduce an already small sample and make analyses of period (1) much less reliable. 
9 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
-5 Nmm 'IT kr) kf) kn r- 
m2 7) m2 
r- r- 
03 
The OLS estimates of the DL model involving m2 and m2x for the two subperiods, 
presented in Table 3.9, reveal that only m2 in period (1) seems to represents the inflation 
process. 81 Thus, the model for period (1) seems to have all desirable properties of economic 
and statistical theory. The fit of the model is fairly good, all of the significant coefficients 
of money are positive, and the diagnostic statistics do not indicate any model deficiency. 
" The models of the split samples involving mO and mb are not presented since these two aggregates 
have not proved to be good proxies of inflation. 
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Figure 3.2 Correlation Between Inflation (, T) and Lagged Ruble Broad 
Money (m 2) 
Table 3.9 OLS of the First Differences of the DL Model of Inflation in the Sub-periods 
m2 m2x 
1992: 2 94: 09 1994: 1198: 07' 1992: 2 94: 09 1994: 1198: 07 
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
,9 
0.025 0.25 0.015 0.327 -0.066 -0.75 0.085 1.83 
19, 
0.328 3.47* 0.135 1.600 0.002 0.02 0.214 3.19* 
0.180 1.53 0.021 0.301 -0.020 -0.20 0.049 0.67 
0.213 1.81 -0.006 -0.103 0.106 1.12 0.062 0.85 
)04 0.257 3.06* 0.075 1.170 0.109 1.17 0.158 2.18* 
A 0.211 2.10* 0.096 1.182 0.116 1.35 0.187 2.61 * 
, 
96 0.250 2.77* 0.128 1.598 -0.048 -0.53 0.179 2.63* 
A 0.039 0.46 0.115 1.737 0.031 0.41 0.142 2.2 1 
A -0.018 -0.22 0.060 1.270 -0.021 -0.30 0.065 1.40 
Yl 3.668 1.73 0.855 1.234 
Y6 -0.651 -0.34 -0.597 -1.521 
Model Performance 
R2 0.707 0.379 0.394 0.405 
Adj. R2 0.463 0.196 0.048 0.272 
S. E. 2.221 1.113 2.956 1.059 
F-statistic 2.894* 2.073 1.140 3.06* 
Log likelihood -43.509 -62.365 -51.853 -61.403 
D. W. 1.667 1.262 2.214 1.190 
Runs test (sig. ) 0.763 0.058* 0.498* 0.038 
LM 1 (4) 0.16(4.42) 4.748* (9.065) 0.00 (1.387) 7.439* (8.497) 
ARCH LM No 23.858 (4)* No 4.40 (1)* 
(lag) 
Sc (1*) 4.28(8) 3.70(8) 5.736(8) 4.227(8) 
Summary statistics 
Long run mult. 1.485 0.639 0.209 1.142 
Mean La2 3.392 4.675 5.042 4.079 
Q-statistics of the Standardized and Sq uared Residuals 
Lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
m2(I Q- St. res. 0.25 3.79 4.64 4.69 4.99 5.28 
Q- Sq. res. 0.41 0.44 0.52 2.76 2.79 3.94 
m2 (11) Q- St. res.. 5.52* 6.5 8* 6.59 7.07 7.09 7.10 7.27 8.03 8.38 8.40 11.52 
Q- Sq. res. 3.75 5.22 5.23 5.23 5.23 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.42 5.90 5.91 
m2x (1) Q- St. res. 1.22 1.23 2.79 3.15 3.55 3.56 
Q- Sq. res. 3.46 5.54 5.71 6.87 7.75 9.00 
m2x (11) Q- St. res. 7.60* 7.62* 7.93 * 7.97 7.98 9.28 10.73 11.11 11.23 11.24 11.77 
Q- Sq. res. 4.77* 5.24 5.25 5.35 5.35 5.55 5.63 5.76 5.80 6.17 8.16 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. 
' Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covanances (White, 1980) 
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Table 3.9 also reveals that both aggregates of broad money supply introduce ARCH effects 
in period (II). However, the specification applied to the entire period may not be 
appropriate for the subperiods. Hence, a new search for both the optimal lag structure using 
the SC, and the exact order of the ARCH model for the two subperiods is performed. These 
tests indicate that the model involving m2 in period (1) that is presented in Table 3.9 is the 
optimal specification. The remaining specifications and the estimates are presented in Table 
3.10. 
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Table 3.10 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the DL Model of Inflation for the 
Subperiods 
m2 m2x 
1994: 1198: 07 a 1992: 2 94: 09 1994: 1198: 07 
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. 
0.009 0.35 -0.163 -0.17 0.004 0.12 
0.047 2.22* -1.274 -1.50 0.064 2.11 
0.762 1.32 
-0.299 -0.62 
0.659 t. 28 
0.603 1.30 
A 0.363 1.76 
0.173 0.52 
0.482 2.32* 
0.083 0.58 
o 0.133 0.61 
)611 -0.275 -1.82 
)612 0.104 0.34 
, 
#13 
-0.244 -1.40 
, 
914 0.134 1.08 
71 0.406 1.90 
76 -0.254 -2.65* 
4 -0.005 -0.69 0.002 0.18 
-0.103 -1.73 -0.102 -1.42 
1.046 10.48* 1.036 8.53* 
R2 0.125 0.942 0.140 
Adj. R2 -0.013 0.537 0.054 
S. E. 1.249 2.216 1.208 
F-statistic 0.908 2.328 1.625 
Log -42.714 -19.459 -46.206 
likelihood 
D. W. 1.364 3.229 1.342 
LM 1 (4) NA 13.556* ( -) NA 
ARCH LM No No No 
sc (1*) 2.49(l) 4.789(14 ) 2.477(l) 
. Q-statistics of Standardized and Squared Residuals 
lag 12 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 
m2 (11) Q- St. res. 3.90* 4.14 6.62 7.38 7.51 7.72 7.72 7.76 7.93 8.22 8.30 
Q- Sq. res. 0.52 1.22 2.56 2.72 2.80 3.71 4.28 4.83 4.95 7.09 7.63 
m2x (1) Q- St. res. 8.26* 14.34* 15.5 9* 16.09* 
Q- Sq. res. 3.82 3.82 3.84 3.84 
m2x (11) Q- St. res. 2.25 2.25 2.84 3.29 3.65 4.32 4.52 4.63 4.73 4.75 4.76 
Q- Sq. res. 0.14 1.42 1.48 1.54 1.75 2.66 2.78 3.57 3.57 5.16 5.25 
Note: An asterisk indicates significance at 5 per cent or better level. 
' Bollerslev-Wooldrige (1992) robust standard errors & covariance 
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Although the results from the SC lag selection are not reported, Table 3.10 indicates 
that this criterion chooses the model of inflation including only a current and one month 
lagged values of either m2 or m2x. After correction for ARCH effects, the model does not 
comply with economic theory. Namely, although individual coefficients of lagged values of 
both aggregates of broad money are individually significant, the overall significance of the 
coefficients (F-test) of all monetary aggregates for two sub-periods is not different from 
zero. Hence, these statistics indicate that there is no a stable linear relationship between 
inflation and m2x in period (1) nor between inflation and either of m2 or m2-x in period (11). 
In order to capture the intensity and the speed of transmission of monetary impulses 
to future inflation, we used several measures of summary statistics. These statistics, 
reported in Table 3.9, reveal important differences between the estimates with respect to the 
strength of the influence of the models' coefficients on the dependent variable in the two 
subperiods. The subsequent analysis focuses on m2, since this monetary aggregate in a DL 
model, despite its shortcomings associated with period (11), outperforms other aggregates in 
explaining inflation. Noticeably, the percentage of the total variation in the inflation rate 
explained by the regression model (R 2) for period (1) is almost twice as much of its 
corresponding value for period (11). The estimates of the coefficients of m2 are also 
considerably greater for period (1) than the corresponding estimates in period (11). This 
difference is equal to the difference of the long run multipliers (Irm), which are in fact sums 
of the coefficients of money. The Irm represents the change in the long run value of 
inflation caused by a unit increase in the growth of money supply. The value of Irm of 1.49 
for m2 in period (1) indicates that a one percent increase in the growth of m2 is reflected in 
a 1.49 percent increase in prices. The Irm in period (11) is considerably lower (0.639) with a 
noticeably smaller impact on the inflation rate, as the examination of the recursive 
coefficients' estimates presented in Fig. I suggest. Moreover, the Irin in period (11) is not 
statistically different from zero. However, even though the Irm seem to be notably different 
from I in both subperiods, the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of m2 being 
82 
reflected in prices one-for-one for either of the periods, nor indeed for the entire period . 
The summary statistics presented in Table 3.6 also give a tentative indication of the 
lengthening of a lag between money and prices. As a measure of the speed, the mean lag 
(ml), expressed in the number of months with which prices respond to money on average, 
82 The test produces Chi-square statistics for periods (1) and (11) of 0.517 and 0.625, respectively. 
The 
corresponding statistics for the entire period is 0.439. 
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83 , appears to be significantly greater (4.68) in period (11) than in period (1) (3-39). Similarly, 
while the inflation rate has the highest correlation with money growth four months earlier 
in period (1) (0.318), the highest correlation in period (11) (0.624) is with money growth 
seven months earlier, as shown in Fig. 2.84 
3.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis of the relationship between various monetary aggregates and inflation 
supports earlier claims that, broad money growth appears to have the strongest 
correspondence to contemporary inflation in post-communist Russia. However, this 
relationship proved to be unstable, and sensitive to changes taking place in the new 
economic and institutional envirom-nent. In addition to other evidence about changes in this 
relationship, the summary statistics presented in the chapter suggests that, the average 
speed of transmission from changes in the growth of ruble broad money to inflation have 
increased from just over three months to just short of five months as Russia has embarked 
on a path of macroeconomic stability soon after the exchange rate crises of October 1994. 
Similarly, the summary statistics also reveal that, changes in the growth of the broad money 
had a considerably greater impact on prices in the period before October 1994, than in the 
period thereafter. Furthermore, the lack of overall significance of the coefficients of money 
in this later period points to a break in the systematic pattern of money price relationship, 
which was observed two and a half years after price liberalization in Russia. In contrast, the 
impact of changes in the previous month's inflation rate on current inflation does not abate. 
The overwhelming influence of this impact signifies the existence of the considerable 
inflation inertia prevalent in the Russian economy and the persistence for inflation shocks. 
This result calls for the inclusion of the one-month lagged inflation variable in the inflation 
model. Hence, the ADL model of inflation including m2x avoids the shortcomings of some 
" The corresponding statistics for the entire period is 3.56 months. The magnitude of the calculated 
mean lags for periods (1) and (11), obtained by OLS 'unremedied' estimates, and their difference is not 
substantially different from the 'remedied' estimates. A similar DL model except for the ARCH terrn is given 
by Carlson (1980) for the American economy for 1955-1979 period. 
84 The corresponding statistic for the entire period is 0.654 for lag of four months. For this particular 
exercise, the lag estimates of m2 prior to February 1992 are taken into consideration. The largest r for 
inflation and m2, if observations of m2 prior to February 1992 are excluded, applies to a lag of five months 
for both, period (1) and the entire period, while the highest r for period (11) is for a lag of seven months as 
reported. 
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of the representations in the previous literature. This model also provides a reasonably good 
short hand description of the fundamental inflation process in Russia. 
Even though our sample period of six and a half years, is the longest considered so 
far, it may still be considered too short for meaningful analysis, particularly in these times 
of major transformation of not only the economic system but also the entire country or 
region. In addition, as pointed out by many researchers, Russian statistics must be used 
cautiously so that we should not rule out the possibility of model misspecification due to 
erroneous data. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from this analysis rest on the adequacy of 
the sample length and the accuracy of the data for model specification. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Money - Inflation Causality in Transition Economies: The Case of Russia 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite numerous empirical studies devoted to role of money in the evolution of 
real market economy, the topic has endured considerable controversy as the new economic 
environment was created in the former socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Among unsettled policy issues that have unwittingly been extended to transition economies 
are those related to Granger causality testing and inevitably, suitability of the applied 
macroeconomic stabilizations. The objective of this study is twofold; it aims to shed some 
additional light to the issue of the choice of lag selection criteria in causality testing on one 
hand, and the issue of suitability of monetary aggregates for influencing and controlling 
inflation via policy instrument, in transition economies like the Russian Federation, on the 
other. 85 
At one end of the spectrum of opinions on monetary policy, money is viewed only 
as a passive adaptor to business condition with a little independent influence. At the other 
end, an opposing hypothesis holds that monetary actions, as measured by movements in the 
monetary aggregates, have lasting effects on nominal variables like GNP, output and a 
price level. An influential tenet of the latter school of thought, branded monetarism, is the 
view that inflation, as a persistent increase in the general level of prices, results solely from 
maintained expansion of money stock at rates in excess of increase in the amount of money 
demanded in the economy. In contrast to empirical evidence in support of monetarist views 
for majority of market economies, no systematic pattern for the money price relationship 
was detected in transition econornies, except for Russia and Poland, thus undermining the 
Inflation was chosen to be a goal variable since the two main goals of economic policy, full 
employment and price level stability, are directly linked to nominal GNP. In many transition economies, 
taming inflation was often proclaimed to be the chief objective of economic policy. This arguably 
unidimensional goal was advocated and to the extent dictated by the IMF. However, Gross National Product 
or Gross Domestic Product could be used as a goal variable, or indeed could be incorporated into current 
analysis without difficulties. 
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conventional monetarist view, at least in the transitional context (Economic Commission 
for Europe, 1995). If indeed this were the case, it would imply among other things, that 
traditional tools used for stabilization and control of inflation in advanced market 
economies may not be appropriate for transition economies. Given that it is well established 
that high inflation is costly in terms of a loss of output in transition economies (Fisher et 
al., 1996), inappropriate policies to combat inflation may not only be detrimental to a 
current welfare of societies in transition, but also may cause unnecessary delay in the 
transition process which in turn, may also exacerbate the loss of welfare in the long rM. 86 
Suitability of monetary policy, in particular the issue of appropriateness of monetary 
targeting in the transition economy like the Russian Federation, is best settled by 
empirically testing the usefulness of aggregates of money supply as an intermediate target 
for controlling inflation. In practice, an intermediate target is effective if it (i) has a 
significant explanatory power in determining goal variable, (ii) is exogenous or causally 
prior to the goal of policy actions, and (iii) could be reasonably controllable by 
policyrnakers. Since the first of theses criteria appears to have been fulfilled, at least in the 
early years following price liberalization, it remains to be determined whether broad money 
aggregates are causal prior to inflation in Russia, and should it prove so whether are 
controllable by policymakers. 87 
The outcome of an empirical investigation of the causal relationship between money 
supply and inflation, or indeed any other macroeconomic variable e. g., income, seems to be 
largely determined by the choice of the length of their distributed lags in a bivariate model. 
Despite numerous empirical studies, e. g., Hsiao (1981); McMillin and Fackler (1984); 
Thornton and Batten (1985); Jones (1989), the jury on the verdict of superiority of criteria 
for the selection of a lag length in causality testing is still out. On one hand, Hsiao (1981) 
and Thornton and Batten (1985) claimed that the statistical criterion given by Akaike 
86 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission in Moscow argued that high inflation would be 
detrimental to Russian economy in many ways, e. g., it would generate uncertainty about key prices, including 
real interest and exchange rates, which in turn would deter long-ten-n credit, investment, and growth. In 
addition, high inflation would be damaging to economy by encouraging unproductive activities aimed only at 
hedging against inflation. Furthermore, high inflation would be hurting the most deprived social group, which 
lacks political strength to protect their real income against rising prices. Finally, high inflation would 
contribute to a general climate of uncertainty and lack of trust in government policies, all of which would 
encourage speculation against the ruble and capital flight (Hemdndez-Catd, 1995). 
87 Many researchers, e. g., Nikolic (2000), claimed that broad money aggregates (potential 
intermediate target) have a significant explanatory poweTin deten-nining inflation (goal variable) in Russia in 
the years after the price liberalization of February 1992. Nikoli6 (2000a) however, showed that the influence 
of the variation in the former on the latter became considerably weaker and more protracted as financial 
system became more sophisticated and macroeconomic environment more stable. 
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(1970) was superior not only among the other statistical criteria but also over the ad hoc 
specifications, which are most common in literature. On the other hand, Jones (1989) 
disputed their claims favouring one of the ad hoc criteria and implying that the results 
obtained by Thornton and Batten (1985) were data specific. It seems that a good way of 
settling such a controversy may be to utilize an independent data set, e. g., for Russia 
instead of the United States, and evaluate the empirical results obtained by various criteria 
as well as an extensive portion of a lag space. Thus, this analysis amounts to a great extent 
to an empirical testing of the monetarist paradigm that money supply, in a transition 
economy, causes inflation without a feedback. 
The reminder of this section is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
and methodology employed in the analysis. In section 3 the model and the criteria for its 
selection are outlined. The empirical results are reported and discussed in section 4, while 
section 5 briefly reviews a few considerations related to the Russian experience with 
monetary targeting. Finally, section 6 concludes with the surnmary of the findings. 
4.2 Data and Methodological Overview 
As in the most previous analysis of inflation and money supply processes in Russia, 
this study was conducted using data published by the Russian Economic Trends (RET). The 
choice of monetary variables was based on the findings (NikoliC', 2000a) of the significant 
systematic pattern of the money supply-inflation relationship in the early years after the 
price liberalization of January 1992. The data consist of monthly observations of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), ruble broad money (M2), and extended broad money (M2X), 
from February 1992 to July 1998. M2 is defined as the sum of currency outside banks, as 
reported by the Central Bank's of Russia (CBR) Money Circulation Department, and ruble 
deposits in the banking system defined as the sum of demand, savings and time deposits of 
enterprises, the state insurance company, voluntary organizations, individuals, and deposits 
for long-term capital investment, but excluding deposits of the enlarged government. M2X 
comprises M2 and the foreign exchange deposits with commercial banks. 
As an empirical work on time series requires, all of the variables were examined for 
stationarity and cointegration. As expected, no variable in its original forrn was found to be 
stationary, nor were any of the original time series of either monetary aggregate 
105 
cointegrated with the CP1. In order to obtain stationary time series, we employed the 
growth rates of each individual variable, which is approximately equivalent to combining 
88 differencing transformation, or operator as it is often termed, with power transformation . 
Since policy deliberations are couched in terms of growth rates, use of the growth rates 
seems appropriate. The growth rates of each time series (CPI, M2, and M2X), denoted as I-r' 
m2 and m2x respectively, were checked for the existence of a unit root by standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. In addition, since the 
standard unit root tests are not very powerful, i. e., they cannot distinguish between unit 
roots and near unit root stationary processes, we employed a more powerful test, which 
tests the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root. The test is a 
recent work of Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992), after whom is named the 
KPSS test. The results of the standard unit root tests, as well as the KPSS test for 
stationarity, are presented in table 1. 
Table 4.1 Unit Root Tests: 1992: 02-98: 07 
1 
ADF 
Z 
ppa KPSS ADF 
m2 
ppa KPSS ADF 
m2x 
ppa KPSS 
1 -4.07 -4.46 0.179 -4.96 -6.62 0.056 -4.835 -5.924 0.141 
2 -3.86 -4.38 0.138 -5.67 -6.67 0.050 -4.303 -5.932 0.122 
3 -3.49 -4.46 0.120 -5.96 -6.60 0.050 -4.133 -5.928 0.114 
4 -4.44 -4.51 0.111 -7.00 -6.55 0.054 -4.336 -5.941 0.111 
5 -3.12 -4.51 0.108 -4.71 -6.43 0.066 -3.255 -5.865 0.114 
6 -2.47 -4.49 0.108 -4.02 -6.41 0.080 -2.525 -5.813 
0.117 
7 -1.94 -4.45 0.110 -3.88 -6.44 0.096 -3.077 -5.828 
0.117 
8 -2.18 -4.41 0.112 -4.00 -6.47 0.108 -5.453 -5.875 
0.115 
9 -2.56 -4.39 0.114 -2.93 -6.50 0.115 -5.604 -5.902 
0.113 
10 -2.29 -4.36 0.116 -2.37 -6.48 0.114 -3.635 -5.912 
0.112 
Note: 'Lag truncation (0 for Bartlett kernel for T, m2, and m2x is 10,1, and 3, respectively, while 
Newey-West (1987) suggests 3 for all series. 
Critical values for the tests are as follows: 
ADF pp KPSS 
1% -4.082 -4.080 0.216 
5% -3.469 -3.468 0.146 
10% -3.161 -3.161 0.119 
See Nikoli6 (2000a). 
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All of the ADF test statistics were obtained by inclusion of a constant and a linear 
time trend (trend) into regressions. It appeared that the ADF statistics were sensitive to the 
choice of a truncation lag (ý for the inflation series. Critical values for the ADF test 
including a constant and a linear trend term clearly allowed rejection of a null hypothesis of 
a unit root for the first four lags at a conventional level of significance. 89 Following Perron 
(1989), 1 was selected if the t-statistic on the coefficient of a lagged difference of a 
dependent variable (Zi) was greater than 1.60 in absolute value, and the t-statistic on 'Vi for 
i>1 was less than 1.60. This procedure yielded 1=4 for which the null of a unit root could be 
rejected at the conventional level of significance. However, the Schwarz Criterion (SC) for 
determination of an optimum I suggested the lag 8, for which the null of a unit root could 
not be rejected. Nevertheless, neither the constant nor the trend term were significant in this 
specification (or indeed for any 1>4) indicating misspecification of the deterministic part of 
the regression. Furthermore, as shown by Nikoli6 (2000a), the inflation rate time series 
might have had a structural break at the beginning of 1994 when the inflation rate 
decreased markedly without a significant change in the trend (slope) over the period. 
Applying the modified unit root test (Perron, 1989), the previous assumption concerning 
the structural break was confirmed and the unit root hypothesis rejected. Following 
Perron's proposed unit root test, a dummy variable D,, was included to account for a 
potential structural break. Hence, the following regression was estimated: 
9 
A/T= 15.32 - 0.15trend - 4.52D, - 0.61 ;T-+Y 2-, A/T- (4.1) 
(4.59) (3.71) (4.23) (4.88) 
where D,, is a dummy variable so that D,, =l after January 1994 and 0 otherwise, while t- 
ratios are in the brackets. The values of the test statistics for the Dummy variable (4.23) and 
for the one period lagged inflation (4.88) imply a structural break and the rejection of a unit 
root, respectively. Hence, based on both, the ADF and the PP test statistics, the inflation 
series proved to be a trend stationary process. Similarly, m2 is also found to be a trend 
stationary process since both, the Perron's method (1=2) and the SC (1=4) chose truncation 
lags that produced the ADF and the PP statistics that rejected the null of a unit root. The 
same reasoning applied to the m2x series since the Perron's method and the SC chose 1=4 
" The conventional level of significance throughout this paper is taken to be 5%. 
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and 1=10, respectively, for both of which the null of a unit root was also rejected. Equally 
important, the KPSS test statistics could not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity for any 
of the series at any tested truncation lag length, except for the lag I in the inflation series. 
This last point did not question the acceptance of stationarity even for the inflation series. 
This is because a conventional, the so-called 18 rule, I=INT[S(T/I 00)1/41 suggested by the 
KPSS authors, set 1 to equal 7, so that the hypothesis of stationarity could not be rejected. 
Hence, all the series under consideration were found to be trend stationary. 
In order to examine seasonality patterns in the data, all variables were regressed 
against a constant, a trend, and the seasonal dummies, Di's. A seasonal dummy, Di, was set 
to equal I for the month in which seasonal variation was observed and 0 otherwise, and 
i=1 ... 11, denotes the month in which the value for a dummy is set equal to I e. g., 
D, =January, D2=February, ... D, =November. While the inflation and the m2x series do not 
contain any seasonal component, the m2 series exhibit seasonal patterns in January and Jun 
of each year. 90 In addition, a dummy variable D094 is included to account for the 
exogenously induced inflation that occurred in October 1994 as result of the exchange rate 
crises commonly referred as the Black Tuesday. The dummy variable takes a value of I for 
October 1994 and zero otherwise. 91 
4.3 The Model of Wiener-Granger Causality and Lag-Length Selection Criteria 
While the significant lead-lag relationship between money supply and inflation in 
Russia has been confirmed by a number of studies, 92 not much has been revealed about 
cause and effect of this relationship. A common approach to detect direction of causality is 
to utilize the test given initially by Wiener (1956) but better known as the Granger (1969) 
90 m2 = 18.61 - 0.27trend - 6.18DI + 4.19D6 
(15.4) (-10.15) (-2.79) (2.03) 
(t statistics in parenthesis). 
9' At the beginning of October 1994, the CBR lost control over the exchange rate and with reserves 
running low, was unable to prevent Black Tuesday on October 11, when the ruble (R) to dollar ($) exchange 
rate fell by 28%, jumping from R3,000 to almost R4,000 in one day. While there have been many financial 
and other crises in Russia during transition, the magnitude of the Black Tuesday crises, if not taken into 
account, renders a simple distributed lag (DL) model of the money-price relationship given in Nikoli6 (2000a) 
to be unstable. In addition to the structural break that seemed to occur in the 1994, the failure to take account 
of this exogenous shock caused the true partial coefficients simultaneously to equal zero (F-test). A similar 
exogenous shock, but with a greater magnitude, took place in August 1998. It would be necessary to take this 
into account in a similar manner if the period after July 1998 were modelled. 
92 see Nikolid (2000a) 
108 
causality test. The Granger's test procedure is based on the premise that if predictions of 
variable Y obtained using past values of both Y and another variable X are statistically 
superior to forecasts obtained using only past values of Y, than X is said to "cause" (in 
Granger's sense) Y. Standard representation of the Granger variant of the causality test 
could be specified and implemented as follows. Let ()r,, mi, ) represent discrete, linearly 
indeterministic, stationary, bivariate time series on inflation and the growth 0f ith money 
supply in time t. The Granger test, to determine the causal relationship between the 
inflation series (, -rt ) and the growth of money supply (mj, ), involves estimating the 
following reduced-fonn bivariate distributed lag model of finite order: 
z ]=[A a (L) 
Mi, t C'(L) 
Bb (L) ll-, ýT I, e, t 
Dd (L)]Lmi, t] 
I 
e2t 
(4.2) 
where t=1,..., T; mi = m2, m2x; A(L), B(L), C(L), and D(L) are one-sided lag polynomials 
of order a, b, c, and d, respectively, and error terms, el and e2, are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with zero means and constant variances (i. e., they are white noise). 93 
Examination of the Granger causality between mi and )T, amounts to testing 
following null hypothesis: B(L) =0 and C(L) = 0. If neither can be re ected, then mi and /T j 
are independent series. If both are rejected, then there is a "feedback" between mi and /T. If 
the former hypothesis is rejected but the latter is not, there is unidirectional causality 
running from mi to ,; whereas if the latter is rejected and the former is not, the reverse is 
true. 
The tests of the hypothesis mentioned above crucially hinge on the unknown 
parameters a, b, c, and d, which represent lag lengths for the one-sided polynomials A(L), 
B(L), C(L), and D(L), respectively. Since Granger causality test seems to be sensitive to the 
choice of a lag for the polynomials, the choice of an approach used to determine the lag 
length could be crucial for the outcome of this test. 
Essentially, there are two categories of alternative approaches to determine the lag 
length for the lag polynomials associated with dependent and independent variables. The 
9' If the assumption of mutual non-correlation of error terms el, and e2, held, it would allow us to 
estimate (2) using ordinary least square (OLS) method. Should the error terms el, and e2t prove not to be a 
white noise, this has to be rectified and the estimation become much more complicated and computationally 
demanding. 
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first category consists of the so-called ad hoc approaches that are non-statistical in nature 
and include arbitrary lag specifications and the rule-of-thumb lag lengths specifications. 
The most popular lag lengths of the former are 4-4 and 8-8 for the dependent and 
independent variable, respectively, while the latter, advocated by Geweke (1978), favours 
smaller lag length for the independent variable. Extending these practices we employed the 
lag length of 4-4,8-8,12-12, and 16-16 for the dependent and independent variables, 
respectively, when the arbitrary approach was analyzed. The corresponding lag 
specifications for the rule-of-thumb method were chosen to be 4-2,8-4,12-8, and 16-8. 
Undoubtedly, there could be a variety of specification and one could argue that, when 
dealing with a monthly data, as in our case, it may be necessary to consider longer lag 
lengths than those used mostly for a quarterly data. However, Nikolic (2000) showed that 
the average lag between variations in money supply and price level was far shorter in 
postcomunist Russia than in developed market economies. Hence, the choices of the lag 
length specifications for the ad hoc approaches are justified, if not too laborious. 
The second category of approaches used to determine the optimal lag lengths for the 
variables in a bivariate model consists of a number of statistical criteria presented in the 
recent literature (Hsiao, 1981; Batten and Thornton, 1983; McMillen and Fackler, 1984; 
Thornton and Batten; 1985; Jones, 1989; and Cheng, 1996). 94 Amongst a variety of the 
statistical selection criteria, we employed two that are the most cominon in use: the 
Akaike's (1970) final prediction error (FPE), initially suggested by Hsiao (1981) in 
causality testing, and the Bayesian estimation criteria (BEC) of Geweke and Meese 
(198 1). 95 These two criteria provide interesting extremes in the balance/efficiency trade-off 
as pointed by Thornton and Batten (1985). The former tends to favour unbiasedness over 
efficiency by selecting, on average, the lags that are to long in large samples. While the 
latter is asymptotically efficient, its downside is that it tends to select lags that are too short 
in finite samples. We paid a particular attention to the FPE criterion, which received a 
different evaluation by Jones (1989) to those of Hsiao (1981) and Thornton and Batten 
94 For some of these criteria see Thornton and Batten (1985) and Geweke and Meese (1981). 
95 Unlike Batten and Thornton (1983) and Jones (1989), we refrained from using the Pagano and 
Hartley (1981) t-test (PH) for lag specification, despite its computational efficiency. The PH procedure gave 
similar results to the FPE test in both of the studies mentioned above albeit with a less parsimonious lags 
specifications. Since a potential weaknesses of the FPE criterion is that it selects lag length that are too long 
in large samples (it's asymptotically inefficient) we saw a little point in testing criteria which was likely to 
suggest even longer lag lengths. Besides, even in Jones' (1989) study the PH did not outperform the FPE, and 
it performed considerably worse than the FPE in the Batten and Thornton (1983) study. 
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(1985). The crux of the matter is the question whether the FPE outperforms other statistical 
search criteria as well as the ad hoc ones. 
In order to give an adequate answer to the above question it is necessary to look into 
the nuts and bolts of the Hsiao's method given in the Appendix. Less technically, this is a 
stepwise procedure based on Granger's concept of causality and the FPE criterion, which is 
employed as a practical means to identify the order of lags of each variable in a bivariate 
autoregressive process. According to Hsiao (198 1) the great advantage of the FPE criterion 
is that it balances the risk due to the bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to 
the increase of variance when a higher order is selected. In addition, this method does not 
require that all the variables entering the system have identical lag lengths. Thus, unlike 
some other methods, which impose this artificial restriction that not only may induce some 
lack of efficiency of the procedure, but also it may actually bias the value, the FPE method 
is free from these restrictions. Furthermore, the FPE procedure, in addition to being a 
reasonably powerful test of exogeneity (causality), also allows a finer specification of the 
system equations without using an arbitrary damping factor. Moreover, economically 
meaningful hypothesis can still be formulated and tested based on the reduced form 
estimates (Hsiao, 1981). 
4.4 Empirical results 
Eq A. 2, or rather the subset of equations derived from the A. 2, in the Appendix 
according to the Hsiao's procedure, were first estimated using the OLS method, albeit 
inclusive of the exogenous shock dummy D094, seasonal dummies, Di's, where 
appropriate, and a linear time trend. 96 The residuals obtained using the OLS method from 
the regressions however, appeared to have violated the assumption of being white noise. 
More specifically, the Ljung-Box Q-statistics of standardized and squared residuals was 
utilized to check for the existence of serial correlation (or the specification of the equation) 
and for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), respectively. In addition, 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for ARCH, and skewness and kurtosis in the Jarque-Bera 
test, were also used when an ARCH effect was suspected. Wherever an ARCH was 
detected in (A. 3) to (A. 10), these equations were re-estimated by the ARCH or the 
96 While the rationale for inclusion of the dummies D094 and Di's is explained above, a linear time 
trend is included in all equations to adjust for possible non-stationary elements 
generalized ARCH (GARCH) models as proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), 
respectively. The ARCH/GARCH specifications were obtained by minimizing the Swartz 
Criterion (SC) of predictive accuracy. 97 The same procedure was also implemented when 
estimating the ad hoc specified models described above. We looked at the ARCH(I), 
ARCH(2), and ARCH(3) models and, as it had become a convention, at the GARCH(I, 1), 
GARCH(1,2), GARCH(2,2) and GARCH(2,1) models. Only in a few instances were the 
above-mentioned models had failed to adequately model an ARCH/GARCH term, did we 
use a more complex ARCH/GARCH structure. The Ljung-Box Q-statistics of standardized 
and squared residuals, as well as the Jarque-Bera statistics finally tested the adequacy of the 
ARCH/GARCH models. These statistics were insignificant in all the cases we presented. 98 
Hence, the lag-length selection results, obtained by the unbiased and consistent estimation 
of variances employing both the FPE and the BEC criteria, are given in table 2.99 
Table 4.2 Lag Lengths Selected by the FPE and the BEC 
Dependent Variable/ FPE BEC 
Independent Variable 
. ýrl m2 
10/13 10/1 
)TI m2x 10115 10/7 
m2 / ,r 12/2 12/2 
m2x / ;T 14/21 12/12 
According to Hsiao (1981), comparison of magnitudes of pairs of FPEs of 
controlled and manipulated variables determines the direction of causality as explained in 
the Appendix. Nevertheless, as noted by Thornton and Batten (1985), this procedure could 
be interpreted as applying higher than conventional significance level and it requires the 
computation of F-statistics in order to maintain a conventional significance levels. Hence, 
the standard F-tests for Granger causality were performed on both, the statistical and the ad 
hoc lag-length specifications and these results are presented in table 3. 
97 See Nikolic (2000) for more details about use of (G)ARCH models. 
9' In rare cases where Q-statistics of residuals was significant despite implementation of various 
ARCH/GARCH specifications we saw no purpose in presenting the results of causality or the level of 
significance of F-statistics. In short, they would be unreliable. 
99 The entire set of the model selection specifications is not presented but could be obtained from the 
author upon a request. 
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Table 4.3 Granger Causality F-statistics for Various Lags Specified by Different Criteria 
Dependent 
/Independ. 
Variable 4-4 
Arbitrary 
8-8 12-12 16-16 4-2 
Rule-of-Thumb 
8-4 12-8 16-8 
Statistical 
FPE BEC 
, rl m2 2.67* 2.10* 3.75* 6.12* -0-91 3.87* 4.97* 7.04* 4.37* 6.08-* 
; T/ m2x 6-97* 4.13* 4.83* 4.98* -0.61 11.69* 1.45 3.82* 3.92* 3.60* 
m2 / )T 8.01* 2.97* 1.08 1.05 3.44* 3.30* 1.44 1.26 3.6 1* 3.61 * 
m2x / )r 2.35 -1.90 5.41 4.29* 2.09 0.36 1.10 2.18 5.53* 4.56* 
Note: * significant at 5% o r better l evel. 
Table 4.3 reveals that the standard F-test for Granger causality produced various 
and at times contradictory results across specifications. In particular, all of the arbitrary 
specifications produced results indicating causality running from both aggregates of broad 
money to inflation. However, commonly used specification, 4-4 and 8-8, suggested 
unidirectional causality for extended broad money, and bilateral causality for ruble broad 
money, while 12-12 and 16-16 specifications gave contrary results. 
Similarly, the matrix of the rule-of-thumb specifications also gave quite 
contradictory results. In particular, the specification 8-4,12-8, and 16-8 indicated causality 
running from ruble broad money supply to inflation but only in the 8-4 specifications was 
this bilateral causality. The specification 4-2, in contrast, indicated that none of the 
aggregates of broad money did cause inflation while inflation did cause only ruble broad 
money. Extended broad money Granger caused inflation only in the 8-4 and 16-8 
specification. None of the rule-of-thumb specifications indicated that inflation caused 
extended broad money. However, in contrast to the ad hoc approaches, both statistical 
criteria indicated bi-directional causality between both of the monetary aggregates and 
inflation. 100 
Given the variety of the results of Granger causality, produced by the various 
specifications, a natural question arises: which of those specifications gave a correct 
account of Granger causality, or which criteria gave the best model specifications. One way 
to answer this question would be to compare all the specifications by the ordinary F-test. 
Since our objective was to evaluate the performance of the FPE relative to other criteria, all 
'00 Despite the perceived superiority of the statistical search procedures for lag-length determination 
over the ad hoc ones, the fon-ner is not immune from criticism because the researcher chooses the maximum 
lag length arbitrarily. 
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of the FPE-selected models were compared with those selected by the ad hoc and the BEC. 
Following Thornton and Batten (1985), if the F-statistics for the FPE-selected models, that 
are of a higher order (H) than the alternative model, were significant at the conventional 5 
percent significance level, the FPE-specified model would be favoured to the alternative 
one. Conversely, if F-statistics for the FPEs of lower order (L) than alternative were not 
significant, the FPE would be preferred model. The results of this comparison, presented in 
table 4, indicate that the FPE criterion, in our data set, outperforms the other specifications 
without exception. 
Table 4.4 F-tests of the FPE Lag Specifications 
Dependent/ 
Arbitrary Rule-of-thumb Statistical Indep. Var. 
4-4 8-8 12-12 4-2 8-4 12-8 16-8 16-16 BEC 
)r/ m2 10.18* (H) 14.39* (H) 5.62* (H) 1.28 (L) 12.97* (H) 9-09* (H) 1.81 (L) 0.54 (L) 3.21* (H) 
)r/ m2x 7.3 3* (H) 8.3 1* (H) NN 0.64 (L) 10.26* (H) 4.82* (H) NN NN 3.20* (H) 
m2 ,r NN NN 0.63 (L) 0.86 (L) 11.53* (H) NN -0.35 (L) 0.43 (L) 
m2x )r 22.28* (H) 23.71 * (H) 3.68* (H) NN 22.55* (H) 12.86* (H) 7.42* (H) NN 5.79* (H) 
Note: NN represent non-nested models that are not tested. 
A dash (-) indicates the same lag length as one chosen by the FPE. 
* Significant at the 5% or better level. 
The results presented in table 4 not only reveal the comparative superiority of the 
FPE-selected model over both the ad hoc and the BEC, but also have implication for the 
assessment of the results of the Granger causality test reported in table 3. Namely, given the 
results of table 4, it appears that the FPE criteria gave an order of the models that correctly 
identified Granger causality between inflation and the both aggregates of broad money 
supply in Russia. Therefore, as table 3 reveals, there exist feedback or bilateral causality 
between both ruble broad money and inflation and extended broad money and inflation in 
Russia. 
The results presented in table 3 illustrate that the outcome of causality testing is 
clearly sensitive to the choice of the lag-length specifications. Thus, contrary to Jones 
(1989) claim, the arbitrary lag length specification of 4-4 and 8-8 that are most common in 
the literature, as well as the other arbitrary specification, may produce misleading results as 
indicated by Thornton and Batten (1985). Likewise, the rule-of-thumb methodology 
produced even less satisfactory results. In short, none of the ad hoc approaches produced a 
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complete set of satisfactory results for the given sample. In contrast, both statistical criteria, 
the FPE and the BEC, performed very well. 
To further illustrate the extent of sensitivity of Granger causality test to the choice 
of a lag-length specification, an extensive search of the lag space similar to that of Thornton 
and Batten (1985), and Jones (1989) was performed. The lag search was conducted over all 
possible combinations of up to fifteen lag lengths for the dependent and independent 
variables. 101 In line with Thornton and Batten (1985) and Jones (1989), we reported 
marginal significance levels for the computed F-statistics of Granger tests in Tables 5 and 
6.102 
10' While an extensive search of the lag space would be a reasonably efficient procedure for a 
bivariate case in which the OLS estimates gave satisfactory results, it would be burdensome and 
computationally less efficient in the ARCH/GARCH estimations. For example, a search of the lag space with 
fifteen lags required about 1800 regressions in our case. Hence, extending the lag space to 21 lags if not more, 
as could be more appropriate for the regression of m2x on T, would be very demanding computational] y. 
102 The preference for the report of the significance level over F-statistics is guided by the fact that 
latter is not invariant with respect to degrees of freedom. 
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Table 4.5 Significance Levels for Granger Causality Tests of )rand m2 
; Ton m2 Lags of T 
lags of m2 123456789 10 11 12 13 14 
15 
1 0.115 0.108 0.279 1.000 1.000 0.144 0-000* 0.000* 0-000* 0.000* 0.002* 0.012* 0.042* 0.048* 0.051 
2 1.000 0.874 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.020* 0.026* 1.000 0.036* 0.001* 0.032* 0.016* 
3 0.465 0.965 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.666 0.774 0.041 * 0.003* 0.350 0.613 1.000 0.266 0.020* 
4 0.121 0.887 0.968 0.875 0.00 1*0.093 0.394 0.253 0.048* 0.140 0.003* 0.308 1.000 0.004* 0.03 1* 
5 1.000 0.982 1.000 0.133 1.000 1.000 0.912 0.020* 0.000* 0.040* 0.000* 0.073 0.017* 0.000* 0.049* 
6 0.000* 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.091 0.00 1*0.00 1*0,315 0.020* 0.154 0.042* 0.094 0.119 0.000* 0.006* 
7 0.000* 0.992 0.944 0.243 0.00 1*0.398 0.000* 0.029* 0.002* 0.004* 0.231 0.000* 0.002* 0.000* 0.022* 
8 0.000* 0.867 1.000 0.183 0.381 0.219 0.281 0.706 0.010* 0.070 0.000* 0.002* 0.005* 0.003 * 0.028* 
9 0.000* 0.00 1*0.003* 0.044* 0.994 0.042* 0.076 0.061 0.002* 0.669 0.000* 0.725 0.00 1*0.000* 0.005* 
10 0.050 0.029* 0.055 0.094 0.933 1.000 0.02 1*0.986 0.000* 0.002* 0.000* 0.000* 0-000* 0.000* 0-001* 
11 0.017* 0.007* 0.046* 0.300 0.015* 0.167 0.00 1*0.012* 0.002* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.00 1*0.000* 0.074 
12 0.465 0.009* 0.512 0.004* 0.664 0.994 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.003* 0.00 1 
13 0.461 0.024* 0.841 0.217 0.093 0.038* 0.00 1*0.000* 0.000* 0.00 1*0.00 1*0.00 1*0.002* 0.004* 0.003* 
14 0.506 0.044* 0.463 0.058 0.125 0.018* 0.000* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.004* 0.007* 0.005* 
is O. n49* 0.079 1.000 0.03 1*0.000* 0-001* 0.001* 0.000* 0.0 15* 0.012* 0.002* 0.003 * 0.004* 0.008* 0.008* 
m2 on /T 
lags of /T 1 2 3 4 5 
Lags of m2 
67 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.180 1.000 0.194 0.820 0.917 0.887 0.914 
2 1.000 0.793 0.161 0.039* 0.055 0.005* 0.012* 0.033* 0.037* 0.049* 0.100 0.035* 0.052 0.070 0.056 
3 0.172 0.007* 0.172 0.002* 0.055 1.000 1.000 0.078 0.087 0.820 0.320 0.082 0.116 0.149 
0,124 
4 0.000* 0.000* 0.002* 0.004* 0.111 1.000 1.000 0.063 0.139 0.196 0.785 0.049* 0.076 0.106 
0.086 
5 0.808 0.003* 0.013* 0.023* 0.184 0.017* 0.027* 0.044* 0.229 1.000 0.346 0.074 0.074 0.103 
0.076 
6 0.002* 0.00 1* 0.00 1* 0.002* 0.028* 0.995 1.000 0.074 0.308 0.482 0.290 0.102 0.098 0.154 
0.131 
7 0.006* 0.003* 0.006* 0.006* 0.038* 0.016* 0.013* 0.060 0.262 0.200 1.000 0.157 0.153 
0.225 0.188 
8 0.010* 0.010* 0.029* 0.026* 0.106 0.138 1.000 0.025* 0.053 0.042* 0.333 0.208 0.224 
0.314 0.271 
9 0.002* 0.004* 0.013* 0.020* 0.181 1.000 1,000 0.095 0.087 0.064 0.062 0.245 0.076 
0.115 0.159 
10 0.021 * 0.027* 0.042* 0.053 0.258 0.164 1.000 0.098 0.077 0.088 0.123 0.320 0.116 
0.138 0.211 
11 1.000 0.107 0.095 0.111 0.374 1.000 1.000 0.174 0.146 0.159 0.179 0.359 0.161 
0.193 0.289 
12 1.000 0.160 0.076 0.128 0.392 0.277 0.294 0.333 0.309 0.325 0.346 0.401 0.226 
0.262 0.376 
13 0.978 0.891 0.055 0.061 0.189 0.069 0.081 0.110 0.144 0.160 0.178 0.126 
0.140 0.153 0.265 
14 0.999 0.510 0.101 0.119 0.246 0.105 0.120 0.161 0.207 0.187 0.202 0.180 
0.200 0.178 0.310 
15 1.000 1.000 0.140 0.149 0.215 0.172 0.178 0.212 0.262 0.222 0.244 0.190 
0.210 0.128 0.165 
Note: * Significant at the 5% or better level. 
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Table 4.6. Significance Levels for Granger Causality Tests of zand m2x 
7r on m2x Lags of g 
lap-s of m2x 123456789 10 11 1 IA is 
1 0.02 1* 0.021 * 0.022* 0.023* 0.002* 0.001* 0.000* 0.023* 1.000 0.528 1.000 0.658 0.115 0.899 1.000 
2 0.580 0.614 1.000 1.000 0.898 0.089 0.045* 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.385 1.000 1.000 0.473 0.394 
3 0.447 0.306 0.538 0.001* 0.224 0.012* 0-000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.023* 0.002* 0.163 0.412 0.879 - 
4 0.007* 0.027* 0.006* 0.025* 0.010* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0-028* 0.000* 0.072 0.001* 0.145 0.023* 
5 0.023* 0.085 0.030* 0.0 19* 0.072* 0.053 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* 0.290 0.003* 0.970 0.352 0.095 0.020* 
6 0.010* 0.000* 0.000* 0.007* 0.010* 0.010* 0.000* 0.000* 0.004* 0.025* 0.0 16* 1.000 0.255 0.224 0.365 
7 0.012* 0.430 0.170 0.326 0.117 0.152 0.012* 0.039* 0.000* 0.002* 0.005* 0.007* 0.00 1* 0.00 1 0.030* 
8 0.000* 0.563 0.002* 0.077 0.048* 0.072 0.126 0.060 0.00 1* 0.010* 0.0 11 * 0.205 0.097 0.104 0.919 
9 0.005* 0.067 0.002* 0.023* 0.017* 0.003* 0.000* 0.014* 0.002* 0.02 1* 0.015* 0.288 0.091 0.308 0.222 
10 0.03 1* 0.414 0.042* 0.221 0.154 0.155 0.124 0.025* 0.178 0.051 0.066 0.438 0.016* 0.130 0.470 
11 0.035* 0.083 - 0.082 0.024* 0.303 0.0 11 * 0.004* 0.083 0.082 0.159 0-035* 0.040* 0.434 0.444 
12 0.170 0.157 0.344 0.042* 0.055 0.0 11 * 0.041 * 0.025* 0.046* 0.012* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.004* 0.003* 
13 0.605 0.414 0.632 0.286 0.968 0.003* 0.000* 0.053 0.00 1* 0.020* 0.004* 0.004* 0.003* 0.006* 0.007* 
14 0.123 0.572 0.094 0.533 0.689 1.000 0.999 0.298 0.934 0.037* 0.0 11 * 0.009* 0.008* 0.011* 0.011* 
15 0.676 0.103 0.446 0.002* 0.300 0.00 1* 0.002* 0.002* 0.004* 0.006* 0.008* 0.006* 0.009* 0.0 15 * 0.013* 
m2x on /T Lags of m2x 
lags of /T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to 11 12 13 14 15 
1 - 1.000 0.474 1.000 1.000 1.000 
_ 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.568 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2 - 0.436 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.156 1.000 0.464 1.000 0.711 1.000 1.000 0.529 
3 - 0.015* 0.340 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.661 1.000 0.535 1.000 1.000 1.000 
4 1.000 0.273 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.593 0.854 0.946 0.800 1.000 0.603 1.000 1.000 0.807 
5 1.000 1.000 0.472 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.676 0.907 0.932 0.582 0.629 0.322 1.000 1.000 1.000 
6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.928 0.830 0.696 0.068 0.428 1.000 1.000 1.000 
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.052 1.000 0.603 0.800 0.136 0.005* 0.162 1.000 0.571 
8 1.000 0.139 0.153 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.995 0.793 0.030* 0.054 0.646 0.749 0.137 
9 0.009* 0.299 1.000 0.019* 0.028* 0.048* 0.998 0.231 0.780 0.119 0.074 0.378 0.059 0.978 0.376 
10 0.681 0.620 1.000 1.000 0.615 0.162 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.032* 0.00 1* 0.022* 0.035* 0.382 0.362 
11 0.262 0.530 0.872 0.935 0.821 0.160 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.012* 0.015* 0.007* 0.002* 0.013* 0.002* 
12 - 0.00 1* 0.225 0.919 0.288 0.151 0.300 0.187 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.002* 0.194 
0.004* 0.000* 
13 - 0.004* 0.876 0.463 0.809 - 0.299 0.845 - 0.013* 0.945 0.265 0.017* 
0.032* 0-000* 
14 - 0.420 0.038* 0.339 0.083 0.000* 0.00 1 0.004* 0.000* 0-001* 0.008* 0.003* 
0.019* 0.012* 0.000* 
15 - 0.000* - - 0.001* 0.000* 0.001* 0.004* 0.000* 0.000* 0.001* 0.001* 
0.000* 0-00 1* 0.000* 
Note: * Significant at the 5% or better level. 
A dash (-) indicates that no ARCH/GARCH or OLS estimates give white noise residuals so that no reliable 
decision in respect of Granger causality could be made. 
The results presented in tables 5 and 6, add further evidence to the findings revealed 
in table 3; i. e., that causality tests between inflation and both aggregates of money supply 
are heavily dependent on the lag length specification. Consequently, it is clear that use of 
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ad hoc approaches to determine the order of lags in these tests may produce seriously 
misleading results as in our sample. 
Finally, as the FPE criteria appears to be superior to the other methods of model 
specifications under consideration, we combined all single equations specifications 
obtained by the FPE criteria in order to identify the system. Given the existence of 
feedback or bilateral causality between both m2 and m2x on one side and 7C on the other, a 
bivariate feedback model for both of the broad money aggregates and inflation fitted the 
data best. Hence, for the m2 and 7r pair we chose: 
irt 
t] 
= 
[c, ]+ Alo (L) B 13 (L)][; rt ]+[A]+[D6]+[DO94]+ elt 
m2 C2 c2 (L) D 
12 (L)][m2t] A D6J L011 e2t] 
(4.3) 
where the ci are constants, A(L), B(L), C(L), and D(L) are one-sided lag polynomials of 
order 10,13) 2, and 12, respectively; (D) and (D094) are seasonal and October 1994 
dummies respectively, and the e, are white noise error terms described above. 
Subsequently, for the m2x and ;T pair we chose. 
; Tt 
xt 
[cl ]+ A' 0 (L) B 15 (L) ; Tt ]+[D094]+[elt] 
m2 C2 c 
21 (L) D 14 (L)I[m2xt 0 e2t 
4.5 Policy Considerations 
(4.4) 
We noted above that, for a variable to be useful as a policy target, unidirectional 
causation from it to a goal variable was one of the necessary conditions. Hence, the finding 
of the feedback or bilateral causality between monetary aggregate m2 and inflation severely 
limits ability of the former to be an effective policy target for the latter. The existence of 
such a relationship means that, movements in the target variable may reflect the combined 
influence of policy actions and movements in the goal variable not directly attributable to 
desired policy changes. In other words, if the target variable both causes and is caused 
by 
the goal variable, then it does not provide an unambiguous signal of where actions are 
headed. The counter argument may be that the authorities may be able to control the money 
growth rate, but reacted to past inflation by partially accommodating 
it. It may indeed be 
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the case that feedback causality was the result of accommodation of inflation. Does this 
mean that the strict control of the money growth rate would ensure stabilisation of inflation 
in Russian economy at the beginning of transition? Had velocity of money been constant 
and the institutional infrastructure of a competitive market economy in place the answer to 
the previous question would have possibly been positive. However, as documented above, 
and shown in Fig. 2.1, the velocity was far from constant and we know that the institutional 
infrastructure of a competitive market economy was not in place, at least not during first 
half of 1990s in Russia. In addition, it was utterly unrealistic to expect from Russia to have 
a strict monetary policy and a balanced budget amidst transformational recession when no 
domestic borrowing was possible, or envisaged, and the majority of international loans 
were not forthcoming. Lack of financial discipline in this period meant that monetary 
tightening resulted in considerable increase in barter, widespread use of money surrogates 
and prevalence of all sorts of arrears. Widespread dollarisation signified diminishing role of 
the ruble as a unit of account. In such an economic environment, had the government not 
been a large agent paying and demanding payments in rubles, the role of the ruble as a 
medium of exchange would have been endangered. 
Yet, notwithstanding this evidence, monetary authorities in Russia adhered to 
monetary targeting for a considerable length of time. More specifically, in the 'Guidelines 
on the monetary policy of the CBR' presented to the Russian parliament early in 1992, the 
Gaidar government opted to target quarterly growth rates of M2. A failure to comply with 
its agreed targets, exceeding them by far, unsurprisingly resulted in a high inflation rate 
during entire 1992 and 1993. One of the reasons for the failure was the total disorder of 
monetary data, which made such targets unreliable. In 1993, targets for credit to 
commercial banks, to the budget, and to other former Soviet republics were set. In addition, 
floor levels for net international reserves, gross reserves, and ceilings for the CBR's net 
domestic assets (NDA) and the net credit to the enlarged government, i. e., credit targets, 
were set (Buch, 1998). The additional target levels for M2 and monetary base followed 
these practices in 1994. Under strong auspices and guidance of the IMF, Russian monetary 
authorities continued carrying out their approach employed in 1994 also in 1995. M3 was 
used not only as the main intermediate target for monetary policy but also for calculating 
the targets for the monetary base and the NDA of the CBR (Bofinger et aL, 1997). 103 
103 The same approach was adopted for two other members of the CIS-3, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
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In July 1995, Russian authorities officially announced a corridor for the ruble/dollar 
exchange rate, which was adjusted in the following year and finally modified into a sort of 
crawling peg. This action, on the part of policyrnakers, did not exclude the practice of 
monetary targeting. 104 However, according to Bofinger et al. (1997) the strong 
overshooting of the monetary targets could not allow this stabilization program to be 
classified as a money-based stabilization, but rather as the exchange rate based 
stabilization, which turned out to be successful in short to medium term. 
The poor results of stabilization efforts prior to 1995, gave ammunition to critics of 
the design and implementation of the IMF-supported policies. The suitability of the 
orthodox, money-based stabilization program was thus brought under spotlights. Economic 
literature suggest, that a few money-based stabilizations implemented in the high-inflation 
countries, like Chile in 1974-1975, and Argentina and Brazil in early 1990, could not be 
cheering experience to be recommended to transition economies. The sluggishness with 
which money-based programs reduce inflation and their adverse effects on output and 
employment make them unsuitable for use in the high-inflation countries. In contrast to 
exchange rate based stabilizations, the recessionary effects of money-based programs tend 
to be immediate. This is mainly due to the short-term downward rigidity in prices and 
wages and the lack of credibility in the government resoluteness to stick to targets. The next 
serious reservation is related to the essential pre-condition for money-based stabilization - 
stable velocity of money. Given the severe limitations of monetary targeting in the OECD 
countries, it was observed that money-based approaches were unlikely to be suitable for 
short-term stabilization in transition economies where a stable demand for money was not 
observed, at least in the early years of transition (Bofinger et al, 1997). 105 Furthermore, it 
was argued that monetary targets carried the danger of Dornbusch-style exchange rate 
overshooting (Fisher, 1986). Moreover, even if velocity could be forecasted perfectly, it 
104 On 22.2.96 the CBR and the government set out a medium-tenn strategy for economic policy 
agreed with the IMF, which provides Russia with an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) credit of $10.2bn. The 
EFF, designed to operate for a longer period of time than the stand-by facility granted in the previous year, 
was going to span for 3-year period. In order to insure appropriate implementation of the Programme by the 
Russian authorities the IMF was to monitor the implementation of the targets specified in the program on a 
monthly, rather than a quarterly basis. These targets included ceilings on the NDA, limits on monetary 
authorities' net credit to the federal and general governments, as well as floors on net and gross international 
reserves. The latter were to reach $19.7 bn. by the end of 1996 (RET, 1996). By the end of first quarter of 
1996 all of the indicative targets on the monetary programme were met. 
105 Bofinger et al. argued that, while the Bundesbank uses monetary targeting as a medium-term 
policy guideline, the IMF applies this concept for short-term stabilisation purposes. Furthermore, they argued 
that this practice was inconsistent with the monetarist paradigm, which opposes all sort of fine tuning because 
of the famous "long and variable lags" in monetary policy. 
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would be needed to forecast both, real output and prices, to set a sensible target for 
monetary aggregate. This task could be particularly difficult at a time of considerable doubt 
about the real output and the prices, as during early transition (Begg, 1997). Literature 
advocates that in the face of an unstable money demand, an exchange rate anchor may not 
only both signal and help secure the end of an inflationary spiral, thereby enhancing 
confidence and helping in the re-monetisation, but also it may induce a greater commitment 
to the fiscal adjustment which was desperately lacking in Russia. 106 
With a benefit of hindsight, it emerged that despite its shortcomings, exchange rate 
peg, with occasional credible realignments, might have been earlier introduced as an 
arguably better instrument for stabilizing Russian economy. Alternatively, money targeting 
might have been used as a medium-term policy guideline as practiced by Bundesbank and 
Swiss National Bank rather than for short term stabilisation purposes. Nonetheless, such 
policy prescription could not spare the IMF team and the Prime Minister Gaidar of 
embarrassment related to the vast underestimation of corrective inflation in January 1992. 
The inflation was assumed to be 100% against the actual 245%, and as a consequence 
dented government credibility for Q1,1992 (Gomulka, 1995). It is also not clear to what 
extent that policy would absorb the other policy errors of the IMF. Among these are an 
initial support for a common currency and monetary union of most of the Former Soviet 
Union, and stubborn insistence on macroeconomic policies and stabilization, largely 
neglecting reforms in liberalization, privatization, and institutional change (Gomulka, 
1995), not to mention economic growth. What's more, it is unclear what implication such 
policy might have had on fiscal responsibility which is as important as the choice of 
aggregate targets, if not more. 
On the other hand, it was argued (Begg, 1997) that money-based stabilizations 
performed surprisingly well in the group of transition economies including Albania, 
Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Along the same lines Buch (1998) argued that the 
experience with monetary targeting was not entirely disappointing in Russia. As argument 
went, it helped the CBR to reduce growth in domestic assets, particularly lending to 
government. In addition, despite the evident instability of demand for money across 
majority of transition countries over time (Begg, 1997), Buch (1998) found that the long 
106 The lack of political consensus to undertake large fiscal adjustment was revealed in the failure to 
take necessary budget measures as well as to restrict credit to enterprises and sectors as stipulated 
by the 
several IMF-supported programs. 
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run money demand in Russia remained relatively stable, although short run fluctuations 
were substantial. Subsequently, Buch (1998) argued that the CBR ought to aim at moving 
to a monetary target in the medium-term. 
In should be noted that, when monetary targeting was applied in Russia, a 
prediction for a demand for money could hardly be based on solid foundations. This is not 
only related to the great uncertainty associated with the years after the price liberalization 
of January 1992, but also to the lack of meaningful time series of the economic aggregates 
measured in the new policy regime. For the same reasons, policyrnakers could not 
scrutinize suitability of any of the monetary aggregates along the criteria suggested above, 
except using a very short time series bound to produce unreliable and susceptible results. In 
addition, in the pursuit of multiple nominal anchors, as it was the case in Russia, failure of 
one should not prejudice the entire program. Moreover, for any nominal anchor, fiscal 
(ir)responsibility mattered even more, as evidenced by the financial crises of August 1998. 
The merits of the arguments for and against monetary targeting indubitably extend 
to economies other than transition ones. Our analysis nevertheless, leads to the conclusion 
that, given the existence of bilateral or feedback causality between both aggregates of the 
broad money supply and inflation, use of the former as the intermediate targets to control 
the latter, had severe limitation in postcommunist Russia. These empirical results signify 
the accommodating character of Russian monetary policy, as indeed was the case with the 
Visegrad countries in the early years of transition (Rostowski and Nikoli6,1998). Had the 
Russian government not been accommodating inflation in the early years of transition, in 
the environment of ill financial discipline and underdeveloped competitive economic 
infrastructure it would have risked endangering the role of the ruble as medium of 
exchange. Bofinger et al. (1997) showed that, questionable stability of the demand for 
money, together with a use of monetary targeting for short-term stabilization purposes 
instead of a medium-term policy guideline as practiced by Bundesbank and Swiss National 
Bank, was "completely misconceived" concept for transition countries. As argument went, 
money based stabilization that was developed for stable economies, would result in the 
liquidity crunch (Calvo and Vegh, 1992) and consequent high interest rate, which would 
adversely affect the output. In light of these critiques, the continuation of quantitative 
targeting of money stock as the main intermediate target for monetary policy, applied 
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during transition in Russia by the monetary authorities under the strong influence of the 
IMF, does seem to be questionable policy prescription. ' 07 
Having found that monetary aggregates were not exogenous or causally prior to 
inflation in Russia as well as unstable velocity of money, it would be somewhat redundant 
to conduct the analysis of controllability of these two aggregates of the broad money 
supply. Even so, it may be worth mentioning that the CBR may have had difficulties in 
controlling broad money supply even if the broad money supply happened to be prior to the 
goal variable and with no feedbacks. More specifically, since changes in broad money 
result from the cumulative effects of changes in the monetary base and in the money 
multiplier, the latter may cause the CBR to face control and information problems (Buch, 
1998). The former emerges as a result of inability to predict accurately the changes in the 
portfolio structure of households as well as the excess reserves of commercial banks. The 
latter arises because the CBR, or any other central bank for that matter, observes the 
behaviour of money stock with a time lag. 
4.6 Conclusion 
After assessment of various criteria for the optimal choice of the lag length in 
causality testing, the Akaike's (1969) FPE criterion seems to outperfonn both the ad hoc 
and the statistical criteria under consideration. In addition, the results indicate that arbitrary 
lag length specifications, including the most common 4-4 and 8-8 ones, may give seriously 
misleading results in causality testing. That, in turn, may have severe consequences for 
economic policy, particularly in cases where some kind of intermediate targeting is 
exercised. 
The correct identification of the direction of causality between broad money and 
inflation in postcommunist Russia gave us an opportunity to assess appropriateness of 
monetary policy in this transition economy. An intermediate target in this sense is 
appropriate if it reasonably determines a goal variable, if it is "exogenousil or causally prior 
to the goal of policy actions, and if it is controllable by policyrnakers. Assuming the first 
prerequisite of stable relationship between a target (ruble broad or extended broad money 
supply) and a goal variable (inflation) is fulfilled, as claimed in the recent literature, this 
The same conclusion applies to Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
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study clearly demonstrates that neither of the targets is exogenous in the case of Russia. In 
other words, the existence of feedback or bilateral causality between inflation and both 
aggregates of broad money diminishes their suitability for monetary targeting. This is 
because none of them can provide an unambiguous signal of where policy actions are 
headed. As a result, these findings make redundant the testing for controllability of the 
monetary aggregates aforementioned. 
In light of these findings, it appears that use of monetary targeting for short-term 
stabilization purposes applied by the Russian monetary authorities under strong auspices of 
the IMF, at least before the second half of 1995, might have not been the wisest policy 
prescrip ion. 
Finally, as it has become almost customary for Russian annalists to express the 
reservation in regard to the Russian statistics, we follow the suit. In addition to the 
conceptual problems related to the change from socialist to a market economy, we had at 
our disposal only relatively limited number of observations. Moreover, the period over 
which tests were conducted was characterized by large fall in economic activity, 
unprecedented transformation of economic system and socio-political institutions, the new 
regime of economic policy, and the advances in financial innovations. In such economic 
environment all the results and conclusions have to be treated with the due caution. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Role of International Financial Institutions in Stabilising Russian 
Economy"' 
5.1. Introduction 
Between the end of Czarist Russia in 1917 and early 1950s, about one third of the 
world population in various ways made transition from market economy to central 
planning. In the late 1980s, a period of the final demise of Soviet empire, a leading and the 
most resourceful member of this group, set in motion a reverse process for most of the 
former socialist countries: transition from planned to market economy. A very long legacy 
of central planning made assistance of international financial institution to transition 
economies very much sought-after. This assistance was anticipated to be both financial and 
consultative. 
Having had a considerable experience with structural reforms in Latin America, the 
Bretton Wood institutions, guardians of international financial system, the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund IMF, were the obvious choice for assistance to transition 
economies in their endeavour. These two institutions, particularly the IMF, had been 
involved with unequal extent and a various degree of success in Central and East European 
(CEE) transition economies, including Russian Federation for the most part of transition 
process. Given the considerable pain and protraction of Russian transition efforts, many 
issues related to the role of the IMF in Russia remain controversial. This chapter analysis 
the role of the IMF in Russia within global financial architecture, and particularly in the 
context of transition. It is often claimed that, the IMF, as a main guide and a coordinator of 
the Western assistance to Russia, has performed less than optimally in Russia (Sachs, 1997; 
LaRouche, 1999; Soros, 2000; Sanders, 1998, among others). IMF's positive effects of 
provider of credibility to this major transition economy in 1990s were, in general, annulled 
by the lack, not so much of pledges, but of sufficient lending disbursement at critical times 
am indebted to Dr. Tomasz Mickiewicz for the useful comments on the earlier versions of this 
paper. Responsibility for any remaining errors rests with the author. 
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for a successful transition, particularly at the beginning of its involvement. In addition, the 
shortcomings of the IMF guided stabilisation programs in the first few years of transition 
(see Chapters 2 and 4), were coupled with the consistent disregard for institutional building 
(Kolodko, 1999), not to mention disrespect for equitable growth of Russian economy. 
Furthermore, as documented in section 7, the IMF made a number of policy errors, which 
have contributed to the delay of macro stabilisation of the Russian economy. 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss 
briefly the role of the IMF in the present global financial architecture and the Washington 
consensus, respectively. Section 4 analyses the general policy consideration of the IMF 
involvement in Russia, while section 5 outlines the quantitative indicators of capital flows 
in European transition economies and Russia. Section 6 is devoted to the common criticism 
of the IMF programs while section 7 outlines specific policy consideration of the IMF 
involvement in postcommunist Russia. Section 8 elaborates the reason for a developing 
country to seek the IMF assistance while section 9 concludes with the summary of the 
findings. 
5.2 IMF in the Present Global Financial Architecture 
The Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and particularly the IMF have been 
the comer stones of the global financial system for more than five decades. During this time 
the results of the Bank/ Fund involvement in various stabilisation experiences has been 
mixed. The Bank has responded to the financial crises with recommendations to strengthen 
policy regimes and financial support. Although the Bank is not intended to act as a lender 
of last resort and is not primarily designed to fight crises, its participation has been required 
because of the important structural origins of the crises and the enormous impact the crises 
has had on income distribution and poverty. 
Having had macro-economic stability as its chief aim, the IMF had a leading role in 
creation and execution of these programs. Over time it became possible to identify the main 
characteristic of these programs. Despite differences related to country- specific 
characteristic, most IMF's programs have three common but complement elements: (i) 
securing sustainable external financing; (ii) adoption of demand restraining measures - 
especially in the early stages of a program; and (iii) implementation of structural reforms. 
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The availability of external financing determines the magnitude and pace of the 
necessary adjustment process. At the outset of the program a country that experiences 
balance of payment difficulties typically can borrow only a meagre funds. IMF guidelines 
require that the country does not show an ex ante external financing gap, that it remain 
current in its debt service commitments, and that it eliminates external debt arrears it may 
have accumulated prior to program approval (Mussa and Savastano, 1999). 
Demand restraining measures, typically understood as tightening monetary and 
fiscal policies, are best known but controversial elements of a typical Fund program. The 
intention of the architects of such programs is to bring aggregate demand in line with the 
prospective output and available external financing and, thus, with a sustainable current 
account. In order to facilitate external adjustment, program creators may, in addition, opt 
for the alteration of the nominal exchange rate. In recent times, the IMF tends to stress 
tightening of monetary rather than fiscal policy in countries with weak financial systems 
when investors loose their confidence. The aim is to prevent currency crises, but the IMF 
record in this area is not impressive. 
The endeavour in a typical program to alleviate structural and institutional rigidities 
is aimed to facilitate an efficient allocation of resources and in doing so to smooth the 
progress of economic growth. Structural reform may include changes to a variety of 
activities and vary from a country to country. Typically, the key structural priorities for 
transition economics are privatisation and building of market institutions. 
5.3 Washington Consensus for Transition Economies 
The IMF involvement in steering former planned economies of Central and East 
Europe to market economy was biggest and unprecedented challenge of its existence. The 
IMF took the lead in assistance efforts of Western donor organisations and countries to 
transition economies. The starting point for the policy advice to these countries was the so- 
called Washington Consensus, a body comprised of the US Treasury, the IMF, and the 
World Bank. The consensus was the product of the Latin America's structural crises in the 
1980s, and operated under following slogan: 'liberalise and privatise as quickly as possible, 
and be tough in fiscal and monetary matters'. Restructuring would follow in the later phase. 
Since the starting assumption was that transition economies were in macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, much like Latin American economies, the stabilisation was the priority. 
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Demand rather than supply side management was the preferred order of the day. External 
and internal liberalisation coupled with privatisation and stabilisations were expected to 
transform transition economies into fully-fledged market economies. 
The Washington consensus motto was to a large extent promoted in Russia via the 
IMF guided reforms. The main components of the Russian reform included: a fast price 
liberalisation, the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and the convertibility of the 
ruble, a considerable foreign trade liberalisation, macroeconomic stability, privatisation 
and, to a lesser extent, other systemic, structural, and institutional reforms. Safety nets and 
external assistance were additional, supportive features (Gomulka, 1995). The discussion 
about reforms usually centres on the issues of rapid or shock versa gradual pace of reforms 
or the gradation of these two. Since the chief concern of the IMF has traditionally been 
macroeconomic stability in the short and mediw-n term, we concentrate on this issue. 
Subsequently, the results of the macro - stabilisation efforts would be a way of judging the 
degree of the IMF's success in Russia by its own criteria. 
5.4 General Policy Consideration of the IMF Involvement in Russia 
The role of the IMF in developing economies has been scrutinised particularly by 
the structuralist theoreticians during seventies and eighties (Taylor, 1988 among others). 
Inevitably, the IMF role in the Russian transition to market economy received a particular 
attention in the wake of financial crisis of August 1998. These articles, usually critical for 
their own ends, distinguish between structural deficiencies of the IMF within the global 
financial architecture (Soros, 2000) and the IMF's specific policy mistakes made in Russia 
(Sachs, 1997, among others). 
The IMF involvement in Russia began after some experimentation with the early 
reformers in early 1990s. The Fund, together with the Russian government, devised a 
stabilisation plan for the biggest and most important transition economy. The first official 
Fund-supported programme for Russia was unveiled in June 1992, the same month the 
country formally rejoined the Bretton Wood institutions. Half-hearted stabilisation efforts 
were already enacted since autumn 1991 but with poor results. In this period the IMF 
position in general was that (i) the Soviet ruble should continue to be common currency for 
the successor states of the Soviet Union, (ii) Russia should have balanced budget deficit, 
and (iii) since inflation was viewed as a pure monetary phenomenon, money supply should 
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be kept under tight control. Various monetary targets were imposed and inflation rate was 
supposed to decline below 5 percent per month. Conspicuously, in stabilisation efforts in 
the first few years neither exchange rate nor wage rate target served as a nominal anchor. 
Hence, orthodox money based stabilisation strategy was chosen by the IMF for Russia. The 
poor results of the June 1992 Fund-supported stabilisation led to another programme in 
June 1993. Since the latter had a similar fate as the former, it was succeeded by the more 
ambitious "March 1994 program". Annual inflation rate of 1526.0 percent in 1992 preceded 
875.0, and 311.4 percent in the following two years (EBRD, 1998) giving little credit to 
each of these stabilisation efforts, even though inflation trend was downwards. In addition, 
as elaborated in Chapter 2, on 'Black Tuesday' on II October 1994, Russia suffered the 
first full-fledged financial crises in post-communist times. Consequently, it was clear that 
stabilisation doctrine had to take a new shape. After thorough preparation, the new, 
exchange rate based stabilisation programme, with heterodox elements, was finally 
implemented in June 1995. This programme was relatively successful but only in the short 
to medium run. 109 Macroeconomic stability is always fragile in transforming economies 
like the Russian Federation in which the fiscal deficit has not been brought under control 
and has averaged close to 8 percent per annum. up to 1998 (Nikolic', 2000a). The dire 
position of government finances and the economy as a whole was undermined further by 
the other internal and external factors (see Chapter 3). The most prevalent among the 
former were macroeconomic and structural weaknesses, particularly over-dependence on 
short term capital inflows, while the latter were dominated by the fall of oil and other 
commodity prices and the fall in confidence on the part of the international capital investors 
to invest in trouble ridden countries like Russia. The failure of the policyinakers to address 
these issues in the relatively favourable investment climate of 1997 led Russia, in August 
1998, into the worst financial crises of its transition period and contributed to the global 
financial turbulence. The ruble was effectively devalued and left floating while the 
government defaulted on its own maturing short-term securities - Gosudarstvennye 
Kratkosrochnye Obligatsii (GKO). 110 
109 The summer 1995 stabili sation programme is described elsewhere i. g., Bofinger et al (1997) and 
Nikoli6 (2000a). 
"0 In 1998, the official exchange rate went from R5,96/$ to R20,65/$, a depreclatlon of 246 per cent. 
From August 1998 to end-March 1999, the ruble has depreciated 287 per cent, from R6,24/$ to R24,16/$. For 
details see Nikoli6 (2000a). 
129 
Failure to regain macro-economic stability during the first years after liberalisation 
attracted sharp criticism of the IMF from various quarters. This is not to say that the 
successive Russian governments are immune of criticism. Their chief fault lies in the 
chronic refusal to reform. Yet, reluctance of the G7 to get involved in reforms and provide 
financial assistance to Russia when most needed is equally to blame. Moreover, a snail pace 
of the World Bank involvement also contributed to failure. Even so, both, the Russian 
government and the IMF, were accused of squandering one after another opportunity to 
stabilise Russia with disastrous consequences for the welfare of the Russian people. Critics 
charged that these two, of which the IMF was a typical representative of the West, have 
never missed opportunity to miss opportunity in Russia (Sachs, 1997). During this time, a 
common understanding between the West and the Russian government, via the IMF, was 
maintained. The West would pretend to aid the Russians while they would pretend to 
stabilise (Granvile, 1995). Likewise, IMF promised loans and Russian govenu-nent 
promised reforms. This turned out to be a pseudo lending for pseudo reforms. 
The end result of Russian transformation endeavour in 1990s may well conform to 
the criticism of the IMF designed programs. Although there are doubts about its accuracy, 
between 1992 and 1995, Russian official statistics recorded a fall of GDP by 42 percent and 
a fall of industrial production by 46 percent - far worse than the contraction of the U. S. 
economy during the Great Depression. Critics points out that, the basic results of the IMF 
prescriptions for the decontrol of prices, radical economic and financial liberalization, and 
indiscriminate opening of markets to imported products, has been to transform Russia into 
a raw materials producer, rather than an agro-industrial country (LaRouche, 1999). Soros 
(2000) argues that the IMF has not been in Russia as having goal in economic development 
but merely as bill collectors for the world financial community. The critics further charges 
(Sanders, 1998; Soros, 2000) that, much of the IMF loans has gone to bail out international 
creditors, creating what is now recognised as moral hazard. The rest has mainly gone to 
corrupt government officials, bureaucrats, and connected businessmen. 
The effect of the Russian economic policy guided by the IMF has been devastating 
on the Russian people. Between 1991 (time of Soviet Union collapse) and 1995, real 
income plummeted 40 percent. A quarter of all Russians were living below the subsistence 
level. Nearly one-third lived below the poverty level. Three-quarters barely survived on an 
average income of $100 per month. The average life expectancy for men has declined by 
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seven years, to 59, since 1990. One-quarter of Russia's labour force receives its wages late, 
in kind, or not at all (Sanders, 1998). 
Finally, the last strand of criticism ought to be directed at the political economy of 
the IMF involvement in Russia. Yet, literature is not very forthcoming with this issue. More 
specifically, given a large gap between promised and delivered funds, as well as timing of 
some deliveries, one cannot help thinking that both the IMF and the United States Treasury, 
which calls the tunes at the IMF, were used to spoon-fed Russia to the point of no return. 
No more, no less. Throughout transition period Russian reformers received just enough aid 
and just at the right time to remain in power and insure that Russia passes the benchmark 
beyond which would be highly unlikely to return to the central planning and autarky. A 
recent analysis (Thacker, 1999) confirmed that, contrary to expectations that the IMF has 
become less politicised since the end of the cold war, the influence of politics has actually 
increased since 1990. Thacker (1999) claims that political realignment toward the United 
States, the largest power in the IMF, increases a country's probability of receiving an IMF 
loan. The study concluded that the behaviour of multilateral organizations is still driven by 
the political interests of their more powerful member states. 
5.5 Quantitative Indicators of Capital Flows and the IMF Involvement in the 
European Transition Economies and the Russian Federation 
Capital flows in Russia from 1989 to 1993 were shaped by Western governments' 
determination to make the transition "stick", coupled with a wait-and-see approach by 
private sources of funds. In addition to the financing provided by the IMF and the World 
Bank, bilateral credits were extended to Russia mostly from seven major industrial 
countries. Moreover, official creditors, under the auspices of the Paris Club, and debt 
deferrals by commercial bank creditors offered a comprehensive debt relief package for 
Russia, but only in late 1990s. When economic performance improved and the transition 
progressed, private capital began to enter the market, first tentatively, then with great speed. 
Hence the sequence was as follows: official financing, FDI, non-guaranteed bank loans, 
dedicated equity funds, and lastly international bond issues and direct local stock and 
money market investments (EBRD, 1998). 
Despite the fact that by 1993, virtually all of the East European economies and 
Russian Federation were IMF members, overall they received smaller and declining share 
131 
of financial resources relative to the developing countries in the first quinquennium of the 
1990s (UN/ECE, 2000). Although many transition economies attracted capital inflows"' of 
the order of 5 per cent of GDP in line with developing economies between 1990 and 1998, 
a significant number including Russia failed to do so (UN/ECE, 2000). In fact, Fig. I 
demonstrates that despite substantial volatility, net capital inflows, including "errors and 
omissions", were negative in Russia between 1993 and 1998.112 Table 5.1 demonstrates the 
size of the Russian net capital flows relative to other east European transition economies. 
Definition of capital inflow throughout this article refers to the acquisition of domestic assets by 
non-residents (plus grants). Sales of domestic assets are defined as a negative capital inflow. Thus the terin 
net capital inflow denotes acquisitions minus sales of domestic assets by non-residents. Conversely, capital 
outflow refers to the acquisition of foreign assets by residents. Sales of foreign assets are defined as a negative 
capital outflow. Thus the term net capital outflow denotes acquisitions minus sales of foreign assets by 
residents. 
112 "Errors and omissions" stands for unrecorded capital flows, mainly capital flights. 
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Table 5.1 Net Capital Flows into Eastern European Transition econornies, by Type and 
Flow (1993-1998) 
Trade Flows 
1993-98 
US (billions) Per capita Per GDpa 
Private Flows 
(per GDP)' 
Total Long-terrn 
Albania 0.9 298 111 26 39 
Bosnia and Herzegovinac 3.8 1082 
Bulgaria 2.5 292 62 47 -1 Croatia 7.6 1686 250 159 137 
Czech Republic 22.7 2208 169 154 112 
Hungary 20.5 2017 204 207 160 
Poland 32.4 837 112 80 61 
Romania 12.4 550 87 44 42 
Slovakia 8.3 1547 163 148 73 
Slovenia 2.2 1094 78 108 108 
FYR Macedonia 1.5 748 175 20 5 
Estonia 2.4 1646 218 131 100 
Latvia 1.5 595 106 109 103 
Lituania 5.1 1389 223 63 55 
Armenia 1.7 473 229 14 12 
Azerbeijan 4 528 256 99 99 
Belarus 3.8 366 62 14 10 
Georgia 1.8 348 105 6 6 
Kazakhstan 6.1 372 77 76 71 
Kyrgyzstan 1.5 325 141 26 23 
Republic Of Moldova 1.1 252 113 43 40 
Russian Federation -40.8 -277 -40 21 17 
Tajikistan 0.8 129 136 29 23 
Turkmenistan 1.7 392 148 156 110 
Ukraine 8 156 47 23 17 
Uzbekistan 2.9 124 59 39 30 
Total Above b 91.9 231 39 56 43 
Russian Federation d 2.6 18 3 21 17 
Source: LTN/ECE, 2000 No. 1, pp. 149. 
Note: Total flows are the sum of the capital and financial accounts and errors and omissions as 
reported in the national balance of payments statistics. Total private flows include FDI, long-term private 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt, short-term debt and portfolio equity flows. 
' Per $ 100 GDP in 1997. These are Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates of GDP 
b Excluding Bosnia and Herzegovina 
' 1994-1998 
d Excluding errors and omissions from total flows 
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The variation in the size of capital flows among transition economies reflects their 
degree of economic reforms. In effect, an access to official funds is often conditional on the 
implementation of structural reforms and sound macroeconomic policies. Table 5.1 shows 
that most of the foreign capital (about 60 per cent) has been attracted by the early refon-ning 
countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In contrast, although the exact size of 
the volatile Russia's capital flows is uncertain, Fig. 5.1 indicates that inflow of capital per 
capita has been negligible while outflows were substantial. While the former represents 
reported financial inflows, the latter is calculated as the sum of recorded flows and "errors 
and omissions". This latter item is generally considered to include unrecorded capital flows, 
which is a synonym for capital flight (Table. 5.9). Russian total capital outflows, including 
unrecorded capital, averaged about 3 per cent of GDP in 1993-1998 period (UN/ECE, 
2000). Such a large outflow of capital has been made possible by a large current account 
surplus and foreign borrowing. 
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Fig. 5.1 Capital Flows into Transition Economies (1993-1998) US $ Per Capita 
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Source: UN/ECE, 2000 (See Table 5.1). 
Note: 'Including errors and omissions 
The increase in the growth of capital inflows into transition econon-ýies during 1990s 
has been associated with the change in their composition (Table 5.2). While the five leading 
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Central European Transition Economies (CETE-5)1 13 have steadily decreased official 
financing and even repaid the IMF debts by 1996, Russian Federation increased the size of 
official funds after 1994. These official funds were mostly comprised of IMF credits and 
grant aid, and accounted for the most of official financial inflows into transition economies. 
A large share of the official capital flows were on account of German transfers to the 
former Soviet Union, as part of the German unification agreement. As the transition got 
underway private flows (FDI, long-term debt and short term debt) began to dominate 
capital market. An important proportion of private inflows has taken the form of so-called 
non-debt creating inflows, notably FDL On average, the share of FD1 in total net inflows 
was higher in transition economies than in developing countries though this does not apply 
to Russia. ' 14 
Table 5.2 Net Capital Flows into the Five Central European Transition Economies 
(CETE-5) and Russia, by type of finance, 1993-98 (per cent of GDP) 
CETE-5 Russian Federation 
1991-95 1996-98 1993-95 1996-98 
Capital transfers' 
FDI 
Long-term debt 
External bonds 
IMF 
Short -term funds 
Portfolio investmenO 
Short -term flows 
Errors and omissions 
Total net flows 
1.8 0.1 0.2 -0.1 
2.3 2.6 0.4 0.7 
0.9 0.3 -0.7 -0.3 
1.4 0.4 -0.1 1.5 
-0.5 -0.1 1.1 0.9 
1.3 2.3 -2 -2.4 
0.6 0.6 -0.2 4 
0.3 0.9 0.1 -3.9 
0.4 0.8 -1.9 -2.5 
6.2 5.2 -2.1 -2.1 
Total flows (US$ bn) 40.5 45.3 -16.5 -24.3 
Source: UN/ECE, 2000 No. 1, pp. 15 1. 
Note: a Includes debt write-offs under debt restructuring agreements, especially important for Poland 
during 1993-1995. 
b Excludes external bonds 
"' Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
114 Between 1990 and 1998, FDI accounted for 34 per cent of capital inflows into the developing 
economies. Conversely, from Table 5.2 it can be calculated that between 1993 and 1998 FDI accounted 
for 43 
per cent of capital inflows in CETE-5 and 26 per cent in the Russian Federation. 
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Despite being among the top 10 recipients, the group of developing countries that 
receive more than 70 per cent of FDI flows, FD1 per capita in Russia has been 
disappointingly low. The FD1 in Russia rose significantly with opening of its economy, but 
political instability and the poor business climate deterred many foreign investors. Fig. 5.2 
indicates that, even though the trend of FD1 was upward during 1990-98 period, it was 
much more significant in the five Central European Transition Economies (CETE-5) and in 
Central and East European (CEE) transition economies cumulatively than in Russia. This 
difference is much more pronounced if FD1 per capita were considered instead. While all 
European transition economies received $439 in forms of cumulative FDI-inflows per 
capita between 1989 and 1997, Russia received only $63 for the same period (EBRD, 
1998). That is many times less than any other European transition economies, except FYR 
Macedonia, and even less than an average ($84) of a country from the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). At the end of 1997 the total FD1 stock in Russia was only half of 
the sum invested in Hungary between 1989 and 1997. 
Fig. 5.2 Inflows of FDI in ECE Transition Economies, 1990-98 ($US millions) 
25000 
20000 
15000 
10000 
5000 
0 
0 All European Transition Economies -M- CETE-5 A Russia 
Source: UN/ECE, 2000 and author's calculations. 
The inflow of capital in Russia peaked in 1997. This was a result of 
the 
improvement in economic policy environment and financial position, 
together with 
successful rescheduling agreements with Paris and London 
Clubs creditors in 1996 and 
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1998 
1997 respectively. However, as most of these inflows were directed to short-term 
investment in government securities and equities, Russia became increasingly vulnerable to 
shifts in market sentiment. This weakness was forcefully manifested in the form of increase 
in the already sizeable capital outflows after the onset of the Asian crises in the late 1997. 
The widening of the gap between inflow and outflow of capital in Russia has culminated 
during and immediately after August 1998 crises and Russian default on the GKOs. 
The analysis of the flow of capital in Russia during transition would be incomplete 
without considering external debt and its implication for stabilisation of economy. Table 
5.3 demonstrates external debt and debt indicators for Central and East European (CEE) 
economies in transition in comparison to Russia in the 1990s. 
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Table 5.3 Debt Indicators for Economies in Transition, 1990-98, ($US billions) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Russia/SU (before 1992) 
Total external debt (TED) 59.8 67.8 78.4 111.7 121.5 120.3 124.9 126 183.6 
Long term debt 48 55.2 65.2 103.4 111.6 110 112.8 120 165.2 
Concessional 0 0.7 1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Bilateral 0 0.7 1 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Multilateral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Official non-concessional 5.9 8.8 10.8 54.6 64.5 64.3 72.9 74.2 85.3 
Bilateral 5.5 8.4 9.3 50.8 58.8 52.7 57.6 55.7 59.4 
Multilateral 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.5 2 2.8 5.3 6.6 
IMF credit 0 0 1 2.5 4.2 9.6 12.5 13.2 19.3 
World Bank credit 0.6 1.5 2.6 5.3 6.4 
PrMite creditors 42.1. 45.6 53.4 46.7 44.6 43.2 -17.4 43.5 77.6 
of which 
Bonds' 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.1 4.6 16 
Commercial bankSa 17.9 16.8 18.5 15.9 16.4 16.7 15.6 29.3 29.3 
Short-term debt 11.8 12.6 13.1 8.3 9.9 10.4 12.1 6.1 18.4 
Memorandum Item 
IMF credits/TED (in per cent) 0 0.0 1.3 2.2 3.5 8.0 10.0 10.5 10.5 
CEE 
Total external debt 109.3 117.7 113 116.8 121.5 138.3 139.8 141 156.3 
Long term debt 91.1 102 99.9 104.1 109.5 120.8 121.7 116.5 127.8 
Concessional 5.2 4.9 14.3 13.6 12.1 13.6 12.8 10.5 11.5 
Bilateral 5.1 4.7 14.2 13.4 11.9 13.3 12.5 10.1 11 
Multilateral 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Official non-concessional 36.6 47.6 38.6 39.6 41.9 42.3 40 37 36.5 
Bilateral 28.7 34.7 24.3 24.9 25.1 26.9 25.9 23.5 23.5 
Multilateral 6.6 7.9 8.9 9.3 11.1 12.3 11.9 11 10.6 
IMF credit 1.3 5 5.4 5.4 5.7 3.1 2.2 2.5 2.4 
Private creditors 49.3 49.5 47 50.9 5 5.5 64.9 68.9 69 79.8 
of which 
BondSa 5 6.7 7.4 11.7 28.1 30.9 29.1 26.1 28.3 
Commercial bankSa 34.7 33.6 30.8 29.1 14.4 16.6 20.2 21.1 21.4 
Short-term debt 18.2 15.7 13.1 12.7 12 17.5 18.1 24.5 28.5 
Debt Indi cators ( percentage) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Ratio of extemal debt to GNP 
Russia/FSU (before 1992) 
CEE 
10.3 12.5 18.6 29.1 37.9 35.3 29.6 28.8 69.4 
38.8 65.1 58.2 50.9 47.3 43.5 41.7 44.4 44.2 
Ratio of external debt to exports 
Russia/FSU (before 1992) 73.8 124.8 143 169.8 156.7 129.5 119.3 121.4 207.1 
CEE 179.4 214.9 165.5 141 121.8 103.3 98.3 100.2 103 
Ratio of debt service to exports 
Russia/FSU (before 1992) 14.6 42.8 2.5 3.3 4.4 6.4 6.7 6.4 12.1 
CEE 20.9 19.5 16.8 11.7 14.4 13.6 13.5 14.1 15.9 
Source: UN 2000; IMF, 1999 
Note: ' Government or government-guaranteed debt only 
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Notably, the total external debt of Russia equalled the corresponding debt for all 
other CEE transition economy in 1994, and surpassed it in 1998. In addition, Table 5.3 
implies that in contrast to other CEE economies the role of official creditors in Russia and 
that of the IMF, in particular, has become more important over time. However, again in 
contrast to the rest CEE economies the official financing to Russia was not significant in 
the first years at the beginning of transition. Arguably, that was the time when Russia most 
needed it. Furthermore, one can argue that the size of IMF lending to transition economies 
has been hardly excessive (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Net IMF Lending to Transition Economies, By Facility, 1990-98, ($US bn. ) 
Source: UN, 2000. 
As demonstrated in Table 5 actual foreign currency disbursements relative to either 
Gross National Product (GNP) or to Total External Debt (TED) are not particularly 
high, 
even in the period when these achieved their peak. Moreover, as 
far as Russia is concerned, 
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the size of official disbursements rarely matched promised finances (see section 7). The 
total IMF foreign currency disbursements to Russia from the beginning of transition until 
the end of 1998 had been just over $20 billion (IMF, 1999, and author's calculations). 
Table 5.5 Foreign Currency Disbursements to the Russian Federal Government, 1994-98 
($US mill. ) 
Creditors 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total (1994- 
98) 
Multilateral 1 ý931 6,319 41940 45777 71519 259486 IMF a 1)544 55450 35758 2M19 65240 19,011 
World Bank 280 826 15107 21699 1 ý219 61131 EBRD 6 43 75 59 60 243 
Other 101 0 0 0 0 101 
Bilateral 21057 1,554 3ý280 1X5 2)110 10,376 
Tied 25057 1,554 L090 11375 21110 8,186 
Untied 0 0 2ý190 0 0 21190 
Bonds b 0 0 15000 35549 95615 145164 
Suppliers/other conunercial 507 93 0 1ý136 156 11892 
Total 45496 7ý966 91220 10,836 19,399 515918 
(excludng IMF) 25952 25515 5ý462 8,817 13,160 32,907 
Memorandum Items 
GNP 320,580 391,784 472,297 489,583 225,216 
Total Extemal Debt (TED) 121,500 120,300 124,900 126,000 183,600 
IMF disbursment/GNP 0.48 1.39 0.80 0.41 2.77 
IMF disbursment/TED 1.27 4.53 3.01 1.60 3.40 
Multilateral/GNP 0.60 1.61 1.05 0.98 3.34 
Multilateral/TED 1.59 5.25 3.96 3.79 4.10 
Source: IMF, 1999, author's calculations 
Note: ' Full amount of Fund purchases. In 1998 part of this amount was disbursed directly to the 
CBR. 
b Figure for 1998 includes $3,700 of Eurobonds purchases by residents. Data on resident purchases in other 
years were not available. 
Nevertheless, it is not only IMF credits that were important for Russian financial 
consolidation. As mentioned above, one has to consider the growing role of private 
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financing and other sources of official financing, particularly bilateral and multilateral 
credits as shown in Table 5.3. This might not have come had Russia not received the green 
light for her reforms by the IMF. In addition, prior to August 1998 crises Russia had 
reached key rescheduling agreements with Paris and London Clubs creditors. 
Table 5.6 Multilateral Debt Relief Agreements with Official Creditors, 1990-98. 
Consolidation 
period for current Repayment 
maturities termSa 
Share of 
Contract debt Amount Maturity Grace 
Date of cutoff Start Length Arrears consolidated consolidated (years/ (years/ 
Agreement date date (months) included (percent) (mill. $US) months) months) 
2-Apr-93 bI -Jan-91 I-Jan-93 12 Y 100 14497 10/0 6/0 
2-Jun-94 I -Jan-91 1 -Jan-94 12 100 7100 15/2 2/9 
3-Jun-95 I -Jan-91 I-Jan-95 12 100 6400 15/4 2/10 
15-Apr-96 I -Jan-91 I -Jan-96 Stock 100 40200 21/5 2/11 
6-Oct-97 I -Jan-91 I -Jan-97 N/A N/A 32500 25 6 
Sources: IBRD/The World Bank, 1999; Hishow, 2001. 
Note: The figures in this table are commitment values (amounts of agreed debt relief). They should 
correspond to the disbursement figures (minus debt forgiveness, when applicable). All agreements shown in 
this table were negotiated either through the Paris Club or through the London Club. 
' Maturity is measured here from the end of the consolidation period to the date of the final amortisation 
payment; the grace period is the time between the end of the consolidation period and the date of the first 
amortisation payment. The secretariat of the Pans Club measures the grace and maturity from the midpoint of 
the consolidation period. 
b Agreement follows the deferral signed in January 1992 by the former Soviet republics. 
The agreements shown in Table 5.6 allowed a substantial lengthening of the 
maturity structure of sovereign debt 115 and reduced debt service pressures. Moreover, after 
two years London Club wrote off one third of the debt due in February 2000, as well as 
accepted an interest service reduction (Hishow, 2001). Consequently, the real payments 
amounted to just 40 percent of the due payment as shown in Table 5.7. 
The sovereign debt alone makes Russia one of the most indebted emerging markets in the world. 
Only Brazil ($220 bn. ), Korea ($170 bn. ) and Indonesia ($169 bn. ) run bigger debts (Hishow, 2001). 
1 2) 
Table 5.7 Financial Relief Through Restructuring and Payment Deferrals, ($US bill. ) 
Source: Hishow, 2001 
The reduced debt service expenditures, totalling $80 billion, which is about a half of 
the Russian GDP for 2000, are claimed to be significant contribution of the West to the 
balance of payments (Hishow, 2001). Moreover, Hishow (2001) argues that the size of the 
Russian external debt may allow Russia to misuse her dominant position as a debtor and 
default on her external obligation as it did with the internal debt in the wake of August 
1998 crises. The worry for the West is that Russia may impose either a unilateral 
moratorium or try to achieve an infinite debt restructuring, which in the end may result into 
the same. It could be argued that continuing lending to Russia despite unsustainable 
policies may be based in part on expectations of support of international financial 
community. In other words, there is an implicit moral hazard where creditors continue 
investing in Russia led to believe that Russia is too big to be allowed to fail. Reportedly, in 
the wake of Russian financial 1997-98 crises, the IMF's sceptical officials were persuaded 
by the United States Treasury to provide a loan package on the ground that Russia was "to 
nuclear to go bust" (Hale, 1998). It is therefore always difficult to determine the optimal 
level of financial assistance for any country and particularly for Russia given her military 
might and vast economic resources. 
The IMF faced the same dilemma when determining the size of the rescue package 
for the financial crises of 1997-98. On one hand sufficient financing was necessary to meet 
anticipated foreign exchange needs, restore market confidence, and ensure the success of 
the program. On the other hand the provision of very large amount of finance risked moral 
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hazard. From July 1997 to October 1998 the international community pledged about S187 
billion to support Indonesia, Korea, Russia, and Thailand (Table 5.8). However, due to the 
performances under IMF-agreed reform programs the disbursements amounted to about one 
third of the pledged funds for all countries. In the event, due to the disappointing results of 
the Russian reforms only the first tranche of the IMF loan ($4.5 billion) was disbursed. 
That represented about seven percent of the total disbursements, and was about a quarter of 
the pledged sum to Russia. Following mounting fiscal and financial difficulties, August 
1998 ruble devaluation, unilateral restructuring of the GKO debt and the declared 90-day 
moratorium on private debt repayments, and ongoing weakness in oil prices, the flow of 
financing was cut off for a period of time. 
Looking at Table 5.8 one cannot help noticing that the funds pledged to Russia are 
considerably smaller than the funds designated for any other country except Thailand. 
Moreover, the disbursed funds to Russia are much smaller than for any other country under 
consideration. This observation led Hale (1998) to claim that the Russian package was too 
small to be effective. According to Hale (1998), had the $22 billion package for Russia 
been similar to the Mexico one of $40 billions in 1995, investors would probably not fled? 
Furthermore, had more of these fund been disbursed the investors would have been less 
sceptical? In the event, investors judged that, given the delicate finances of Russia, the 
pledge of $22 billions and even considerable smaller actual commitments, was not enough 
to bail Russia out. 
Table 5.8 Rescue Package in East Asia, Russia, and Brazil: 1997: 07-1998: 10 ($US bill. ) 
Funds pledged I Funds disbursed 
Country 
Indonesia 
Korea, Rep. Of 
Thailand 
Russia 
Brazil 
11.2 10 5.5 26.1 47. 
20.9 14 10 23.3 58. 
4 2.7 1.5 10.5 17. 
11.2 1.5 1.5 9.9 22. 
18 9 4.5 14.5 41. 
6.8 1.3 1.4 9.5 
18.2 5 4 27.2 
3 0.8 8.9 12.7 
4.5 4.5 
4.6 b 4 8.6 
Total 65.3 37.2 23 84.3 186.8137.1 7.1 18.3 62.5 
Source: IBRD/The World Bank, 1999. 
IMF Multilaterala 
World 
Bank 
World 
Bilateral Tota IMF Bank Others Total 
Note: 'World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Bank. 
b Package was approved in Dec. 1998. First IMF disbursement was in January 1999. 
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The evidence presented here give credence to claims that Western aid to Russia Nvas 
not sufficient to enable Russia to go through the pains of transition smoothly (Sachs, 1997; 
Hale 1998). In fact the Western contribution to Russia could hardly be qualified as "aid". It 
is clear that those were credits which Russia needs to repay sooner or latter. Though these 
credits seem cheaper than those taken on the financial markets, the Russian government 
was expected to accept the conditions formulated by IMF ideologues and policy-makers. 
5.6 Common Criticism of the IMF Programs 
Although every society has it own priorities, broad objectives of economic policy 
are usually not in dispute. These should include a high rate of growth, low rate of inflation, 
alleviation of poverty, social stability, adequate supply of public goods and services, and 
not too wide income inequality. Criticism of the IMF takes various form and along several 
lines. In most general form, the critics finds the first three elements of a typical IMF 
program outlined above in dissonance with the broad objectives of economic policy. 
One of the strides of this line of criticism is the view that the macroeconomic 
underlying the IMF approach to stabilisation is fundamentally wrong (Taylor, 1988). 
Taylor's criticism is rooted in the contrasting view about the nature of inflation, the relative 
importance of fix-price and flex-price markets, the role of forced saving and output 
adjustment, dynamics of economic growth, and the sensitivity of specific balance of 
payments and financial linkages to various policy measures. 
Another line of criticism views the Fund as a hermetic institution whose standard 
stabilisation package is not sufficiently responsive to the ever-changing conditions in the 
global economy and the evolution of professional thinking. More specifically, the 'financial 
programming' based on the Polak (1957) model is viewed as to some extent dogmatic, 
somewhat outdated and rather ill suited for the diverse crises such as collapse of central 
planning and the financial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s (See Taylor, 1998 
for more details). 
Other strand of criticism aims at the structural elements of a reform package. The 
critics charges that the Fund's staff lacks expertise and mandate to convey advice and 
design conditionality on structural issues. 116 It is argued (Feldstein, 1998) that the 
legitimate political institutions of the country should determine the nation's economic 
116 See Mussa and Savastano (1999) for the references of the critics. 
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structure and the nature of its institutions rather than the IMF via conditionality provisions. 
As argument goes, the IMF role should be limited to providing technical advice and limited 
financial assistance. Subsequently, the desperate need of financial assistance does not give 
the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgements for the outcomes of the 
nation's political process (Feldstein, 1998). 
Yet another thread of criticism identifies two major interconnected asymmetries of 
the IMF operating practices (Soros, 2000). One is a disparity between crises prevention and 
crises intervention; the other is disparity in the treatment of lenders and borrowers. The first 
disparity stems from the fact that the IMF cannot provide any debt relief to the debtor 
countries during the crises since that could have devastating effects on the financial markets 
(Soros, 2000). Only after the crisis is weathered, can any debt relief follow. The second 
disparity is explained by the political economy of the IMF. Namely, Soros (2000) asserts 
that international financial architecture is skewed towards centre. It implies the countries at 
the centre of the global financial system control the IMF; therefore it would go against the 
national interest of controlling shareholders if the IMF penalised lenders. The net effect of 
this approach is to place the burden of adjustment mainly on the borrowing countries by 
compelling them institutionally to service their debt, which usually stretches them to the 
limits of their capacity. This feature of the IMF reportedly had an important role in shaping 
investors expectations in Russia in 1998 (Soros, 2000). Namely, many investors kept 
buying Russian treasury bills (GKOs) despite the fact that fiscal and monetary indicators 
were clearly indicating a possible crisis. Their actions were influenced by the view that 
Russia was too important not to be allowed an IMF bail out. In the event, according to 
Soros (2000), the very recognition of the moral hazard inherent in the IMF method of 
operation made the bail out politically unacceptable. Subsequently Russia was doomed for 
the default and the GKOs holders for the financial disaster. 
5.7 Specific Policy Consideration of the IMF Involvement in Postcommunist Russia 
The themes 'what went wrong' and 'who lost Russia' have been prominent in the 
literature for several years. The answers on these questions may be a useful lesson 
for 
policy analysts and many others on both sides of the Atlantic but its beyond scope of this 
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study. 117 Instead we proceed with enlisting specific potential errors on the part of the IMF 
in Russia. 
Error 1. IMF policies contributed to short-termism in policyrnaking and diverted 
attention from strategic policy making. The priorities for the IMF, irrespective of changes 
in conditionality, seem to be short-term financial performance criteria. More precisely, the 
IMF tends to impose (quarterly) ceilings on the nominal value of the fiscal deficit, 
(quarterly or even monthly) ceilings on the expansion of net domestic credit of the central 
bank and (quarterly) floors on net international reserves. Such policies tend to keep the time 
horizon of policy makers fixed on the very short term. 
Error 2. A huge underestimation of corrective inflation after liberalisation of prices 
in January 1992. While the IMF and the Russian Prime Minister estimated the size of 
monetary overhang about 50 per cent (Gros and Steinherr, 1995) and price jump of not 
more than 100 percent (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1992), respectively, the prices jumped as much 
as 245 percent in January 1992. As elaborated in Chapter 1, one of the probable causes of 
this miscalculation should be sought in the use of sophisticated models of the demand for 
financial assets that give quite good results over the long run in developed market 
economies (Gros and Steinherr, 1995). However, these models proved inadequate in Russia 
and other transition economies, were households had essentially only three assets: cash, 
saving deposits and foreign currencies. Another probable cause for the miscalculation of 
price jump was reliance on the velocity of saving deposits rather than the velocity on cash, 
because the former proved to be much more variable than the latter (Gros and Steinberr, 
1995). The error regarding the corrective inflation was not incurable, but it clearly helped to 
undermine the credibility of the Gaidar's government budget for the first quarter of 1992. 
Error 3. The IMF initial support for the Ruble zone, an arrangement for 15 former 
Soviet Republics (FSR) to continue to use a common, unconvertible currency, the Soviet 
ruble, upon the break up of the USSR in December 1991, was a costly mistake. This poor 
advice was intended to minimize dislocation of central planning's organic enterprise links 
between these states. That implies smaller trade shocks and lower fall in output. In addition, 
the IMF considered other non-Russian republics unfit to manage their own currencies 
(Sachs, 1997). The IMF's explanation is that it tried to limit the inflation rate by providing 
a 'set of rules for a coordinated monetary policy' (Hemandez-Cata, 1995). The Ruble zone 
117 Interested reader is referred to various articles edited by the foriner Russian advisers 
like Anders 
Aslund; Gros and Steinherr (1995); Soros (2000); and Stiglitz (2002). 
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probably not only did absorb some of the trade shocks between these states, but also 
safeguarded some of the non-Russian industries from immediate collapse. These industries 
were able to obtain unauthorized credits ('non-cash' rubles) from the Central Bank of 
Russia via national central banks. The dual money system, characterized on one hand, with 
soft supply of non-cash credits and a hard constraint on the delivery of cash on the other, 
was particularly costly to Russia in the first year of transition. Credits to other FSRs 
amounted in 1992 to at least 8.5 per cent of Russian GDP if delivery of cash is excluded, 
and 11.6 per cent otherwise, in terms of the CBR credits alone (Granville, 1997). Needless 
to say, such substantial increase in money supply inevitably fed into higher prices and 
much aggravated stabilization efforts. Although it has four distinct phases, the destabilizing 
effects of the Ruble zone prevailed until November of 1993. In July of 1993, the CBR 
suddenly withdrew pre-1993 ruble notes, which together with the collapse of negotiations 
between Russia and Kazakhstan in November 1993 effectively sealed the fate of the old 
Ruble area. 
Error 4. Financial support for Russia was inadequate for the successful stabilisation 
in the early stages of reforms. This point is not however, shared unanimously among 
economists. Sachs (1997) for example argued that the West should have financed Russian 
budget deficit of the order of 5 per cent of GDP. Instead, the IMF maintained that Russia 
should aim for a balanced deficit. According to Sachs (1997), the expectation that, amidst 
deep transformation crises, Russia could slash budget deficit below levels observed in 
almost all OECD countries, were utterly unrealistic. Along similar lines Portes (1994) 
argued that the main policy error was in the ever-emphasis on macroeconomic policy itself 
Gornulka (1995) holds that Portes assessment is an exaggeration and that in fact, while 
helpful, the external financial support is not essential for the successful stabilisation. 
Similarly, since the financing of budget deficit should be mostly repayable, Hernandez- 
Cata does not recommend such course of action. 
Whatever merits for the larger or smaller external assistance may be, the fact 
remains that the West, principally via the IMF, has consistently failed to live up to their 
promise from the very beginning of its involvement in Russia. At the beginning of 1992, 
Russian reformist government was promised US $ 24 billion of Western aid, to 
be 
disbursed in the second part of that year. The implications of a sophistic use of term aid 
were rendered obsolete since hardly anything of the promised assistance was 
delivered in 
1992. More precisely, neither $ 0.719 billion IMF stand by arrangement, or 
$6 billion 
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exchange rate stabilisation fund, or an official debt rescheduling deal materialised except an 
interim IMF credit of $1 billion disbursed in August 1992 for the reserve purpose only 
(Granville, 1995). In addition, the $ 670 million assistance approved by the World Bank in 
1992, was not disbursed until the end of 1993. This assistance failed to be materialised at 
the time of the adverse political climate for the reformist government, so that at the end of 
1992 the reformist Prime Minister was forced to resign. Subsequently, the refonns lost an 
appeal and a slowdown of the momentum of the reform was unmistakeable at the beginning 
of 1993 (Granville, 1995). 
The $28 billion 'aid' package announced in July 1993 had a similar fate to the $24 
billion announced in April 1992. None of these two packages were ever properly elaborated 
or delivered (Sachs, 1997). Sachs (1997) further argues that both G7 and the IMF failed to 
understand Western financial assistance for the Russian budget was a conditio sine qua non 
to achieve financial stabilisation. 
In July 1997 the IMF pledged yet another "aid" package of $22 billion to Russia. In 
the event only $4.7 billion of this package was disbursed. Investors seem to have viewed 
this package to small to bail Russia out, so they fled. As mentioned above, Hale, (1998) 
argued that had this package been as large as the $40 billion package for Mexico in 1995, 
investors probably would have not fled. 
IMF's advocates would argue that the reason for the discontinuity of disbursement 
of the pledged funds by the IMF was the failure of the Russian government to consistently 
hit agreed targets. The counter argument however is that the targets were unrealistic i. e., 
balanced budget (Sachs, 1997), and government was never likely to achieve them. 
Error 5. Contrary to its positive experience with the two stage Polish partial debt 
cancellation, the West has failed to write off at least a part of old Soviet debt. Instead, 
Russia inherited all of the old era ex Soviet debt and was expected to duly service it. 
Consequently, the debt obligation added substantial strain to the long-suffering and 
deteriorating government finances. The issue of forgiveness of debt always critically hinges 
on the prevalence of a good will. Advocates of the IMF policies usually argue that the 
public opinion in the Western democracies did not rise to this historical opportunity and 
were not willing to bail Russia out of the hole (Hemandez-Cata, 1995). 
Error 6. Sachs (1997) argues that, in addition to the failure to provide a significant 
financial assistance to Russia, the IMF failed to incorporate in the programme non- 
monetary means of financing the budget deficit. These could have included Treasury 
bills 
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and bonds. The trouble with these instruments is that their rate of return needs to be ý'ery 
high to make them attractive. This in turn increases the interest burden on government 
finances and enlarges the deficit in the long run. Unless the rate of return comes doNN-n 
significantly, the government finances may be seen as unsustainable, prompting a run on 
currency, or even a default. Despite this unpleasant arithmetic, non-monetary financing of a 
budget is largely perceived as less detrimental to a national economy than a monetary one. 
Yet, there was not significant non-inflationary financing of deficit in Russia in the first 
years of transition. 
Error 7. Failure to recognise prevalence of both inflation inertia and inflationary 
expectations before summer of 1995, on the part of the IMF, led to adoption of classic 
money based stabilization, as argued in Chapters 2 and 3. This proved not to be the wisest 
policy choice (NikoliC', 2000b; NikoliC', 2001). Instead, pegged exchange rate based 
stabilization coupled with heterodox elements would have been more likely to break both 
the inertia and the expectation, as experience after Jun 1995 has shown. Admittedly, such a 
policy option would have required sizable foreign exchange reserves, which Russia was 
lacking at the time. However, this is exactly where external financial support ought to have 
played its role. After all, one of defining roles of the IMF ought to be to provide a short- 
term liquidity to countries with ailing finances. 
Error 8. The existence of bilateral causality between inflation and broad money in 
postcommunist Russia, as documented in Chapter 4, may also imply that the latter may not 
be an effective intermediate target for the former (NikoliC', 2000b). In other words, the 
existence of feedback or bilateral causality between inflation and broad money supply 
makes latter unsuitable for monetary targeting. This is because the target cannot provide an 
unambiguous signal of where policy actions are headed. Yet, monetary targeting was a 
central piece of early stabilisation efforts guided by the IMF. In effect, monetary targets 
were imposed in the non-monetary economy (Soros, 2000). Consequently not only 
monetary target were bound to be pervasively missed, but also even when they were met, 
that did not imply that inflation was under control. 
We consider that all of the errors enlisted above were related to the IMF approach 
rather then possible implementation failures. Possibly, we could classify error 4 as an error, 
both in design and implementation. In contrast, Gomulka (1995) argues that most of the 
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errors were in implementation rather than in design. 118 The M advocates would argue that 
their recommendations were good but were never fully implemented. However, as pointed 
out by Stiglitz (2002), in economics it is impossible to follow a prescription precisely. 
Instead, good policy guidelines should take into account what is feasible to achieve given 
complex political processes and fallibility of individuals. 
The policy errors outlined above significantly contributed to a delay in stabilisation 
efforts. According to Sachs (1997), succeeding efforts to stabilise the economy were made 
more difficult and more costly. Primarily, having lost credibility in the ruble, the Russian 
public engaged in massive capital flights throughout 1990s (Table 5.9). In addition, this 
loss of confidence made it more difficult to finance the budget deficit by non-monetary 
means. In particular, the public was unwilling to buy Russian treasury bills except at 
enormously high interest rates. Likewise, the decline of the broad money to GDP ratio 
increased inflationary consequences for any given level of financing of the budget deficit 
by the Central Bank of Russia. Secondly, Sachs (1997) argue that as a result of the delay in 
stabilisation, tax evasion and tax exemption have swelled a great deal contributing to a 
significant decline in the tax collections. That made the aggravated budget predicament 
even graver. The third consequence of the delay in stabilisation according to Sachs (1997) 
is that the regional governments have managed to capture an ever-growing share of total 
revenue on expense of the federal government. Hence, this too further aggravated the 
financing of the budget deficit. 
Table 5.9 Capital Flight (Net Errors and Omissions) in Russia, 1994-98 ($ bill. ) 
Source: FvEF, 2000, 
A particularly strong criticism of IMF conduct in Russia came from the Nobel Prize 
winner, Joseph Stiglicz who was the chief economist in the IMF's sister institution', the 
World Bank. Stiglitz, 2002, argues that the IW has helped creation of 'ersatz capitalism' 
in Russia which instead of providing incentives for wealth creation and economic growth 
was rather conductive for asset stripping, This particular kind of 'Wild East' capitalism 
118 A- arently, the same members of the RAF team had much more success 
in Poland than in Russia. 
Fp 
Gomulka (1995). 
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was, according to Stiglitz, 2002, result of various mistakes of the Washington consensus 
such as disregard for competition policies, errors in sequencing of reforms, excessive zeal 
in fighting inflation, and shunning aside issues of poverty, inequality and social capital. 
Lack of competition policies and failure to create the institutional structure for a market 
economy resulted in privatised firms' ability to establish monopolies and cartels. Price 
liberalisation before privatisation wiped out savings and imposed stabilisation. As the 
argument goes, stabilisation prevented growth because it imposed high interest rates which 
led to asset stripping because it was too expensive to expand. Asset stripping was also 
helped by the privatisation done the 'wrong way' and liberalisation of the capital markets. 
Privatisation 'as quickly as possible', no matter how, also was responsible for the decline in 
income and increase in inequality. Stiglitz, 2002, further argues that the MF's loans to 
Russia were harmful because these set back a deeper reform agenda. The loans left the 
country more indebted and impoverished, maintained an overvalued exchange rate, and 
deliberately intervened in the political life of the country (Stiglitz, 2002). 
5.8. Alternative Medicine of the IMF: More Prescriptions, Less Injections 
Given these specific policy mistakes and the controversial role of the IMF in 
Russia, one wonders why a developing country needs the INIF support. Literature offers 
three important reasons for the IMF role in today's economy (Hale, 1998). First, the M 
offers macroeconomic and other policy advises that politicians can sell as their own. Even 
though the public is aware that the US Treasury and other G-7 countries heavily influence 
the Fund, it still offers impression of autonomy so that the Funds highly specialised and 
renowned officials make policy advice more politically acceptable to borrowers. Second, 
in 
the present global financial environment the Fund acts as a lender of last resort, similar to 
the role of central bank during domestic banking crises. Consequently, the Fund can step in 
the time of financial crises to help the troubled economy bridge short-term 
liquidity 
problems and restore investors' confidence. Third, the IMF could also 
initiate 
microeconomic reforms that might otherwise be politically unacceptable. 
The emphasis of 
this kind of microeconomic reforms is supposed to be on the non-inflationary economic 
growth. 
In addition to these three standard roles of the Fund in today's economy, its role of 
a 
provider of credibility could not be over-emphasised 
(Cottarelli and Giannini, 1998). 
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Instead of delegating monetary policy to domestic entity, the alternative way of enhancing 
credibility of adjustment policies in developing countries is to surrender those policies to 
approval of a supranational organisation such as the Fund. The growing role of the Fund as 
the provider of credibility, rather than lender of resource only, is supported by the three 
pieces of evidence given by Cottarelli and Giannini (1998). First, the share of net IMF 
credit over total net external financing (including FDI) to developing countries dropped 
from 4 114 percent during the 1980s to less than I percent during 1990-96. Second, the 
number of precautionary programs has increased in recent years: at the end of 1996 one 
third of the stand-by and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements were precautionary, 
that is, they had been undertaken without any intention of drawing. Third, the ratio between 
actual and potential borrowing in all outstanding IMF arrangements has declined since 
1980s, while the number of countries with programs has risen to historical Peaks. Overall, 
the Fund's stamp of approval has been in demand to enhance the authorities' credibility and 
to give a clear signal to investors that a country is relatively safe for investing. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Transformation of a world super power into a market economy, after three quarters 
of century of central planning, represented an unprecedented task with an unpredictable 
outcome. This process in the Russian Federation turned out to be long-drawn-out and 
agonizing with a less than desirable outcome. Yet, despite being characterised as a country 
of 'robber capitalism' rather than market economy, Russia is nowadays well away from the 
central planning and the kind of autarky most people dreaded of. The Russian style 
capitalism was brought about by Russian reformers supported by the West and guided by 
the IMF. The IMF prescribed medicine and the West seems to have spoon-fed Russia just 
enough to pass the benchmark of no return to the previous system. 
The downside of the process, as argued in this chapter, was that prescription has 
often been inappropriate and the medicine quite inadequate. Even when the prescription 
might have been right, the patient was usually nourished too little too late. 
One should bear in mind that the great share of responsibility for less than 
desirable 
outcome of the reforms should be sought within leading political forces 
in the country at 
the time. Not only were they errant but also they found their own interest in consistently 
postponing the true reforms. Reformers sins aside, this chapter argues that the 
IMF has 
1ý1 
been less than generous as far as the financial and good technical assistance is concerned. 
More precisely, as a represent of the West, the IMF has consistently underestimated the size 
of the assistance needed for the successful stabilisation in Russia. In addition, on account of 
conditionality, the IMF disbursed by a long way fewer resources than pledges, not to 
mention lack of desire for debt forgiveness. Furthermore, all of the Russian stabilisation 
programmes had an IMF approval and all of them failed. Moreover, the IMF has arguably 
made a significant number of specific policy mistakes that have inevitably aggravated long 
suffering Russian economy exposed by the pains of transition. Admittedly, transition 
process was a unique process and errors were inevitable. Nevertheless, given the reputation 
and enviable resources of the IMF, one cannot help thinking that they could have done 
much better and that at least part of the Russian socio-economic pains during transition 
were not inevitable. 
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Final Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
This thesis has scrutinized critically and rigorously inflation process in post- 
communist Russia, the strength, dynamics, and causality of the relationship between 
inflation and various monetary aggregates as well as the role of the IMF in that process. 
From the methodological point of view, the emphasis of the study is on application of a 
modem empirical analysis including rigorous econometric testing of the results. 
In contrast to earlier claims, this study clearly demonstrates that lagged inflation in 
postcommunist Russia is a very important determinant of the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation. In both, ADLM and ARMA models of inflation expectations, presented in the 
thesis, lagged inflation rates accounts for more than 90% of the variations in the 
contemporaneous inflation. Economic agents can easily utilize both of these simple models 
to make consistent forecasts of a one-month ahead inflation rate. Unsurprisingly, even 
though they are unbiased and weakly efficient, these forecasts are shown not to be rational 
in the strong form of efficiency. 
The rigorous analysis of the relationship between various monetary aggregates and 
inflation, under-taken in this thesis, supports the main thesis that, broad money growth have 
the strongest correspondence to contemporary inflation in post-communist Russia. 
However, we found this relationship to be unstable, and sensitive to changes taking place in 
the new economic and institutional environment. In addition to other evidence about 
changes in this relationship, the summary statistics presented in the thesis suggests that, the 
average speed of transmission from changes in the growth of ruble broad money to inflation 
have increased from just over three months to just short of five months as Russia embarked 
on a path of macroeconomic stability soon after the exchange rate crises of October 1994. 
Similarly, the summary statistics also reveal that, changes in the growth of broad money 
had a considerably greater impact on prices in the period before October 1994, than in the 
period thereafter. Furthermore, the lack of overall significance of the coefficients of money 
in this later period points to a break in the systematic pattern of money price relationship, 
which was observed two and a half years after price liberalization in Russia. In contrast, the 
impact of changes in the previous month's inflation rate on current inflation does not abate. 
The overwhelming influence of this impact signifies the existence of the considerable 
inflation inertia prevalent in the Russian economy and the persistence 
for inflation shocks. 
This result calls for the inclusion of the one-month lagged inflation variable 
in the inflation 
1ýý 
model. Hence, the ADL model of inflation including m2x avoids the shortcomings of some 
of the representations in the previous literature. This model also provides a reasonably good 
short hand description of the fundamental inflation process in Russia. 
After assessment of various criteria for the optimal choice of the lag length in 
causality testing, this study found the Akaike's (1969) FPE criterion to outperform both the 
ad hoc and the statistical criteria under consideration. In addition, the results indicate that 
arbitrary lag length specifications, including the most common 4-4 and 8-8 ones, may give 
seriously misleading results in causality testing. Leaning on these results, the study clearly 
demonstrates the existence of feedback or bilateral causality between inflation and both 
aggregates of broad money in postcommunist Russia. 
Our analyses of macroeconomic instability in postcommunist Russia lays heavy 
emphasis on the necessity of coordination of fiscal and monetary policies. The formal 
analysis demonstrates that monetary authorities are prevented from successfully fighting 
inflation by itself if the fiscal authority persists in running a net-of-interest budget deficit. 
All the main empirical findings that emerge from the thesis are analysed in terms of 
their implications on economic policy. The empirical results imply that macroeconomic 
policies adopted in Russia under auspices of the IMF, during period under consideration, 
may not have been optimal. In particular, the study argues that lack of coordination of fiscal 
and monetary policies considerably contributed to the failure of all stabilisation programs 
implemented prior to August 1998. In addition, having identified a high degree of inflation 
persistency in Russian economy, unstable relationship between money supply and inflation 
with transmission of monetary impulses to future inflation becoming both, slower and 
weaker, and the existence of feedback or bilateral causality between inflation and both 
aggregates of broad money, this study implicitly suggests that, instead of the money-based 
stabilizations, exchange rate based stabilization with heterodox elements might have 
been 
more suitable for this transition economy. 
Furthennoreý this study also argues that the IMF, under whose auspices Russian 
macroeconomic policy was conducted, has been less than generous as far as the 
financial 
and good technical assistance is concerned. More precisely, as the represent of 
the West, 
the IMF has consistently underestimated the size of the assistance needed 
for the successful 
stabilisation in Russia. In addition, on account of conditionallty, the 
IMF disbursed by a 
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long way fewer resources than pledges, not to mention lack of desire for debt forgiveness. 
Furthermore, all of the Russian stabilisation programmes had an IMF approval and all of 
them had failed. Likewise, the IMF has arguably made a significant number of specific 
policy mistakes that have inevitably aggravated long suffering Russian econom), 
exacerbated by the pains of transition. However, despite all of that, the IMF seems to have 
spoon-fed Russia just enough to pass the benchmark of no return to the previous system. 
The contribution of this thesis lies in the combination of the fields Applied 
Economics and Economic Policy. In the rigorous analysis of the relationship between 
money supply and inflation in postcommunist Russia, this thesis clearly demonstrates that 
not only this relationship was unstable but also transmission of monetary impulses to future 
inflation became both, slower and weaker in the lower inflationary environment that 
emerged in Russia in 1994, and especially in 1995. 
The results of assessment of various criteria for the optimal choice of the lag length 
in causality testing presented in the thesis, indicate that arbitrary lag length specifications, 
including the most common 4-4 and 8-8 ones, may give seriously misleading results in 
causality testing. That may have severe consequences for economic policy, particularly in 
cases where some kind of intermediate targeting is exercised, as in Russia in a few years 
after price liberalisation. 
Given the lack of experience with open inflation on the part of economic agents in 
majority of transition economies, the literature on the formation of expectations in these 
economies is still rather scant. This thesis gives a systematic elaboration of the formation 
and rationality of inflationary expectation in postcommunist Russia. The findings of this 
study sharply contrast the claims that lagged inflation has been relatively unimportant in 
explaining inflation in transition economies. 
Finally, the results of the empirical finding presented in the thesis give ground 
for a 
debate about appropriateness of Russian macroeconomic policies during transition. 
The 
role of the IMF, under whose auspices these policies were conducted, 
is particularly 
scrutinised. 
Even though our sample period of six and a half years, was the longest considered at 
the time of writing the thesis, it may still be considered too short 
for meaningful analysis, 
particularly in times of major transformation of not only the economic system 
but alsO the 
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entire country and region. In addition, as pointed out by many researchers, Russian 
statistics must be used cautiously so that we should not rule out the possibilitly of model 
misspecification due to erroneous data. Further research of the subject would inevitably 
benefit from the longer and revised data series. It is very likely that financial crisis Of 
August 1998 caused a structural break in inflation series which is an additional avenue for 
the research of inflation in postcommunist Russia. It is also likely that this would also have 
implications for the reappraisal of the relationship between money supply and inflation in 
this transition economy. Cointegration and error correction model may be well suited to 
deal with any exogenous shift variables. Needless to say, the 1998 financial crises may well 
have important implications for the modelling of inflation expectations. Even though both 
of our models of inflation expectations seem to exhibit desirable statistical properties, the 
notable volatility of inflation in Russia in the given sample, indicates that this phenomenon 
may alternatively be duly modelled by Markov- switching model. In contrast to 
conventional modelling, this approach makes explicit allowance for the possibility of 
structural change. In other words, Markov- switching model conjectures that two or more 
regimes could have prevailed over the course of history. That is, there is a regime, or a 
state, when inflationary expectations are low and one or more regimes when they are 
high. 
Series of shifts between the regimes (timing of breaks) occur in probabilistic fashion, thus 
endogenously rather than being imposed by a researcher. Such a model may 
be able to pick 
up endogenous shifts in the level of inflationary expectations in Russian economy and give 
superior results. In addition, Markov- switching model may be complemented 
by inclusion 
of other potential variables that explain inflation and are available 
for forecasts, i. e., 
unemployment, money supply, and output gap. Furthermore, 
it is more likely that such 
model may prove rational not only in the weak sense but also 
by the strong efficiency 
criteria described in the thesis. 
158 
Bibliography 
Akaike, Hirotugu, 1970, "Statistical Predictor Identification. " Annals of the Institute of 
Statistical Mathematics Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 163-180. 
Allen, Bill, Hoggarth, Glenn, and Price, Lionell, 1996, "Monetary Policy and Liberalisation 
in Poland, Russia and United Kingdom. " In Franco Bruni, Donald E. Fair, and Richard 
O'Brian, Eds., Risk Management in Volatile Financial Markets. Financial and Monetarý, 
Policy Studies Vol. 32, pp. 326-357. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Acaden-ýc 
Publishers. 
Almon, Shirley, 1965, "The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriations and 
Expenditures. " Econometrica Vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 178-196, Jan. 
Andersen, Leonell C., and Karnosky, Dennis S., 1974, "A Monetary Interpretation Of 
Inflation. " A paper presented to the Conference on Price Behavior, National Bureau of 
Economic Research in Income and Wealth, Nov. 21. 
Anderson, Jonathan, and Citrin, Daniel A., 1995, "The Behaviour of Inflation and 
Velocity. " In Daniel A. Citrin and Ashok K. Lahiri, Eds., Policy Experiences and Issues 
in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, IMF Occasional 
Paper, 133, pp. 44-62. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Dec. 
Aslund, Anders, 1995, "How Russia Became a Market Economy. " Brookings Institute: 
Washington, DC. 
Ball, Laurence, 1991, "The Genesis of Inflation and the Costs of Disinflation. " Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking Vol. 23, no. 3, part 2, pp. 439-452, Aug. 
Barbone, Luka, and Marchetti, Dario, 1995, "Transition and the Fiscal Crisis. " Economics 
of Transition Vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 59-74, Mar. 
Batten, Dallas S., and Thornton, Daniel L., 1983, "Polynornial Distributed Lags and the 
Estimation of the St. Louis Equation. " Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research 
Paper 63, pp. 13-25. 
Begg, David, 1997, "Monetary Policy During Transition: Progress and Pitfalls in Central 
and Eastern Europe, 1990-6. " Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 
13, no. 2, pp. 33- 
46, Summer. 
Begg, David, and Wyplosz, Charles, 1999, "Monetary and Exchange 
Rate Policies, EMU 
and Central and Eastern Europe. " Economic Policy Initiative no. 
5. The Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London. 
1ý9 
Bera, Anil, and Higgins, Matthew L., 1993, "ARCH models: Properties, EstImation and 
Testing. " Journal of Economic Survey Vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 305-366, Dec. 
Bofinger, Peter, Flassbeck, Heiner, and Hoffmann, Lutz, 1997, "Orthodox Money-Based 
Stabilisation (OMBS) Versus Heterodox Exchange Rate-Based StabIlisation (HERBS): 
The case of Russia, The Ukraine and Kazakhstan. " Economic Systems Vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 
1-33, Mar. 
Bollerslev Tim, 1986, "A Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity. " 
Journal ofEconometrics Vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 307-327, June. 
Bollerslev, Tim, and Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 1992, "Quasi-Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation and Inference in Dynamic Models with Time Varying Covariances. " 
Econometric Reviews Vol. 11 , no. 2, pp. 143 -172. 
Bollerslev, Tim, Chou, Ray, and Kroner, Kenneth, 1992, "ARCH Modeling in Finance: A 
Review of the Theory and Empirical Evidence. " Journal of Econometrics Vol. 52, no. I- 
2, pp. 5-59, Apr. 
Brinner, Roger E., 1977, "The Death of the Phillips Curve Reconsidered. " Quarterly 
Journal ofEconomics Vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 389-418, Aug. 
Bryant, John, and Wallace, Neil, 1980, "A suggestion for further simplifying the theory of 
money. " Staff Report no. 62, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Buch, Claudia M., 1998, "Russian Monetary Policy - Assessing the Track Record. " 
Economic Systems Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 105-145, June. 
Budina, Nina, and van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1997, "Fiscal Policies in Eastern Europe. " 
Oxford Review of Economic Polic Vol. 13, no 2. pp. 47-64, Summer. Y 
Buiter, Willem H., 1997, "Aspects of Fiscal Performance on Some Transition Economies 
under Fund-Supported Programs. " IMF Working Paper WP/97/31. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Apr. 
Buiter, Willem H., 1999, "The Fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. " NBER 
Working Paper no. w7302, Aug. 
Buiter, Willem H., 2002, "The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: A Critique. " forthcorning, 
Economic Journal, July. 
Burdekin, Richard, Suyono, Salaman, and Willett, Thomas D., 1995, "The High 
Costs of 
Monetary Instability. " In Thomas D. Willett, Richard Burdekin, Richard J. Sweeney, and 
Clas Wihlborg, Eds., Establishing Monetary Stability in Emerging Market Ecotioniies. 
Boulder, CO: Westview. 
160 
Burnside, Craig, Eichenbaurn, Martin, and Rebelo, Sergio, 1998, "Prospective Definitions 
and Asian Currency Crises. " NBER Working Paper no. w6758, Oct. 
Cagan, Philip, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation. " In Milton Friedman Ed., 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, pp. 25-117. Chicago: The UniversitY of 
Chicago Press. 
Calvo, Guillermo A., and Vegh, Carlos A., 1992, "Inflation Stabilisation and Nominal 
Anchors. " IMF Discussion Paper 92/4. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 
Dec. 
Canzoneri, Matthew B., Cumby, Robert E., and Diba, Behzad T. ý 1998, "Is the Price Leý'el 
Determined by the Needs of Fiscal Solvency? " NBER Working Paper no. w647 1, Mar. 
Carlson, John A., 1977, "A study of Price Forecast. " Annals of Economic and Social 
Measurement Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 27-56, Winter. 
Carlson, John A., and Parkin, Michael, 1975, "Inflation Expectations. " Econometrica Vol. 
42, no. 166, pp. 123-38, May. 
Carlson, Keith M. 5 1980ý "The Lag from Money to Prices. " Review, Federal Reserve Batik 
of St. Louis Vol. 62, no. 10, pp. 3-9, Oct. 
Cheasty, Adrienne, and Davis, Jeffrey M., 1996, "Fiscal Transition in Countries of the 
Former Soviet Union: An Interim Assessment. " MOCT-MOST Vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 7-34. 
Cheng, Benjamin, 1996, "On the Relationship Between Money and Inflation in the United 
States: additional evidence. " Applied Economic Letters Vol. 3, no, 8, pp. 549-552, Aug. 
Cochrane, John, H., 1998, "A Frictionless View of US Inflation. " NBER Working Paper 
no. w6646, July. 
Cochrane, John, H., 20005 "Money as Stock: Price Level Determination with no Money 
Demand. " NBER Working Paper no. w7498, Jan. 
Coorey, Sharmini, Mecagni, Mauro, and Offerdal, Erik, 1998, "Disinflation in Transition 
Economies: The Role of Relative Price Adjustment. " In Carlo Cottarelli, and Gyorgy 
Szapary, Eds., Moderate Inflation. - The Experience of Transition Economies, IMF and 
National Bank of Hungary. 
4 
Coricelli, Fabrizio, Dabrowski, Marek, and Kosterna, Urszula 1998 , 'Fiscal 
Policy in 
Transition. " Forum Report of the Economic Policy Initiative no. 3. 
The Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London. 
Cottarelli, Carlo, and Boyle, Peter, 1999, "Disinflation in 
Transition: 1993-97" DIF 
Occasional Paper no. 179. International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC. 
161 
Cottarelli, Carlo, and Curzio, Giannini, 1998, "Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the 
International Monetary Fund. " Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment 9S'12. 
riterriational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Sep. 
Cottarelli, Carlo, Griffiths, Mark, and Moghadam, Reza, 1998, "The Nonmonetary 
Determinants of Inflation -A Panel Data Study. " IMF Working Paper WP 98 23. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Mar. 
Dabrovski, Marek, 1997, "The First Half of Russian Transformation. " In Anders Aslund, 
Ed., Russia's Economic Transformation in the 1990s, pp. 41-55, London: Pinter. 
Dabrovski, Marek, 1999, "Disinflation, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Constraints. 
Experience of the Economies in Transition. " CASE Report no. 16, Warsaw. 
Desai, Padma, 2000, "Why Did the Rouble Collapse in August 1998. " American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings Vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 48-52, May. 
Dornnbusch, Rudiger, Sturzenegger, Federico, and Wolf, Holger, 1990, "Extreme Inflation: 
Dynamic and Stabilization. " Brooking Papers on Economic Activity Vol. 1990, no. 2, pp. 
1-64, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
Easterly, William, and Vieira da Cunha, Paulo, 1994, "Financing the Storm: 
Macroeconomic Crisis in Russia. " Economics of Transition Vol. 2, no, 4, pp. 443-465, 
Dec. 
EBRD, 1998, Transition Report 1998. European Bank for Restructuring and Development. 
London. 
EBRD, 1999, Transition Report 1999. European Bank for Restructuring and Development. 
London. 
EBRD, 2000, Transition Report 2000. European Bank for Restructuring and Development. 
London. 
Economic Commission for Europe, 1995, Economic Survey of Europe in 1994-1995. New 
York and Geneva. 
Ekonomika i Zhizn, 1992 Vol. 10, pp. 9. 
Engle, Robert, 1982, "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the 
Variance of United Kingdom Inflation. " Econometrica Vol. 
50, no, 2, pp. 987-1007, 
July. 
16" 
Fakin, Barbara, and de Crombrugghe, Alain, 1997, "Fiscal Adjustments in Transition 
Economies- Social Transfers and the Efficiency of Public Spending: A Comparison with 
OECD Countries. " Policy Research Working Papers 27/3, no. 18035 World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Feige, Edgar L., and Pearce, Douglas K., 1976, "Economically Rational Expectations: Are 
Innovations in the Rate of Inflation Independent of Innovations in Measures of Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy? " The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 499-522, June. 
Feldstein, Martin, 1998, "Refocusing the IMF. " Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 21-33, 
Mar/Apr- 
Figlewski, Stephen, and Wachtel, Paul, 1981, "The Forination of Inflationary 
Expectations. " Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 1-10, Feb. 
Fisher, Irving, 1930, "The Theory of Interest. " New York: The Macmillan Company. 
Fisher, Irving, 1963, "The Purchasing Power of Money. " New and revised Ed., Reprinted, 
New York: Augustus M. Kelley. 
Fisher, Stanley, 1986, "Exchange Rate versus Monetary Targets in Disinflation. " In: 
Stanley Fisher Eds., Indexation, Inflation and Economic Policy, pp. 247-262. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Fisher, Stanley, 1993, "The Role Of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth. " Journal of 
Monetary Economics Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 485-512, Dec. 
Fisher, Stanley, 1994, "Prospects for the Russian Stabilization in the Summer of 1993. " In 
Anders Aslund, Ed., Economic Transformation in Russia. London: Pinter Publishers. 
Fisher, Stanley, Sahay, Ratna, and Vegh, Carlos A., 1996, "Stabilisation and Growth in 
Transition Economies: The Early Experience. " Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 
10, no. 2, pp. 45-66, Spring. Also published as "Stabilization and Growth in Transition 
Economics: Early Experiences. " IMF Working Paper WP/96/3 1, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A., and Lown, Cara S., 1994, "An Indicator of Future Inflation 
Extracted 
from the Steepness of the Interest Rate Yield Curve Along its Entire Length. 
" Quarterly 
Journal ofEconomics Vol. 109, no. 2, pp. 517-530, May. 
Frenkel, Jacob A., 1973, "Inflation and the Formation of Expectations. " 
Universitý, of 
Chicago, Report, no. 7353. 
163 
Frenkel, Jacob A., 1976, "Inflation Expectations and Some Dynamic Aspects of the 
Welfare Costs. " In Michael Parkin and George Zis, Eds., Inflation in the TVorld 
Economy. Studies in Inflation, no. 4, pp. 47-69, Manchester. 
Friedman, Milton, 1968, "The Role of Monetary policy. " American Economic Revielt, Vol. 
58, no. 1, pp. 1-17, Mar. 
Friedman, Milton, 1989, "Quantity Theory of Money. " In John Eatwell, Murray Mile., ate, 
and Peter Newman, Eds., The New Palgrave: Money, pp. 1-40. London and Basingstoke: 
The MacMillan Press Ltd. 
Gavrilenkov, Evgeny, and Masaaki, Kuboniwa, 1997, "Development of Capitalism ill 
Russia: The Second Challenge. " Tokyo: Maruzen. 
Geweke, John, 1978, "Testing the Exogeneity Specification in the Complete Dynamic 
Simultaneous Equations Model. " Journal of Econometrics Vol. 7, no. v2, pp. 163-85, 
Apr. 
Geweke, John, and Meese, Richard, 1981, "Estimating Regression Models of Finite but 
Unknown Order. " International Economic Review Vol. 22, o. 1, pp. 55-70, Feb. 
Gomulka, Stanislav, 1995, "The IMF supported programs in Poland and Russia, 1990- 
1994: Principles, Errors, and Results. " Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 20, no. 3, 
pp. 316-346, June. 
Gramlich, Edward M., 1983, "Models of Inflation Expectations Formation: A Comparison 
of Household and Economist Forecasts. " Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking Vol. 15, 
no. 2, pp. 155-173, May. 
Granger, Clive W. J., 1969, "Investigating Causal Relationship by Econometric Models and 
Cross-Spectral Methods. " Econometrica Vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 424-438, July. 
Granville, Brigitte, 1995, "The Success of Russian Economic Reforms. " London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
Granville, Brigitte, 1997, "Farewell, Rouble Zone. " in Anders Aslund Ed., Russia's 
Economic Transformation in the 1990s, pp. 101-118. London and Washington: Pinter 
Publishing. 
Gros, Daniel, and Steinherr, Alfred, 1995, "Winds of Change. " London: 
Longman. 
Hale, David D., 1998, "The IMF, Now More than Ever. " Foreign Affairs Vol. 77, no. 6, pp. 
7-14, Nov. /Dec. 
Hamilton, James D., 1989, "A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary 
Time Series and the Business Cycle. " Econometrica 
Vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 357-384, Nlar. 
104 
Hamilton, James D., 1990, "Analysis of Time Series Subject to Changes in Regime. - 
Journal of Econometrics Vol. 45, no. 1-2, pp. 39-70, July. 
Hanson, Philip, 1999, "The Russian Economic Crises and the Future of Russian Economic 
Reform. " Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 1141-1166, Nov. 
Hernandez-Cata', Ernesto, 1995, "Russia and the IMF: The Political Economy of 
Macro stabilization. In Daniel A. Citrin, and Ashok K. Lahiri, Eds., Policy Experiences 
and Issues in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union. L11F 
Occasional Paper 133, pp. 117-124, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Heyman, Daniel, and Leijonhufvud, Alex, 1995, "High Inflation. " Oxford: Claredonian 
Press. 
Hishow, Ognian N., 2001, "Russia's External Debt: Infinite Rescheduling?. " Coninninist 
and Post- Communist Studies Vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 114-127, Mar. 
Hoggarth, Glenn, 1996, "Monetary Policy in Russia. " In Jouko Rautava, Ed., Rlissia's 
Financial Markets and the Banking Sector in Transition, Bank of Finland Studies A: 95, 
pp. 53-83. Helsinki. 
Holden, Kenneth, and Peel, David A., 1977, "An Empirical Investigation of Inflationary 
Expectations. " Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics Vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 291-299, 
May. 
Hsiao, Cheng, 1981, "Autoregressive Modelling and Money-Income Causality Detection. " 
Journal ofMonetary Economics Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 85-106, Jan. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/The World Bank, 1999, 
Global Development Finance (formerly World Debt Tables), Washington, DC. 
International Monetary Fund, 1999, "Russian Federation: Recent Economic 
Developments. " International Monetary Fund Staff Country Report no. 99/100, IMF, 
Washington, DC. 
International Monetary Fund, 2000, International Financial Statistics, December. INIF, 
Washington, DC. 
Izvestya, 1997,15 Oct. 
Jones, Jonathan D., 19895 "A Comparison of Lag-Length Selection Techniques in 
Tests of 
Granger Causality Between Money Growth and Inflation: Evidence for the 
US. 1959- 
86. " Applied Economics Vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 809-822, June. 
Keynes, John Maynard, 1936, "General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. " 
London: Macmillan. 
165 
Kharas, Homi, Pinto, Brian, and Ulatov, Sergei, 2001, "An Analysis of Russia's 1998 
Meltdown: Fundamental and Market Signals. " Brookings Papers on Economic. 4ctivitll 
Vol. 2001, Issue, 1, pp. 1-68, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
Koen, Vincent, and Marrese, Michael, 1995, "Stabilization and Structural Change in 
Russia, 1992-1994. " IMF Working Papers WP/95/13. Washington: international 
Monetary Fund, Jan. 
Kolodko, Grzegorz W., 1999, "Transition to a Market Economy and Sustained Growth. 
implications for the Post-Washington Consensus. " Communist and Post- Coln in 1111 ist 
Studies Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 233-261, Sep. 
Komulainen, Tuomas, and Pirtilld, Jukka, 2000, "Fiscal Explanations for Inflation: Any 
Evidence from transition Economies?. " Bank of Finland Institute for Economics in 
Transition, Discussion Papers no. 11. 
Korhonen, likka, 1996, "An Error Correction Model for Russian Inflation. " RcOcIv of 
Economies in Transition Vol. 4/96, pp. 53-61, Bank of Finland, July. 
Korhonen, likka, 1998, "An Error Correction Model for Prices, Money, Output, and 
Interest Rate in Russia. " Review of Economies in Transition 5/98, pp. 33-44, Bank of 
Finland, Nov. 
Korhonen, likka, and Pesonen, Hanna, 1998, "The Short and Variable Lags of Russian 
Monetary Policy. " Review of Economies in Transition Vol. 4/98, pp. 35-45, Bank of 
Finland, Apr. 
Kwiatkowski, Denis, Peter, Philips C. B., Peter, Schmidt, and Yongcheol, Shin, 1992, 
"Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root. " 
Journal ofEconometrics Vol. 54, no. 1-3, pp. 159-178, Oct. 
LaRouche, Lyndon H., Jr., 1999, "Lyndon LaRouche, Economist: Scrap the Foolish IMF 
Package! " Kommersant - Nast, January 26. 
Layard, Richard, and Richter, Andrea, 1994, "Who Gains and Who Loses 
from Russian 
Credit Expansion?. " London School of Economics and Political Science5 Centre 
for 
Economic Performance, Discussion paper no. 200. London. 
Locke, John, "The Works ofJohn Locke" Vol. 5. A New Edition, 
Corrected, London, 1823. 
Printed for Thomas Tegg. 
Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Alexashenko, Sergei V., 1998, 
"Fiscal policy Issues During 
the Transition in Russia. " IMF Occasional Paper no. 155, International 
Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC. 
166 
Lucas, Robert, 198 1, "Studies in Business Cycle Theory", Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Lucas, Robert, E., Jr., and Rapping, Leonard A., 1969, "Real Wages, Employment and 
Inflation" Journal ofPolitical Economy Vol. 77, no. 5, pp. 721-754, Sep/Oct. 
Maddala, G. S., 1992, "Introduction to Econometrics. " New York: Macmillan, 2 nd ed. 
McMillin, Douglas W., and Fackler, James S., 1984, "Monetary vs. Credit Aggregates: An 
Evaluation of Monetary Policy Targets. " Southern Economic Journal Vol. 50, no. pp. 
711-23, Jan. 
Menil, George de, and Bhalla, Surjit S., 1975, "Direct Measurement of Popular Price 
Expectations. " The American Economic Review Vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 169-180, Mar. 
Mishkin, Frederic S., 1990, "What Does the Terni Structure Tell us about Future Inflation. " 
Journal ofMonetary Economics Vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 77-95, Jan. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Sutch, Richard, 1966, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy. " Die 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings Vol. 56, no. 1/2, pp. 178-197, 
Mar. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Shiller, Robert J., 1973, "Inflation, Rational Expectations and the 
Term Structure of Interest Rates. " Economica, N. S. Vol. 40, no. 161, pp. 12-43, Feb. 
Mullineaux, Donald J., 1978, "On Testing for Rationality: Another Look at the Livingston 
Price Expectation Data. " Journal of Political Economy Vol. 86, no. 2, Part. 1, pp. 329- 
336, Apr. 
Mullineaux, Donald J., 1980, "Inflation Expectations and Money Growth in the United 
States. " The American Economic Review Vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 149-161, Mar. 
Mussa, Michael, and Savastano, Miguel A., 1999, The IMF Approach to Econom1c 
Stabilization, International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/99/104. International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, July. 
Muth, John F., 1961ý "Rational Expectations and Theory of Price Movements. " 
Econometrica Vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 315-335, July. 
Newey, Whitney K., and West, Kenneth D., 1987, "A Simple Positive 
Semi-Definite, 
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix"' 
Econolnetrica 
Vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 703-708, May. 
Nikoli6c, Milan, 2000a, "Money Growth-Inflation Relationship in Postcommunist 
Russia. " 
Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 108-133, 
Mar. 
Nikoli6c, Milan, 2000b, "Money - Inflation Causality 
in Transition Economies: A Casc of 
Russia. " University College London, SSEES, rt-ýimeo, June. 
167 
Nikolic', Milan, 2001 "Inflation Expectation in Postcommunist Russia. " University College 
London, SSEES, mirneo, Jan. 
Nikolic', Milan, 2002, "Russia and the IMF: Pseudo Lending for Pseudo Reforms. " 
University College London, SSEES, Centre for the Study of Economic and Social 
Change in Europe: Working Papers Vol. 6, pp. 1-20, Jan. 
Pagano, Marcello, and Hartley, Michael, 198 1, "On Fitting Distributed Lag Models Subject 
to Polynomial Restrictions. " Journal o Econometrics Vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 171-198, June. 
Perron, Pierre, 1989, "The Great Crush, the Oil Shock and the Unit Root Hypothesis. " 
Econometrica Vol. 57, no, 6, pp. 1361-1401, Nov. 
Pesando, James E., 1975, "A Note on the Rationality of the Livingston Price Expectations. " 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 849-858, Aug. 
Pesaran, Hashern M., 1987, "The Limits of Rational Expectations. " Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Phelps, Edmund S., 1968, "Money Wage Dynamic and Labour Market Equilibrium. " 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. 76, no. 4, Part 2, pp. 678- 711, July-Aug. 
Pigou, Arthur C., 1927, "Industrial Fluctuations. " 2 nd edition, London: Macmillan, 1929; 
reprinted, New York: A. M. Kelley, 1967. 
Polak, J. J., 1957, "Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Payments Problems. " 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers Vol. 5. International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC, Nov. 
Poole, William, 1976, "Rational Expectations in the Macro Model. " Brooking Papers on 
Economic Activity Vol. 1976, no. 2, pp. 463-514. 
Portes, Richard, 1994, "Transformation Traps. " Economic Journal Vol. 104, no. 426, PP. 
1178-1189, Sep. 
Ramsey, James B., 1969, "Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least Squares 
Regression Analysis. " Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, series B Vol. 31, no. 2, 
pp. 350-371. 
Ricketts, Nicholas and Rose, David, 1995, "Inflation, Learning and Monetary Policy 
Regimes in the G-7 Economies. " Bank of Canada Working Papers no. 95/6. 
Robinson, Neil, 2001, "The Myth of Equilibrium: Winner Power, Fiscal Crises and Russian 
Economic Reform. " Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 423- 
446, Dec. 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 1992, "Yegor Gaidar. "3 July. 
168 
Rossiiskie vesti, 1994,5 Mar. 
Rostowski, Jacek, and Nikolic', Milan, 1998ý "Macroeconomic Shocks and Policy 
Responses During Transition: A Cross-Country Comparison. " In Leszek Balcerowicz, 
Cheryl W. Gray, and Iraj Hoshi, Eds., Enterprise Exit Processes in Transition 
Economies, pp. 57-91. Budapest: CEU Press. 
Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1994, Russian Economic Trends (RET) 
(quarterly) Vol. 3, no. 3, Moscow. 
Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1996, Russian Economic Trends (RET) 
quarterly Vol. 5, no. 1. Moscow. 
Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1997, Russian Economic Trends (RET) 
(quarterly) Vol. 6, no. 4, Moscow. 
Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1998, Russian Economic Trends (RET) 
(quarterly) Vol. 7, no. 2, Moscow. 
Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1993-1999, Russian Economic Trends 
(RET) (monthly updates), Moscow. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1997, "Why Russia Has Failed to Stabilize. " In Anders Aslund Ed. 
Russia's Economic Transformation in the 1990s, pp. 127-134. London and Washington: 
Pinter Publishing. 
Sanders, Bernard, 1998, "The IMF's disastrous plan for Russia. " Christian Science 
Monitor, Jun 25. 
Sargent, Thomas J., and Wallace, Neil, 1976, "Rational Expectations and the Theory of 
Economic Policy. " Journal ofMonetary Economics Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 169-183, Apr. 
Sargent, Thomas J., and Wallace, Neil, 1986, "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetics. " 
In Thomas Sargent Ed., Rational Expectations and Inflation, pp. 158-190. New York: 
Harper and Row. 
Sargent, Thomas J., 1993, "Rational expectations and inflation. " 2nd ed. New York, NY: 
Harper Collins College Publishers. 
Schmidt, Peter, and Waud, Roger N., 1973, "The Almon Lag Technique and the Monetary 
Versus Fiscal Policy Debate. " Journal of American Statistical Association Vol. 68, no. 
341, pp. 11-13, Mar. 
Segodnya, 1994,27 Sep. 
169 
Shiller, Robert, 1978, "Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Structure of 
Macroeconomic Models: A Critical Review. " Journal of Monetary Economics Vol. 4, 
no. 1, pp. 1-44, Jan. 
Sims, Christopher A., 1994, "A Simple Model for Study of the Determination of the Price 
Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy. " Economic Theory Vol. 4, no. 
3, pp. 381-399. 
Sinel'nikov-Murilev, Germanovich S., and Trofimov, Yu G., 1998, "Fiscal Crisis and 
Macroeconomic Policy in Russia. " Communist Economies & Economic Transformation 
Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 189-202, June. 
Sbderlind, Paul, 1995, "Forward Interest Rates as Indicators of Inflation Expectations. " 
Stockholm School of Economics, Seminar Papers, no. 594. 
Soros, George, 2001, "Open Society - Reforming Global Capitalism. " London: Little, 
Brown and Company. 
Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1991,29 Oct. 
Spitdller, Erich, 1978, "A Model of Inflation and Its Performance in the Seven Main 
Industrial Countries, 1958-76, International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers Vol. 25. no. 2, 
pp. 254-277, June. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, 2002, "Globalization and its Discontents. " London: Penguin Books. 
Sutela, Peka, 2000, "The Financial Crises in Russia. " In Tuomas Komulainen, and likka 
Korhonen Eds., Russian Crises and its Effects, pp. 17-33. Helsinki: Kikimora 
Publications. 
Svensson, Lars E. 0.5 1993, "Monetary Policy with Flexible Exchange Rates and Forward 
Interest Rates as Indicators. " Banque de France, Cahiers economiques et monetaires 
Vol. 43, no. 0396-4701, pp. 305-332. 
Taylor, Lance, 1988, "Varieties of Stabilization Experience - Towards Sensible 
Macroeconomics in the Third World. " Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Thacker, Strom Cronan, 1999, "The High Politics of IMF Lending. " World Politics Vol. 
52, no. 1, pp. 38-75, Oct. 
Theil, Henry, 1961 "Economic Forecast and Policy. " Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Thornton, Daniel L., and Batten, Dallas S., 1985, "Lag-Length Selection and Tests of 
Granger Causality between Money and Income. " Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
Vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 165-178, May. 
170 
Turnovsky, Stephen J., 1970, "Empirical Evidence of the Formation of Price Expectations 
Hypothesis. " Journal of the American Statistical Association Vol. 65, no. 332, pp. 144 1- 
1454, Dec. 
United Nations (UN), 2000, World Economic and Social Survey 2000: Trends and Policies 
in the World Economy, pp. 274-275. 
United Nations/Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), 2000, Economic Survey of 
Europe, no 1, Chapter 4, pp. 15 1. 
Walters, A, A., 1971, "Consistent Expectations, Distributed Lags and the Quantity 
Theory. " The Economic Journal Vol. 81, no. 322, pp. 273-281, Jun. 
White, Halbert, 1980, "A H eteroskedasticity- Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity. " Econometrica Vol. 48, no, 4, pp. 817-838, May. 
Wiener, Norbert, 1956, "The Theory of Prediction. " In E. F. Beckenback, Ed., Modern 
Mathematicsfor Engineers, pp. 165-190. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Woodford, Michael, 1994, "Monetary Policy and Price Level Determinacy in a Cash-in- 
Advance Economy. " Economic Theory Vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 345-380. 
Working Centre for Economic Reforms, 1994, Russian Economic Trends (RET) (quarterly) 
Vol. 3, no. 3, London. 
Working Centre for Economic Reforms, 1995, Russian Economic Trends (RET) (quarterly) 
Vol. 4, no. 2, London. 
171 
Appendix 
In order to test the null hypothesis, Ho: B(L) = 0, the first step of the Hsio's 
procedure is to specify the own lag length of /TThis is best achieved utilizing (A. 1) derived 
from (2): 
co + A(L) + et (A. 1) 
Determination of the own lag length for 1-r could be achieved by varying a lag in the 
autoregression (A. 1) from 1 to x, where x is the highest order lag, co is a constant, A(L) is a 
xaa, distributed lag polynomial such that A(L) =E AaL ,L is the lag operator so that Li= 
Zt-ai 
a=1 
and e, is a zero mean white noise error term. Thus, the first step of the Hsiao's procedure is 
to regress zt on 17t-a tOobtain the sum of squared residuals (SSR) from the sample T, where 
a=1,2, ..., x. The obtained SSR is used to compute the FPE, as defined by Akaike (1970), 
for each autoregression described in (A. 2): 
FPE(, )=(T+ a+ I) I (T- a- 1) * SSRý, )/ T. (A. 2) 
Thus if x in (A. 1) were set at 15, as in our test, there would be 15 FpEs obtained from 
(A. 2). 119 The order of a lag of a one-dimensional autoregressive process, which yield the 
smallest FPE is chosen and denoted as FPE(, *). 
Having found the order (a) of A(L), in the second step of Hsio's procedure, 
determination of whether monetary variables enter the ,r equation is made. This amounts to 
testing the null hypothesis HO: B(L) = 0. Thus the second step begins with the estimation of 
the bivariate (A. 3) 
I-rt =- co + A(L))rt + B(L)mi, t + et 
(A. 3) 
... If the appropriate lag length turns out to be 15 for any variable, prudence required that the 
maximum lag length was allowed to extend beyond 15 by at least 3 lags to check on whether a 
longer lags 
were more appropriate. This practice wais further extended should the longest lag under consideration again 
be chosen as the optimal one. 
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where mij are monetary variables m2 and m2x considered one at the time, and B(L) is a 
distributed lag polynomial defined in a similar manner to A(L). In (A. 3) I-rt is thus used as 
the controlled variable, with the order of lag(s) set at a*, and mij is treated as the 
manipulated variable. From (A. 3) we again obtain SSR needed to compute the FPEs of the 
controlled variable according to the formula given by (A. 4). As in the step one, we vary 
order of lags of mij over b=1,2,..., x and determine the order, which yields the smallest 
FPE, say b*. The corresponding two-dimensional FPE(a*, b) is 
FPE(a*, b):::::::::: (T+ a*+ b +1) 1 (T- a* -b- 1) * 
SSRýa*, b) I T- (A. 4) 
In step three of Hsio's procedure, the smallest FPEs of the steps one and two are 
compared and concluded that money Granger-causes inflation (mi => /-ý if FPE(,., b*) 'Cýý 
FPE(,, *), and money does not Granger-causes inflation (mi #> /-ý if converse is true. In other 
words, if the FPE obtained from the step two is smaller than the FPE obtained from the 
step one then the optimal model for predicting inflation (, Iz) would be the one including a* 
lagged 1-r and b* lagged mi. If, however, the converse is true, one-dimensional 
autoregressive representation for ;T should be used. By the same token, according to Hsiao 
(198 1), the null hypothesis, Ho: B(L) = 0, is rej ected if FPE(, *, b*) "ý FPE(a*) and not re ected j 
if converse is true. 
In step four of the Hsiao's procedure, the steps one to three are repeated for the mi 
processes. Firstly, the FPEs resulting from the treatment of each variable of broad money 
supply as one-dimensional autoregressive process are found. Secondly, having specified the 
order of autoregressive operator on mi, mi and /, Tare then treated as a controlled and a 
manipulated variable, respectively. As above, this is in order to compute the optimum lag 
of the latter and the FPEs of the former. The purpose of this exercise is to test now whether 
inflation Granger-cause money supply. Eqs. (A. 1) to (A. 4) are then transformed to reflect 
changes of the treatments of variables , rand mi, resulting into the corresponding eqs. (A-5) 
to (A. 8), presented below. Needless to say, this is a tantamount to testing the null 
hypothesis, Ho: C(L) = 0. 
mi't = co + D(L) mi, t + et 
(A. 5) 
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FPE(d) : -- (T+d+ I) I (T-d- 1) * SSR(aý/ T (A. 6) 
where d is the order of lag(s) of the one-dimensional autoregressive money supply process 
varying from I to x, and d which yield the smallest 
FPE is chosen and denoted as FPE(d*)- 
mi,,: = co + D(L) mi,, + C(L)174 + e, (A. 7) 
FPE(d*, 
c): = (T+d*+c+1) I (T-d*-c- 1) * SSRýd*, c)/ 
T (A. 8) 
Once again, d* is the optimum number of lags 
for mi, t, computed from (A. 6), and c 
is the 
order of lag(s) varying from I to x, where the c, which yields 
the smallest FPE, is denoted 
as c*, as practiced above. 
The order of the one-dimensional autoregressive process of mt, 
obtained by using the 
FPE(d*) criterion in (A. 6) is compared with the corresponding 
two-dimensional FPE(d *, c) 
obtained from (A. 8). If the former is less than the 
latter, one-dimensional autoregressive 
representation for mi is used. This is equivalent to the acceptance 
of the null hypothesis, Ho: 
C(L) = 0. If the converse is true, we say inflation 
Granger-causes money supply (; r=> m), 
and the optimal model for predicting mi is the one 
including d* lagged values of mi and c* 
lagged Ir Naturally, this amounts to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis, Ho: C(L) = 
0. 
The combinations of the FPEs obtained 
from (A. 2), (A. 4), (A. 6), and (A. 8) in the 
Hsiao's (1981) procedure, leads to the distinction of the 
four theoretical cases of Granger- 
causality between money and inflation, as mentioned above: 
(i) unidirectional causality from m to IT 
(m =ý> /T) : 
FPE(a*, b*) <FPE(a*) and 
FPE(d*, 
c*) ýý'FPE(d*)ý or 
B(L) #0 and C(L) =- 0; 
unidirectional causality from ; Tto m 
(; T=: > m): 
FPE(d*, c*) ': 
' FPE(d*) and 
FPE(a*, 
b*)> 
FPE(a*)ý or C(L): # 0 and B(L) =: = 0; 
feedback or bilateral causality, from m to ;T and /T 
to m at the same time (m <ýý 
/# 
FPE(a*, b*) <ý FPE(a*) and 
FPE(d*, c*) 
< FPE(d*), or B(L) #0 and C(L) # 
0; and 
(iv) independence - no causality from m 
to /Tnor vice versa 
(m <#> /# 
FPE(a*, b*) > 
FPE(a*) and FPE(d*, c*) 
>FPE(d*) or B(L) =0 and C(L) =: 
0. 
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From a practical point of view, or from the standpoint of a Policy maker, only variables 
satisfying conditions in (i) and (ii) above, may be utilized as intermediate targets, via the 
instrument variables, for controlling the goal variable. 120 In Other words, for a measure to 
be useful as an intermediate target, in addition to being correlated with a goal variable as 
well as reasonably controllable by policyrnakers, It should also have the feature of being 
"exogenous" or causally prior to the goal variable and have no significant feedback from 
the goal variable. Thus, for a variable to be useful as a policy target, unidirectional 
causation from it to the goal variable is a necessary condition, though not necessarily 
sufficient. That is not the case in (iii) and (Iv) above because variables in these two cases 
are not exogenous. 
Finally, in step five of Hsio's procedure, we combine all single equations specifications 
in order to identify the system. We pay a particular attention at the direction of causality as 
outlined in the four cases above. Thus, if for example, the goal variable is chosen to be /T' 
then the usefulness of mi as a policy target rests on the direction of causality with the goal 
variable ;T 
Analogous formula for the BEC criteria, in the univariate distributed lag case, described 
f IIOWS: 121 by (A. 1), can be expressed as 0 
SSRýa) / T+(aSSRý, )/ T In 7) 1 (T-x- 1) (A. 9) 
where the variables are as described above, and the minimum BEC correspond to the 
optimal lag lengths (a*). The formula could be modified in a straightforward manner to 
account for the bivariate distributed lag case for both aggregates of money supply. 
120 Depending on the choice of the goal variable, only one of these two cases could 
be utilised; i. e., if 
the inflation rate (, rý were a goal variable, then only mi in case (i) (unidirectional causality 
from mi to T) could 
be utilised as a policy target. 
12 1 For further details see Jones (1989) or Geweke and Meese (1981). 
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